關於 reported speech today ，我們在網路上蒐集到這些相關的討論、資訊與評價

【大使館發言人批評意大利國會邀請我作聽證 外交部長反駁斥捍衛言論自由】

感謝意大利國會議員邀請，日前我藉視像通話方式，參與意大利國會外交及人權委員會的聽證會，呼籲意大利支持香港實現民主普選，停止出口衝鋒車予香港警察，亦鼓勵他們參考《香港人權民主法案》醞釀制裁機制。

聽證結束以後，本來當地關注尚算有限，但中國駐意大利使館發言人高調發表聲明批評意大利國會議員「執意與黃之鋒搞視頻通話，為港獨分子撐腰」，就令到香港議題再度進佔輿論版面。

根據「中國外交Bingo紙」，聲明內文中了至少9個關鍵詞，包括斥我「竭力 #顛倒黑白，#美化暴力，詆毁一國兩制……是個徹頭徹尾的港獨 #跳樑小丑」，還有「#極其錯誤、#不負責任」，表示 #強烈不滿、#堅決反對，呼籲有關人士 #尊重主權（？？？），多做有利中意友好與合作事宜，這只反映中國外交系統何等「玻璃心」。

據意大利記者告知，中國駐意大利大使館發言人的取態，導致意大利外交部長及國會議員先後回應，表明捍衛言論自由，反對中國政府阻礙交流；同時，政界與傳媒亦深深體會到中共威權擴張的可怕，相信此舉只會有助香港令國際社會明白，為何與香港同行就是捍衛自由。

作用曾遭中共駐多國使館均曾批評人士，我已對一切批評見怪不怪，也由衷感謝中國外交系統的批評，往往本來聽證會也沒有甚麼關注，但只要大使館發言批評，就令到香港議題再度進佔輿論版面。我會繼續努力，讓世界看見香港，與香港同行。

最後，附上自己的國會發言全文給各位細閱：

Thursday, 28 November 2019
Italy Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Testimony by Joshua Wong

Good afternoon,

May I first express our heartfelt gratitude to the Senate’s generous invitation to give testimony before the honourable Senators and Congressmen, even though I’m not allowed to fly to Italy. The very moment I was rejected by the court to travel, I felt that it was even worse than deciding my sentences in jail as I would not be able to meet with friends in Europe to explain our cause for democracy and freedom.

Implications of Local Election result

As you may aware of Hong Kong’s local election record-high turnout, almost 3 million Hong Kong people, in a community and policy-based election, had cast ballot to express our discontent to the government and huge distrust to the Beijing authorities. Democrats went up to 385 seats, but the largest pro-Beijing party DAB, who owned 119 seats in the last term, had reduced to 21 seats.

The significance of this election to the world is that HK's current political crisis must be resolved by political solution, instead of policing force. The implications of this election are more than the number of seats in the council, but a sharp political message to the world that Hong Kong people stand with fellow protestors, and our resolve to free elections and a thoroughly independent investigation on police brutality. These humble demands are denied by China since 1997.

Civil Liberties Denied

Unfortunately, I have the most frequent encounters of civil liberties deprivation recently. At first, I went protesting against the controversial extradition bill, exercising my freedom to assembly. The government arrested me and charged me of inciting people taking part in an unlawful assembly. Then I went contesting in this local election, yet the government banned me from running for office because of my political stance. I turned to international advocacy, planning to fly to Italy explain to friends in Europe our democratic and peaceful cause. Regrettably, the court thought this Senate hearing is not important and rejected my travel application. Following the court decision, it's clear now I'm deprived of the right to election, freedom of movement, freedom of assembly (not allowed to appear on designated area), and freedom of speech. The civil liberties guaranteed in the constitution are however no longer applicable to me.

The principle of ‘One Country, Two Systems’ is a fragile ruling philosophy defining China-Hong Kong relations, guaranteeing the global financial city its autonomy. But in the past 22 years, Beijing intervened on many fronts already. Since 2014, Hong Kong’s civil society, particularly student leaders, had become the target of revenge in the past 5 years. I was arrested for 3 times, prosecuted and later imprisoned for my leading role in the Umbrella Movement. My colleague, Nathan Law, the youngest Councillor in HK’s history, was unseated and later imprisoned for the same reason. So this time people learnt from the experience and not to rely on particular ‘leading activists’ in order to prevent them from exposing to political prosecution. Besides, In the past three years, altogether Six elected legislators are disqualified for ridiculous reasons and led to an uninvited constitutional re-interpretation by Beijing.

