關於 autonomy definition ，我們在網路上蒐集到這些相關的討論、資訊與評價

Jenna Cody :

Is Taiwan a real China?
No, and with the exception of a few intervening decades - here’s the part that’ll surprise you - it never has been.

This’ll blow your mind too: that it never has been doesn’t matter.

So let’s start with what doesn’t actually matter.

Until the 1600s, Taiwan was indigenous. Indigenous Taiwanese are not Chinese, they’re Austronesian. Then it was a Dutch colony (note: I do not say “it was Dutch”, I say it was a Dutch colony). Then it was taken over by Ming loyalists at the end of the Ming dynasty (the Ming loyalists were breakaways, not a part of the new Qing court. Any overlap in Ming rule and Ming loyalist conquest of Taiwan was so brief as to be inconsequential).

Only then, in the late 1600s, was it taken over by the Chinese (Qing). But here’s the thing, it was more like a colony of the Qing, treated as - to use Emma Teng’s wording in Taiwan’s Imagined Geography - a barrier or barricade keeping the ‘real’ Qing China safe. In fact, the Qing didn’t even want Taiwan at first, the emperor called it “a ball of mud beyond the pale of civilization”. Prior to that, and to a great extent at that time, there was no concept on the part of China that Taiwan was Chinese, even though Chinese immigrants began moving to Taiwan under Dutch colonial rule (mostly encouraged by the Dutch, to work as laborers). When the Spanish landed in the north of Taiwan, it was the Dutch, not the Chinese, who kicked them out.

Under Qing colonial rule - and yes, I am choosing my words carefully - China only controlled the Western half of Taiwan. They didn’t even have maps for the eastern half. That’s how uninterested in it they were. I can’t say that the Qing controlled “Taiwan”, they only had power over part of it.

Note that the Qing were Manchu, which at the time of their conquest had not been a part of China: China itself essentially became a Manchu imperial holding, and Taiwan did as well, once they were convinced it was not a “ball of mud” but actually worth taking. Taiwan was not treated the same way as the rest of “Qing China”, and was not administered as a province until (I believe) 1887. So that’s around 200 years of Taiwan being a colony of the Qing.

What happened in the late 19th century to change China’s mind? Japan. A Japanese ship was shipwrecked in eastern Taiwan in the 1870s, and the crew was killed by hostile indigenous people in what is known as the Mudan Incident. A Japanese emissary mission went to China to inquire about what could be done, only to be told that China had no control there and if they went to eastern Taiwan, they did so at their own peril. China had not intended to imply that Taiwan wasn’t theirs, but they did. Japan - and other foreign powers, as France also attempted an invasion - were showing an interest in Taiwan, so China decided to cement its claim, started mapping the entire island, and made it a province.

So, I suppose for a decade or so Taiwan was a part of China. A China that no longer exists.

It remained a province until 1895, when it was ceded to Japan after the (first) Sino-Japanese War. Before that could happen, Taiwan declared itself a Republic, although it was essentially a Qing puppet state (though the history here is interesting - correspondence at the time indicates that the leaders of this ‘Republic of Taiwan’ considered themselves Chinese, and the tiger flag hints at this as well. However, the constitution was a very republican document, not something you’d expect to see in Qing-era China.) That lasted for less than a year, when the Japanese took it by force.

This is important for two reasons - the first is that some interpretations of IR theory state that when a colonial holding is released, it should revert to the state it was in before it was taken as a colony. In this case, that would actually be The Republic of Taiwan, not Qing-era China. Secondly, it puts to rest all notions that there was no Taiwan autonomy movement prior to 1947.

In any case, it would be impossible to revert to its previous state, as the government that controlled it - the Qing empire - no longer exists. The current government of China - the PRC - has never controlled it.

After the Japanese colonial era, there is a whole web of treaties and agreements that do not satisfactorily settle the status of Taiwan. None of them actually do so - those which explicitly state that Taiwan is to be given to the Republic of China (such as the Cairo declaration) are non-binding. Those that are binding do not settle the status of Taiwan (neither the treaty of San Francisco nor the Treaty of Taipei definitively say that Taiwan is a part of China, or even which China it is - the Treaty of Taipei sets out what nationality the Taiwanese are to be considered, but that doesn’t determine territorial claims). Treaty-wise, the status of Taiwan is “undetermined”.

