關於 militant democracy ，我們在網路上蒐集到這些相關的討論、資訊與評價

#Opinion by Joseph Long｜"If that failed to deter China from pushing forward its evil agenda on Hong Kong and Xinjiang, then the international community, relying on its China-proof technosphere and supply chain systems, would be able to consider the options of economic sanctions, or even an outright embargo."

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【#TheDiplomat🌍】難得The Diplomat讀者對香港有興趣：

The series of iron-fisted moves last month in Hong Kong may seem sudden to international observers: Hong Kong government’s earlier reinterpretation of the China-Hong Kong relationship, the election of a pro-Beijing legislator to be a Legislative Council chair through a controversial mechanism, and Beijing’s recent decision to impose a national security law on Hong Kong. The desire to bring Hong Kong under the banner of “one country, one system” is not impulsive. Quite the contrary, it’s a calculated campaign to initiate a so-called “second reunification with Hong Kong” — since the first reunification after the handover, using a lenient soft-power approach, has supposedly failed.

What are Beijing’s calculations that motivate this bold campaign now? And more important, will the campaign work?

While I remain highly skeptical of solely applying the realist framework to study Hong Kong, Beijing’s mentality is nonetheless entirely realism-driven. It is therefore essential to use this lens to understand more of their thoughts.

COVID-19: A Golden Opportunity on the International Stage?

To start with, the coronavirus pandemic seems to have created an ideal backdrop for Beijing to push forward its iron-fisted policy toward Hong Kong. The West has been devastated by the pandemic, more so than China, and has been slower to recover economically. Instead of decoupling from China, Beijing thinks the West is desperate for an influx of Chinese capital and markets. This notion encourages Beijing to pursue brinkmanship, in the form of confrontative “wolf warrior diplomacy,” its escalation of sharp power, and, most recently, Hong Kong’s national security law. As long as the international community does not put their condemnation into action, Beijing will keep pushing the envelope.

Beijing is convinced that the chambers of commerce representing other countries in Hong Kong will always place profits above all else as long as the national security law does not threaten them. Business deals struck at the crucial moment can entice foreign businesses to use their lobby teams in their home countries in Beijing’s favor.

Although anti-China sentiment has become more mainstream, Beijing, the major beneficiary of globalization in the past two decades, has tied its destiny with various elites internationally. These “friends of China” can be swayed to safeguard Beijing’s interests, but the up-and-coming leaders in many countries look less friendly. Therefore, the window of opportunity for Beijing to act is closing before the new value-driven generation comes to power.

The Lack of Incentive Behind the U.S. and U.K.’s Escalating Rhetoric

While U.S. politicians from left to right are vocal against China, their ultimate goal, Beijing believes, is to win votes in the November election. They would hence avoid hurting the interest groups they represent and go easy on actions aiming to punish China, such as denying Hong Kong’s status as a separate customs territory, sanctioning Chinese companies listed in Hong Kong, or escalating the trade war.

Even though the Trump administration is ramping up the rhetoric to sanction China, protecting Hong Kong’s autonomy is not one of the United States’ core interests. In contrast, having control over Hong Kong is China’s core interest. Beijing would rather make concessions over other disputes with Washington in exchange for claiming victory in Hong Kong for its internal propaganda.

Britain, the co-signer of the Joint Declaration for Hong Kong’s handover, is arguably most entitled to denounce Beijing’s violation, which would give mandates to the United States to act. But Beijing is convinced that Britain, not as powerful as it used to be, will not make such a move. Beijing’s recent plans to withdraw businesses from the United States and list them in the London stock market is a move to place a wedge between the two powers. U.S. President Donald Trump’s unilateralism and his harsh stance against U.S. allies also strengthens Beijing’s conviction that the West will not follow the United States’ lead.

Beijing’s Divide and Conquer Strategy in Hong Kong

Hong Kong’s parliament, the Legislative Council (LegCo), is a major roadblock to Beijing’s control, as demonstrated twice since the handover — in 2003 when the national security law was first introduced and in 2019 with the anti-extradition legislation that sparked city-wide protests. In both setbacks, Beijing lost control when moderate pro-establishment legislators broke away from the party line in the face of public outcry. As the September LegCo election approaches, the last thing Beijing wants is for the election to become a de facto referendum on the single issue of the national security law, which could result in another landslide win for the democratic parties. The law would be untenable to the international community if it’s opposed by both pro-democracy voters, which according to polls account for 60 percent of the votes, and moderate pro-establishment voters.

The moderates, despite their reluctance to embrace hardline rule in Hong Kong, differ from the more militant faction within the non-establishment camp in that the former rejects the so-called “mutual destruction” option, which risks Hong Kong’s special trade status — its economic lifeline — as a bargaining tactic to force Beijing to back off. Now that Washington is considering withdrawing Hong Kong’s privileges, the possibility of mutual destruction is becoming real. As Beijing has been promoting a narrative that all supporters of the protest movement’s “Five Demands” are bringing about mutual destruction, Beijing hopes the moderates, in fear of losing their financial assets, might turn toward the establishment.