Most recently in last week, Chinese troops, not only ready to be deployed, they have actually deployed soldiers near university area with an excuse to 'clear the barricades' of the streets. It is important to voice out to the global community, which is an attempt to coerce China's aggressive behavior using international pressure.

Trusted and Self-correcting protestors VS Abusive Police Power

In the past five months, I took a lot of interviews from journalists all over the world who are interested in reporting Hong Kong. They often find it difficult to understand why a social movement can be led without a leader, why protestors’ use of force is tolerated by fellow Hong Kong people and whether there is foreign forces behind this movement. Behind all these questions, I would like to appeal to you two messages:
firstly, the police brutality is far more serious than what is reported. Pregnant women also got beaten by police; young female (who is not a protestor) was gang raped inside the police station and many others

Secondly, there is strong and mutual trust among protestors. Certainly, protestors always have different tactical viewpoints. But there are apparently some principles guiding protestors’ decision-making, to name a few: to achieve the five demands, to prevent casualty, to avoid being arrested and to achieve mass support. These principles are essential, although we have suffered a lot of notorious police brutality in the past five months, making us more determined to fight for the five demands in solidarity.

As I mentioned the above, I realise these features are the important elements when practising democracy - mutual trust, transparency, people’s mandate, checks-and-balance. It is just ironic that Hong Kong is far from practising full democracy and free election under the authoritarian rule of Xi Jinping.

Another Frontier: International Advocacy

International advocacy is another frontier that Hong Kong people are keen on taking part in. It is the reason why I find compelled to travel and explain our cause and demands to the world. Before testifying in this committee, I attended an assembly an hour ago to yield for international support and to express our acknowledgement to advocacy efforts on the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act. The bill is signed by the US President today to coerce and prevent further human rights violation in Hong Kong. I also wrote to several Italian papers to share the viewpoints of the protestors during this period. To enhance the understanding of Hong Kong and deteriorating human right situation in China is essential for world leaders to make an informed choice in their collaboration with the Chinese authorities too.

Why Italy should care about Hong Kong?

However, I have to say I'm quite disappointed reading the Italy Foreign Minister’s Luigi Di Maio indifferent remarks on the dire human rights situation in Hong Kong. Prolonged police brutality since June this year, what protestors facing are live round bullets. Not to mention the fact that some Italian car factories like IVECO did play a part in the brutality of Hong Kong police by supplying police vehicles. I believe a responsible state like Italy should take the conscience of human dignity into consideration.

In fact, Hong Kong can serve as a story to learn from. We were unaware of the Chinese regime's intention to gain influence and control over our economy in the early years. And our economy now is to some extent too reliant on China, which makes our battle for freedom and democracy harder. Italy should stay alert to the reliance on Chinese economic interests. There's no free lunch in the world.

Many would say I am over worrying or being too skeptical about China. But the truth is China is known for not playing by the rules and has a notorious track record for its human rights violations. The failure of 'One Country Two Systems' in Hong Kong represents the notorious track record of China not honouring the international treaty signed in 1984. Besides, there are hundreds of thousands of Muslim Uighurs have been detained in camps without trial now. Victims have come forth and said they are forced to take medicines that lead to infertility, young female Uighurs are forced into marriage with Chinese officials to exchange for the safety of their families. 30 years ago, the Chinese Government sent tanks against its own people on the 4th June despite the public and global attention. It almost happened last week in two universities lockdown and it is my view that the international pressure had prevented this massacre from happening.

Possible Actions by Italy

Finally, I understand that Business leaders and politicians worry that if they directly confront China on its human rights abuses, it could jeopardize future deals. Yet it is my humble wish Italy will also be truth-ful to the promises the European Union has made. EU have pledged themselves to defend and advocate for human rights in neighboring countries and the world and promised to never directly or indirectly encourage human rights violations. Italy and the rest of the free world should refrain from turning a blind eye to this.

Our position is clear: HK people are defending not only the civil liberties, democratic values and economic freedom of this international city. Standing up against the largest authoritarian regime after the Cold War, we shall continue our fight for democracy lest HK becomes a police state nor an authoritarian state. I appeal to you to stand with the people of Hong Kong.