Under more modern interpretations, what a state needs to be a state is…lessee…a contiguous territory, a government, a military, a currency…maybe I’m forgetting something, but Taiwan has all of it. For all intents and purposes it is independent already.

In fact, in the time when all of these agreements were made, the Allied powers weren’t as sure as you might have learned about what to do with Taiwan. They weren’t a big fan of Chiang Kai-shek, didn’t want it to go Communist, and discussed an Allied trusteeship (which would have led to independence) or backing local autonomy movements (which did exist). That it became what it did - “the ROC” but not China - was an accident (as Hsiao-ting Lin lays out in Accidental State).

In fact, the KMT knew this, and at the time the foreign minister (George Yeh) stated something to the effect that they were aware they were ‘squatters’ in Taiwan.

Since then, it’s true that the ROC claims to be the rightful government of Taiwan, however, that hardly matters when considering the future of Taiwan simply because they have no choice. To divest themselves of all such claims (and, presumably, change their name) would be considered by the PRC to be a declaration of formal independence. So that they have not done so is not a sign that they wish to retain the claim, merely that they wish to avoid a war.

It’s also true that most Taiwanese are ethnically “Han” (alongside indigenous and Hakka, although Hakka are, according to many, technically Han…but I don’t think that’s relevant here). But biology is not destiny: what ethnicity someone is shouldn’t determine what government they must be ruled by.

Through all of this, the Taiwanese have evolved their own culture, identity and sense of history. They are diverse in a way unique to Taiwan, having been a part of Austronesian and later Hoklo trade routes through Southeast Asia for millenia. Now, one in five (I’ve heard one in four, actually) Taiwanese children has a foreign parent. The Taiwanese language (which is not Mandarin - that’s a KMT transplant language forced on Taiwanese) is gaining popularity as people discover their history. Visiting Taiwan and China, it is clear where the cultural differences are, not least in terms of civic engagement. This morning, a group of legislators were removed after a weekend-long pro-labor hunger strike in front of the presidential palace. They were not arrested and will not be. Right now, a group of pro-labor protesters is lying down on the tracks at Taipei Main Station to protest the new labor law amendments.

This would never be allowed in China, but Taiwanese take it as a fiercely-guarded basic right.

*

Now, as I said, none of this matters.

What matters is self-determination. If you believe in democracy, you believe that every state (and Taiwan does fit the definition of a state) that wants to be democratic - that already is democratic and wishes to remain that way - has the right to self-determination. In fact, every nation does. You cannot be pro-democracy and also believe that it is acceptable to deprive people of this right, especially if they already have it.

Taiwan is already a democracy. That means it has the right to determine its own future. Period.

Even under the ROC, Taiwan was not allowed to determine its future. The KMT just arrived from China and claimed it. The Taiwanese were never asked if they consented. What do we call it when a foreign government arrives in land they had not previously governed and declares itself the legitimate governing power of that land without the consent of the local people? We call that colonialism.

Under this definition, the ROC can also be said to be a colonial power in Taiwan. They forced Mandarin - previously not a language native to Taiwan - onto the people, taught Chinese history, geography and culture, and insisted that the Taiwanese learn they were Chinese - not Taiwanese (and certainly not Japanese). This was forced on them. It was not chosen. Some, for awhile, swallowed it. Many didn’t. The independence movement only grew, and truly blossomed after democratization - something the Taiwanese fought for and won, not something handed to them by the KMT.

So what matters is what the Taiwanese want, not what the ROC is forced to claim. I cannot stress this enough - if you do not believe Taiwan has the right to this, you do not believe in democracy.

And poll after poll shows it: Taiwanese identify more as Taiwanese than Chinese (those who identify as both primarily identify as Taiwanese, just as I identify as American and Armenian, but primarily as American. Armenian is merely my ethnicity). They overwhelmingly support not unifying with China. The vast majority who support the status quo support one that leads to eventual de jure independence, not unification. The status quo is not - and cannot be - an endgame (if only because China has declared so, but also because it is untenable). Less than 10% want unification. Only a small number (a very small minority) would countenance unification in the future…even if China were to democratize.

