關於 principle of respect for autonomy ，我們在網路上蒐集到這些相關的討論、資訊與評價

咦咦咦，咁既？

G7，加埋日本都咁講啵。
點算？

We strongly urge the Government of China to re-consider this decision. 啵～ ～ ～

～～～～～～～～～～～～

香港に関するG7声明

我々，米国，カナダ，フランス，ドイツ，イタリア，日本，英国の外務大臣及びEU上級代表は，香港に関する国家安全法を制定するとの中国の決定に関し，重大な懸念を強調する。

中国による決定は，香港基本法，及び，法的拘束力を有して国連に登録されている英中共同声明の諸原則の下での中国の国際的コミットメントと合致しないものである。提案されている国家安全法は，「一国二制度」の原則や香港の高度の自治を深刻に損なうおそれがある。この決定は香港を長年にわたり繁栄させ，成功させたシステムを危うくすることとなる。

開かれた討議，利害関係者との協議，そして香港において保護される権利や自由の尊重が不可欠である。

また，我々は，この行動が法の支配や独立した司法システムの存在により保護される全ての人民の基本的権利や自由を抑制し，脅かすことになると著しい懸念を有する。

我々は中国政府がこの決定を再考するよう強く求める。

（English)

We, the Foreign Ministers of the United States, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the High Representative of the European Union underscore our grave concern regarding China’s decision to impose a national security law on Hong Kong.

China’s decision is not in conformity with the Hong Kong Basic Law and its international commitments under the principles of the legally binding, UN-registered Sino-British Joint Declaration. The proposed national security law would risk seriously undermining the “One Country, Two Systems” principle and the territory’s high degree of autonomy. It would jeopardize the system which has allowed Hong Kong to flourish and made it a success over many years.

Open debate, consultation with stakeholders, and respect for protected rights and freedoms in Hong Kong are essential.

We are also extremely concerned that this action would curtail and threaten the fundamental rights and freedoms of all the population protected by the rule of law and the existence of an independent justice system.

We strongly urge the Government of China to re-consider this decision.

在歐盟工作的朋友，剛剛發給我這個由 27 個成員國譜寫的聲明，也跟我說了，他們對早前刊登在China Daily文章被刪走「病毒來自中國」一句十分不滿，而歐盟現時仍最重視中英聯合聲明；對於今次的國安法，現在仍靜候機會與美國聯手出擊。

我跟他說，但願歐盟不會讓香港小市民失望。

https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2020/05/22/declaration-by-the-high-representative-on-behalf-of-the-european-union-on-the-announcement-by-china-s-national-people-s-congress-spokesperson-regarding-hong-kong/

//The EU considers that democratic debate, consultation of key stakeholders, and respect for protected rights and freedoms in Hong Kong would represent the best way of proceeding with the adoption of national security legislation, as foreseen in Article 23 of the Basic Law, while also upholding Hong Kong’s autonomy and the ‘One Country Two Systems’ principle.

The EU will continue to follow developments closely.//

(在《紐約時報》談雨傘革命五周年)

【Hong Kong and the Independence Movement That Doesn’t Know Itself】

The protesters are more radical than they realize. Just like during the 2014 Umbrella Revolution.

By Lewis Lau Yiu-man

HONG KONG — Exactly five years ago, the Umbrella Movement broke out to demand respect for Hong Kong’s democratic freedoms. After it ended, having obtained no concessions from the local government or the Chinese authorities, political time accelerated in the city.

Two years later, social unrest erupted after a scuffle between the police and street hawkers and their supporters, who came to the sellers’ defense in the name of protecting Hong Kong traditions. Pro-democracy candidates were prevented from running in legislative elections or disqualified after winning seats on grounds that they hadn’t displayed enough loyalty toward the state or the notion that Hong Kong is an inalienable part of China. A political party advocating independence for Hong Kong was formed, then disbanded by the government. Feelings toward mainland China hardened. Hong Kong had long had a pro-democracy camp before 2014, but, in a way, the Umbrella Movement was the beginning of everything.

That’s because — want it or not, know it or not — the Umbrella Movement planted the seed of separatism in the city. I don’t mean that the idea was entirely new: There had been some proponents of localism, at the margins. And I don’t mean that separatism is now the order of the day: Most Hong Kongers who fight for democracy today would probably say that they simply want the proper implementation of our Basic Law, or mini-Constitution, and the “One Country, Two Systems” principle that is supposed to protect the city’s semi-autonomy from the mainland. I mean that the Umbrella Movement was, in fact, an independence movement — but an independence movement that didn’t know itself.