Thank you.

【 黎安友專文 l 中國如何看待香港危機 】

美國哥倫比亞大學的資深中國通黎安友（Andrew Nathan）教授最近在《外交事務》（Foreign Affairs）雜誌的專文，值得一看。

黎安友是台灣許多中國研究學者的前輩級老師，小英總統去哥大演講時，正是他積極促成。小英在美國的僑宴，黎安友也是座上賓。

這篇文章的標題是：「中國如何看待香港危機：北京自我克制背後的真正原因」。

文章很長，而且用英文寫，需要花點時間閱讀。大家有空可以看看。

Andrew這篇文章的立論基礎，是來自北京核心圈的匿名說法。以他在學術界的地位，我相信他對消息來源已經做了足夠的事實查核或確認。

這篇文章，是在回答一個疑問：中共為何在香港事件如此自制？有人說是怕西方譴責，有人說是怕損害香港的金融地位。

都不是。這篇文章認為，上述兩者都不是中共的真實顧慮。

無論你多痛恨中共，你都必須真實面對你的敵人。

中共是搞經濟階級鬥爭起家的，當年用階級鬥爭打敗國民黨。而現在，中共正用這樣的思維處理香港議題。

文章有一句話：“China’s response has been rooted not in anxiety but in confidence.” 這句話道盡階級鬥爭的精髓。

中共一點都不焦慮。相反地，中共很有自信，香港的菁英階級及既得利益的收編群體，到最後會支持中共。

這個分化的心理基礎，來自經濟上的利益。

文中還提到，鄧小平當年給香港五十年的一國兩制，就是為了「給香港足夠的時間適應中共的政治系統」。

1997年，香港的GDP佔中國的18%。2018年，這個比例降到2.8%。

今日的香港經濟，在中共的評估，是香港需要中國，而不是中國需要香港。

中共正在在意的，是香港的高房價問題。香港的房價，在過去十年內三倍翻漲。

文章是這樣描述：
“Housing prices have tripled over the past decade; today, the median price of a house is more than 20 times the median gross annual household income. The median rent has increased by nearly 25 percent in the past six years. As many as 250,000 people are waiting for public housing. At the same time, income growth for many Hong Kong residents has fallen below the overall increase in cost of living.”

無論你同不同意這些說法，都請你試圖客觀地看看這篇文章。

有趣的是，黎安友在文章中部分論點引述了他的消息來源（但他並沒有加上個人評論），部分是他自己的觀察。

#護台胖犬劉仕傑
Instagram: old_dog_chasing_ball

新書：《 我在外交部工作 》

**

黎安友原文：

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-09-30/how-china-sees-hong-kong-crisis?fbclid=IwAR2PwHns5gWrw0fT0sa5LuO8zgv4PhLmkYfegtBgoOMCD3WJFI3w5NTe0S4

How China Sees the Hong Kong Crisis
The Real Reasons Behind Beijing’s Restraint

By Andrew J. Nathan September 30, 2019

Massive and sometimes violent protests have rocked Hong Kong for over 100 days. Demonstrators have put forward five demands, of which the most radical is a call for free, direct elections of Hong Kong’s chief executive and all members of the territory’s legislature: in other words, a fully democratic system of local rule, one not controlled by Beijing. As this brazen challenge to Chinese sovereignty has played out, Beijing has made a show of amassing paramilitary forces just across the border in Shenzhen. So far, however, China has not deployed force to quell the unrest and top Chinese leaders have refrained from making public threats to do so.

Western observers who remember the violent crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators in Tiananmen Square 30 years ago have been puzzled by Beijing’s forbearance. Some have attributed Beijing’s restraint to a fear of Western condemnation if China uses force. Others have pointed to Beijing’s concern that a crackdown would damage Hong Kong’s role as a financial center for China.

But according to two Chinese scholars who have connections to regime insiders and who requested anonymity to discuss the thinking of policymakers in Beijing, China’s response has been rooted not in anxiety but in confidence. Beijing is convinced that Hong Kong’s elites and a substantial part of the public do not support the demonstrators and that what truly ails the territory are economic problems rather than political ones—in particular, a combination of stagnant incomes and rising rents. Beijing also believes that, despite the appearance of disorder, its grip on Hong Kong society remains firm. The Chinese Communist Party has long cultivated the territory’s business elites (the so-called tycoons) by offering them favorable economic access to the mainland. The party also maintains a long-standing loyal cadre of underground members in the territory. And China has forged ties with the Hong Kong labor movement and some sections of its criminal underground. Finally, Beijing believes that many ordinary citizens are fearful of change and tired of the disruption caused by the demonstrations.