The issue isn’t the incompatibility of the systems - it’s that the Taiwanese fundamentally do not see themselves as Chinese.

A change in China’s system won’t change that. It’s not an ethnic nationalism - there is no ethnic argument for Taiwan (or any nation - didn’t we learn in the 20th century what ethnicity-based nation-building leads to? Nothing good). It’s not a jingoistic or xenophobic nationalism - Taiwanese know that to be dangerous. It’s a nationalism based on shared identity, culture, history and civics. The healthiest kind of nationalism there is. Taiwan exists because the Taiwanese identify with it. Period.

There are debates about how long the status quo should go on, and what we should risk to insist on formal recognition. However, the question of whether or not to be Taiwan, not China…

…well, that’s already settled.

The Taiwanese have spoken and they are not Chinese.

Whatever y’all think about that doesn’t matter. That’s what they want, and if you believe in self-determination you will respect it.

If you don’t, good luck with your authoritarian nonsense, but Taiwan wants nothing to do with it.

【My message to world leaders and foreign companies】

在美國國務卿向國會表明，他不再視香港擁有自治以後，以下是我撰予全球元首以及企業領袖的信息：

The security law carries massive implementations to ex-pats and investors working and living in Hong Kong. The law will completely change the human rights standards and business environment of this global financial centre, which affects European business interests in the city and leads to democratic backlashes in the region.

In the past, Hong Kong has firewalls to fend off the political influence from China, such as guarantees of human rights protections, an independent judiciary and loose business regulations. These are the reasons why businesses choose Hong Kong as the destination of investment.

However, the law will profoundly erode the city’s firewalls, especially when a Beijing-led secret police branch is to be set up, and when Beijing’s broad definition of national security is imposed. In the past, China treated stock markets and the flow of capital as part of its national security. The proposed law is the stepping stone for its future intervention.

In order to protect the business interest in the city, especially those choosing Hong Kong as the regional headquarters, it is crucial for companies to voice out and oppose the passing of the law. To maintain the autonomy status of Hong Kong is the only way to maintain business interest.

Therefore, I call upon world leaders jointly express opposition against the new law. Since the security law is hugely controversial, there must be full legislative scrutiny and public consultation. I also urge US, European and Asia’s leaders to reconsider whether Hongkong’s special trade status can still be held since, once the law is implemented, Hong Kong will be assimilated into China’s authoritarian regime, on both rule of law and human rights protections.

【#TheDiplomat: 沈旭暉隨緣家書英文版🇭🇰】很久沒有向國際關係評論網 The Diplomat 供稿，但國際線十分重要，不應放棄。這次他們希望分享23條、國安法、反恐法風雨欲來的「新香港」前瞻，願國際社會能多了解快將出現的危機：

While the world is preoccupied with a fight against the COVID-19 pandemic, Beijing has been tightening its political grip on all aspects of Hong Kong’s civil society. Rumor has it that Beijing will push through legislating national security laws under Article 23 of Hong Kong’s Basic Law by unconventional means, such as massively disqualifying pro-democratic legislators or even directly applying a national law, widely argued as a major step to destroy the rights and freedom of Hong Kongers, and bring Chinese authoritarianism to Hong Kong.

After the 2019 protests, the administration of Carrie Lam, who theoretically is still leading the special administrative region of China, has little political capital at stake, with its legitimacy reaching rock bottom. The pro-government camp has dwindling prospects for the city’s upcoming Legislative Council election. The government‘s ”nothing to lose“ mentality is apparent from its recent blatant reinterpretation of the Basic Law’s Article 22 (another article that limits the influence of China’s offices in Hong Kong’s internal affairs). The debate is nothing new, but the pressure this time is quite different.

This article highlights the different strategies Beijing could adopt to enact Article 23 insidiously or under disguise to avoid backlash from the international community, while continuing to reap benefits from the city’s globally recognized special status. This seems to be part of Beijing’s brinkmanship to bring Hong Kong protesters and their supporters to their knees and move the city closer to authoritarianism. To counter these moves, Hong Kongers must define the boundaries beyond which Hong Kong falls into authoritarian rule and make a case as to why the city’s downfall is detrimental to the international community‘s interest.