On Aug. 31, 2014 — the date, instantly infamous, lives on as “8/31” — Beijing issued a white paper setting out its vision of how to apply “One Country, Two Systems” to elections in Hong Kong. The document stated that the city’s next leader, or chief executive, would be elected by the public — but only after Beijing preselected the candidates through a nominating committee. The goal of such vetting seemed plain: to prevent the rise to power of a chief executive who might oppose or resist Beijing’s will.

Some scholars ridiculed this proposal as an “Iranian-style rigged system.” Many Hong Kongers opposed it, denouncing it as “fake democracy,” and instead started calling for “true democracy” and “real universal suffrage.” Five years later, “true democracy” is again a prominent slogan of the pro-democracy protesters, one of their five core demands. And though by now it may seem familiar, it is no less radical today than it was then.

Many Hong Kongers don’t seem to realize this, but we have been building a distinct Hong Kong nation — we have been nation-building — since the Umbrella Revolution.

Calls for real democracy aren’t just calls for general elections and universal suffrage; they are calls for general elections and universal suffrage without any intervention from Beijing. But for the Chinese authorities, the “One Country, Two Systems” principle isn’t some version of federalism; Hong Kong has no sovereignty of its own.

For them, never mind this principle or the Basic Law: China has the right to intervene in Hong Kong’s political affairs; in fact, that right is built into the system.

Some Chinese officials might even say that the mainland’s approach to the city is no different than a mother’s toward her child. There seems to be a consensus about all this in Beijing, as well as an expectation that Hong Kongers must share this understanding, too. Except that they don’t, or fewer and fewer of them do.

And so from Beijing’s perspective, when pro-democracy protesters and their supporters reject what it perceives as its right to intervene here, they are challenging its very sovereignty. In this, at least, Beijing is correct. It knows what many Hong Kongers don’t seem to have fully appreciated: Admit it or not, we are actually rejecting Chinese sovereignty — we are already an independence movement in disguise. And it all started with the Umbrella Movement.

In their notorious 8/31 white paper, the Chinese authorities in Beijing put forward that they had 全面管治權 over Hong Kong, roughly: the “all-inclusive power to govern, no holds barred.” The autonomy enjoyed by the special administrative region is not a given; it is given, or granted, by Beijing. Being told this angered many Hong Kongers, especially those longing for universal suffrage and those who had expected China to act as a responsible ruler and keep the promises it made, including in the Basic Law, for years to come. They saw Beijing’s declaration as an undue attempt to expand its power over Hong Kong, and they made a counter-declaration, in effect, setting out an entirely different vision for the city’s future.

Sep. 28, 2014 is now seen as the day that officially marks the beginning of the Umbrella Movement, and what happened on that day is that a bunch of people who opposed Beijing’s plans for Hong Kong, many of them students, rushed out the city’s main roads, bypassing the adults’ and elites’ own plans, and began occupying the streets in protest. Although they weren’t calling for Hong Kong’s independence then, they already were, perhaps without realizing it, rejecting the Beijing Consensus.

The Umbrella Movement also contained the political DNA of today’s next-generation protesters. It, too, had factions, internal struggles and disagreements over tactics. Benny Tai Yiu-ting, an academic who had been advocating a kind of Occupy operation in Central, a business district, was forced to accept a modified version of his own idea after supporters of the student leader Joshua Wong scaled the gates of the Legislative Council in Admiralty, triggering the police crackdown that really kick-started the movement.

In the course of the 79-day occupation that followed, the sit-in in Admiralty turned into something like a village of mostly young people and adults acting as chaperones of sorts. (A tented library was set up so that students could cram for exams.) But there was a second power center: the camps in Mong Kok, a working-class area, which gathered an older and more mixed crowd. Already back then, the protests’ metabolism ran on decentralization.

The Umbrella Movement was also the initial stage of the “do not split” ethos that binds protesters together today: If you disagree with a proposed action, sit it out, but don’t get in its way. Protesters got used to there being different modes of action in 2014, and that paved the way for an even more flexible, pragmatic approach that people follow now.

There were divergences of views between, say, Benny Tai and Joshua Wong and between the protesters in Admiralty and those in Mong Kok, but everyone was in the same fight together, on the side of democracy. Five years later, the notion that this cohesion, built around our aspirations and identity, extends beyond our differences has only grown stronger. And so has our hunger for self-determination. Even the people who aren’t calling for outright independence are part of an independence movement. The Umbrella Movement was the first battle in the clash of Chinese civilization.