Beijing therefore thinks that its local allies will stand firm and that the demonstrations will gradually lose public support and eventually die out. As the demonstrations shrink, some frustrated activists will engage in further violence, and that in turn will accelerate the movement’s decline. Meanwhile, Beijing is turning its attention to economic development projects that it believes will address some of the underlying grievances that led many people to take to the streets in the first place.

This view of the situation is held by those at the very top of the regime in Beijing, as evidenced by recent remarks made by Chinese President Xi Jinping, some of which have not been previously reported. In a speech Xi delivered in early September to a new class of rising political stars at the Central Party School in Beijing, he rejected the suggestion of some officials that China should declare a state of emergency in Hong Kong and send in the People’s Liberation Army. “That would be going down a political road of no return,” Xi said. “The central government will exercise the most patience and restraint and allow the [regional government] and the local police force to resolve the crisis.” In separate remarks that Xi made around the same time, he spelled out what he sees as the proper way to proceed: “Economic development is the only golden key to resolving all sorts of problems facing Hong Kong today.”

ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS, MANY QUESTIONS

Chinese decision-makers are hardly surprised that Hong Kong is chafing under their rule. Beijing believes it has treated Hong Kong with a light hand and has supported the territory’s economy in many ways, especially by granting it special access to the mainland’s stocks and currency markets, exempting it from the taxes and fees that other Chinese provinces and municipalities pay the central government, and guaranteeing a reliable supply of water, electricity, gas, and food. Even so, Beijing considers disaffection among Hong Kong’s residents a natural outgrowth of the territory’s colonial British past and also a result of the continuing influence of Western values. Indeed, during the 1984 negotiations between China and the United Kingdom over Hong Kong’s future, the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping suggested following the approach of “one country, two systems” for 50 years precisely to give people in Hong Kong plenty of time to get used to the Chinese political system.

But “one country, two systems” was never intended to result in Hong Kong spinning out of China’s control. Under the Basic Law that China crafted as Hong Kong’s “mini-constitution,” Beijing retained the right to prevent any challenge to what it considered its core security interests. The law empowered Beijing to determine if and when Hong Kongers could directly elect the territory’s leadership, allowed Beijing to veto laws passed by the Hong Kong Legislative Council, and granted China the right to make final interpretations of the Basic Law. And there would be no question about who had a monopoly of force. During the negotiations with the United Kingdom, Deng publicly rebuked a top Chinese defense official—General Geng Biao, who at the time was a patron of a rising young official named Xi Jinping—for suggesting that there might not be any need to put troops in Hong Kong. Deng insisted that a Chinese garrison was necessary to symbolize Chinese sovereignty.

Statements made by U.S. politicians in support of the recent demonstrations only confirm Beijing’s belief that Washington seeks to inflame radical sentiments in Hong Kong.

At first, Hong Kongers seemed to accept their new role as citizens of a rising China. In 1997, in a tracking poll of Hong Kong residents regularly conducted by researchers at the University of Hong Kong, 47 percent of respondents identified themselves as “proud” citizens of China. But things went downhill from there. In 2012, the Hong Kong government tried to introduce “patriotic education” in elementary and middle schools, but the proposed curriculum ran into a storm of local opposition and had to be withdrawn. In 2014, the 79-day Umbrella Movement brought hundreds of thousands of citizens into the streets to protest Beijing’s refusal to allow direct elections for the chief executive. And as authoritarianism has intensified under Xi’s rule, events such as the 2015 kidnapping of five Hong Kong–based publishers to stand trial in the mainland further soured Hong Kong opinion. By this past June, only 27 percent of respondents to the tracking poll described themselves as “proud” to be citizens of China. This year’s demonstrations started as a protest against a proposed law that would have allowed Hong Kongers suspected of criminal wrongdoing to be extradited to the mainland but then developed into a broad-based expression of discontent over the lack of democratic accountability, police brutality, and, most fundamentally, what was perceived as a mainland assault on Hong Kong’s unique identity.