The Long-Term Controversy Over National Security Laws

Back in 2003, the implementation of Article 23 was thwarted by the moderate pro-establishment politician James Tien. In face of overwhelming public disapproval of the law, he withdrew support and votes from his Liberal Party. However, 17 years later, it is hard to imagine Beijing following the old legislative playbook: start with a public consultation, followed by public discourse and political debate, and end with the majority rule. This playbook only works in peaceful societies ruled by a trustworthy government with integrity.

The aftermath of 2003, as well as the 2019 protests, should have taught Beijing and the Hong Kong government a lesson: pushing through national security legislation in a flawed parliament controlled by the minority pro-government camp would inevitably set off another full city-scale protest — and undoubtedly more fierce and focused this time. Given the current government’s numerous displays of dishonesty, it is conceivable that they will embark on a less-traveled path to implement Article 23.

Strategy One: “Anti-Terrorism”

In principle, one possible strategy could be to directly enact Chinese national law across Hong Kong, which can be achieved by declaring a state of emergency in the city. However, this is risky business as it would tarnish the integrity of “one country two systems” and subsequently Hong Kong’s international standing. Beijing, a risk-averse regime, is also unwilling to see Hong Kong’s status as a middleman for laundering money disappear into thin air.

Instead, Beijing could be concocting a narrative that would see Chinese national law applied to Hong Kong while not damaging Hong Kong’s international standing and Beijing’s own interests. The key word in this script is “anti-terrorism.” As early as 2014, pro-Beijing scholars have been claiming the emergence of “local terrorist ideology” on Hong Kong soil. Since the anti-extradition bill protests last year, government rhetoric frequently described the protests, which caused no deaths at all in the entire year, with phrases like “inclination to terrorist ideology.” That was a signal to the world that Hong Kong’s internal conflicts had ballooned into a national security issue. This gives the government the legitimacy to justify the implementation of Chinese national laws across the highly autonomous region to counter terrorism. The Chinese government knows that if it can persuade the world that terrorism exists in Hong Kong, and that it is as severe as the terror threat facing many other nations today, the international community will be less critical of Beijing’s actions in Hong Kong. Enacting Chinese laws directly is a convenient path that will save Beijing from having to tackle Hong Kong’s internal conflicts, basically turning the Hong Kong issue into a nonissue.

Strategy Two: Stacking the Legislature by Disqualifying Candidates

An even bolder strategy was probably foretold by a recent incident where the Hong Kong government and Beijing’s agencies for Hong Kong affairs (HKMAO and the Liaison Office) jointly criticized lawmaker Dennis Kwok for filibustering, framing it as “misconduct in public office” and “violating his oath.” It is incomprehensible to claim that filibustering goes against a lawmaker’s main duty; rather, it is common understanding that legislative work includes debating the law and representing public opinion against unreasonable laws. In a parliament controlled by the minority, pro-democratic members representing the majority of Hong Kongers are forced to express their objections using means like filibustering. Wouldn’t a lack of different political opinions turn the legislative branch into a rubber-stamp institution?

The above allegation has set a dangerous precedent for twisting the logic behind a certain provision in the Basic Law to target opposing lawmakers. In other words, to fulfill Beijing’s interpretation of the principal requirement for holding public office in Hong Kong, one could be required to take a meticulously legalistic approach to uphold the Basic Law down to its every single wording. A public official, by this new definition, not only needs to support “one country, two systems” or object Hong Kong independence, but also must abide by every single provision in the Basic Law. Worst of all, based on the previous cases, whether an official’s words or actions oversteps a provision is up to Beijing’s interpretation of his/her “intent.”

If this approach is applied, in the next election, there might be additional official questions for screening candidates like the following: “The Basic Law states that the enactment of Article 23 is a constitutional duty. Failing to support Article 23 legislation violates the Basic Law. Do you support it?” This question would suffice to disqualify even moderate or even pro-establishment candidates like James Tien. Even if any pro-democratic candidates were elected, once Article 23 re-enters the legislative process, they could risk ouster by raising objections.