On the other hand, the pro-democracy camp is at risk of breaking apart. Moderate pro-democracy supporters have been going to rallies to keep up with the political momentum. However, marches with more than a million participants would be impossible under the current oppressive environment. For example, the authorities abuse COVID-19 social distancing measures to suppress rallies, permits for peaceful protests are increasingly difficult to obtain, pro-establishment businesses heavily censored the social media activities of employees, and outspoken individuals are often cyberbullied.

Without support from the moderates, some within the pro-democracy camp may radicalize, as Beijing expects. The radicalization would fit Beijing’s tactic of painting protests as separatism and terrorism, justifying the imposition of the national security law. The trajectory would be similar to Beijing’s handling of the 1959 Tibetan “riots,” during which Mao Zedong’s directive was “the more chaotic the scene, the better.”

The Nationalistic Agenda to Divert Domestic Attention

But after all, to Beijing, Hong Kong is not just Hong Kong. In the wake of the pandemic, Beijing urgently needs to uphold nationalism to divert unwanted attention from its economic crisis. That includes a global propaganda campaign to promote its triumph over COVID-19. Upgrading the Hong Kong protests to a national security issue — as a battle against foreign interference to complete the “reunification with Hong Kong” — best suits the nationalist atmosphere. The all-time low sense of belonging with China among the new generation in Hong Kong further justifies a strong-arm approach. The success of the strategy would offer a way to reunite with Taiwan, which would consolidate Xi’s leadership within the Communist Party.

Also, including the Hong Kong issue as part of the national agenda means that the Hong Kong government, which has already lost its will to govern, will dance to Beijing’s tunes.

This comprehensive crackdown on Hong Kong’s civil society is unprecedented. Beijing believes that the heavy-handed approach would pervade Hong Kong with a sense of powerlessness and bring it to its knees. As long as the international response is limited, the execution of the national security law, according to Chairman Mao’s “theory of contradiction,” will follow a script of “a soft hand” and “a firm hand.” That is, after its imposition, the law will initially apply restraint and be used only on individuals to set a stern example, so that the general public would feel as if the law does not impact them at all and property and stock prices would not fall. Gradually and subtly, if the realist formula of Beijing works, the “second reunification” could become a self-proclaimed success story for Beijing’s propaganda.

However, Beijing’s evaluations are not foolproof. Any single miscalculation could lead to a contradictory outcome for the People’s Republic of China. Is it really prepared?

▶️ 國安法：中國的現實主義框架
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HjhRbV8qTgo
⏺ 中美夏威夷峰會
https://www.patreon.com/posts/38378214

#當代自由民主的焦慮

你是否曾為臺灣的民主自由感到驕傲？但是否也曾焦慮？有亡國感？

本院法律所蘇彥圖副研究員在本期中研院訊的專欄要跟大家聊聊當代自由民主人（liberal democrats）面臨的二重集體焦慮：
　　
　　　　
😬民主衰亡的焦慮😬
　　
（反多元的）民粹主義、金權政治、虛假訊息、社群媒體的武器化、威權國家的銳實力干涉、政治極化與政黨惡鬥――這些都是我們目前已知的常見民主威脅。

......近來備受關注的虛假訊息、廉價言論（cheap speech）乃至新陰謀主義（the new conspiracism），還可能根本掏空了民主決策的理性認知基礎，讓民主社群連「#本於事實與常識的公共議論」如此基本的要求，都不可及。

在民主的諸多威脅中，政治極化似乎尤其危險，因為政治對立的升高與激化，一來可能會增加民主崩潰的風險，二來可能會增加有權者透過操控民主遊戲規則來維持政權的風險。在後者這種情形，憲政社群即使還有定期選舉之形，只怕已無自由而公平的選舉之實。
　　　　
　　　
😬民主防衛的焦慮😬

自由民主並不是第一次遭遇「利用自由反自由」、「利用民主反民主」的顛覆威脅﹔晚近許多論者，也嘗試從過往民主覆亡的歷史經驗中，汲取教訓。不過，主要是從納粹顛覆德國威瑪共和的慘痛經驗中發展出來而試圖以法律手段限制、排除民主社群之內部敵人的戰鬥民主（militant democracy），似乎依然備受議論，也無從解消當代的自由民主人在如何防衛民主這件事情上的焦慮。

像是違憲政黨禁止、仇恨言論（hate speech）管制這類強度干預人民政治自由與參政權的傳統民主防衛措施，往往不是極易被規避而形同具文，就是容易陷於反應過度或者「只能打蒼蠅、不敢打老虎」的執行困境。

更讓人擔憂的是，威權民粹主義者往往就是以「民主受到威脅、需要防衛」為由，箝制特定少數群體或者反對者的自由。即使暫不考慮民主防衛措施本身被自由民主的敵人所顛覆與惡用的風險，戰鬥的自由民主人也必須深思，以各種禁制措施強力防衛民主的結果，是否反而縮短了自由民主與威權的距離。
　　　
　　　
📖全文：https://ppt.cc/fp79xx
　　　　
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👁延伸閱讀：緣分到了，臺灣就會更民主？──蘇彥圖的民主改革政治研究
http://research.sinica.edu.tw/su-yen-tu-politics-of-democr…/

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🙏訂閱中研院訊，中研院精彩專欄／暑期活動／研討會／科普演講不錯過
https://newsletter.sinica.edu.tw/