Despite the absurdity of this tactic, the Chinese regime may just be tempted enough if such a strategy could resolve two of China’s current nuisances — voices of dissent in the Legislative Council and the previous failure to implement Article 23.

Strategy Three: The “Boiling Frog Effect”

Article 23 is not yet implemented, but the dystopian world that the protesters pictured in 2003 is already becoming reality. Regular citizens have been persecuted for “sedition” for sharing their views on social media or participating in legal protests; workers face retaliation for taking part in strikes; corporations are pressured to publicly side with the government’s stance; employees who have the “wrong” political views are fired; schools have been closely monitored for teaching material; protest-supporting fundraisers were framed for money laundering; a retweet or like may lead to persecution, under a colonial-era law. Only now have Hong Kongers woken up to their new reality — although the Basic Law technically protects citizens’ rights to speak, rally, march, demonstrate, and go on strike, the government could enfeeble civil rights by bending antiquated laws and legal provisions. The frequent abuse of law enforcement power on a small scale, such as improper arrests and police violence, is desensitizing the public and the international community. In a few years, Hong Kong will become unrecognizable. This is indeed a clever play on Beijing’s part to slowly strip away Hong Kong’s autonomy and freedom, without causing much international attention.

Counter-Strategies Against Beijing’s Brinkmanship

Beijing’s overarching goal is to hollow out Hong Kong but, at the same time, avoid major backlash from the international community, which could spell the end of the privileged global status of Hong Kong not granted to other Chinese cities. Beijing also aims at preventing single incidents that could cascade down into mass protests as seen in 2003, 2014, and 2019; and eliminating any resistance forces from within Hong Kong’s legislature. The tactics outlined above are typical in a game of brinkmanship.

In response, Hong Kongers in Hong Kong and on the so-called “international frontline” must know their strengths and bargaining chips on this negotiating table with Beijing.

Unlike Xinjiang and Tibet, Hong Kong is a city with transparency and free flow of information. Hong Kongers need to make a case to the world that the protests are not acts of terrorism. Some suggestions include comparing the Hong Kong protests to similar struggles in 20 or so other counties in the world at the present time, none of which were classified as terrorism; collecting a large amount of concrete evidence of the disproportionate use of force by the Hong Kong police; and showing how enacting Chinese national laws in Hong Kong will end the city’s autonomy and spell disaster for international community‘s interests.

The Legislative Council is the institution that can counteract Beijing’s “boiling frog” strategy and to keep Hong Kongers’ hope alive in the system. Those who plan to run for legislative office must be prepared to be disqualified from running. If only individuals are banned, there need to be alternative candidates as back-up plans. However, if and when the disqualification process is applied broadly to entire camps of candidates (for example, all who object to Article 23), the pro-democracy camp must make a strong case to the Hong Kong and global public that this is the endgame for Hong Kong democracy. Then the incumbent popularly elected legislators will hold the internationally recognized mandate from the public and serve as the last resistance.

These recommendations delineates how the slogan “if we burn, you burn with us,” often seen in the protests, may play out in the game of international relations. If the national security laws are “passed” by a legislature that is jury-rigged in this manner, or if related national laws are directly implemented in Hong Kong, Hong Kongers should signal clearly to the world that it goes way beyond the promised “one country, two systems.” Crossing this red line by Beijing should be seen by the world as a blunt violation of its promised autonomy to Hong Kongers. At that time, if the international community led by the United States and the United Kingdom decided to revoke the “non-sovereignty entity” status of Hong Kong and regard the SAR as an ordinary Chinese city, it shouldn’t come as a surprise.

Dr. Simon Shen is the Founding Chairman of GLOs (Glocal Learning Offices), an international relations start-up company. He also serves as an adjunct associate professor in the University of Hong Kong, Chinese University of Hong Kong and the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, and associate director of the Master of Global Political Economy Programme of the CUHK. The author acknowledges Jean Lin, Coco Ho, Chris Wong, Michelle King, and Alex Yap for their assistance in this piece.

▶️ 高度自治 vs 全面管治
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pwt8wZl8jHQ