Still, Chinese leaders do not blame themselves for these shifts in public opinion. Rather, they believe that Western powers, especially the United States, have sought to drive a wedge between Hong Kong and the mainland. Statements made by U.S. politicians in support of the recent demonstrations only confirm Beijing’s belief that Washington seeks to inflame radical sentiments in Hong Kong. As Xi explained in his speech in September:
As extreme elements in Hong Kong turn more and more violent, Western forces, especially the United States, have been increasingly open in their involvement. Some extreme anti-China forces in the United States are trying to turn Hong Kong into the battleground for U.S.-Chinese rivalry…. They want to turn Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy into de facto independence, with the ultimate objective to contain China's rise and prevent the revival of the great Chinese nation.

Chinese leaders do not fear that a crackdown on Hong Kong would inspire Western antagonism. Rather, they take such antagonism as a preexisting reality—one that goes a long way toward explaining why the disorder in Hong Kong broke out in the first place. In Beijing’s eyes, Western hostility is rooted in the mere fact of China’s rise, and thus there is no use in tailoring China’s Hong Kong strategy to influence how Western powers would respond.

IT’S NOT ABOUT THE BENJAMINS

The view that Xi has not deployed troops because of Hong Kong’s economic importance to the mainland is also misguided, and relies on an outdated view of the balance of economic power. In 1997, Hong Kong’s GDP was equivalent to 18 percent of the mainland’s. Most of China’s foreign trade was conducted through Hong Kong, providing China with badly needed hard currencies. Chinese companies raised most of their capital on the Hong Kong stock exchange. Today, things are vastly different. In 2018, Hong Kong’s GDP was equal to only 2.7 percent of the mainland’s. Shenzhen alone has overtaken Hong Kong in terms of GDP. Less than 12 percent of China’s exports now flow through Hong Kong. The combined market value of China’s domestic stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen far surpasses that of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, and Chinese companies can also list in Frankfurt, London, New York, and elsewhere.

Although Hong Kong remains the largest offshore clearing center for renminbi, that role could easily be filled by London or Singapore, if Chinese leaders so desired.
Investment flowing into and out of China still tends to pass through financial holding vehicles set up in Hong Kong, in order to benefit from the region’s legal protections. But China’s new foreign investment law (which will take effect on January 1, 2020) and other recent policy changes mean that such investment will soon be able to bypass Hong Kong. And although Hong Kong remains the largest offshore clearing center for renminbi, that role could easily be filled by London or Singapore, if Chinese leaders so desired.

Wrecking Hong Kong’s economy by using military force to impose emergency rule would not be a good thing for China. But the negative effect on the mainland’s prosperity would not be strong enough to prevent Beijing from doing whatever it believes is necessary to maintain control over the territory.

CAN’T BUY ME LOVE?

As it waits out the current crisis, Beijing has already started tackling the economic problems that it believes are the source of much of the anger among Hong Kongers. Housing prices have tripled over the past decade; today, the median price of a house is more than 20 times the median gross annual household income. The median rent has increased by nearly 25 percent in the past six years. As many as 250,000 people are waiting for public housing. At the same time, income growth for many Hong Kong residents has fallen below the overall increase in cost of living.

【不分膚色界限的兒童權利】
//這議題並不是關於入境事宜，不是關於作為一個難民 (或尋求庇護者)。這是關於難民兒童及他們的基本人權和尊嚴。//
//根據政府文件，目前有超過850位未成年難民兒童在港。他們不是“特殊”情況。這是一個嚴重的問題，是需要透過制度的改革去糾正的。//
//過去十年，數個聯合國專家小組委員會，包括兒童權利委員會、反酷刑委員會及經濟、社會、文化權利委員會就本港難民兒童的待遇提出具體的批評。政府亦不能聲稱已提供足夠的措施去提供福利或保護。平機會，以及今天在場的非政府機構及社福機構，已清楚指出難民兒童的人權及兒童權利持續地被損害。這個不幸延展到歧視、教育、早期兒童發展、基本生活需要和醫療照顧。//

Azan Marwah's speech:
My name is Azan Marwah. I am practising barrister and publish all those specialising in Children’s rights. I would first like to thank the Subcommittee for holding this meeting to consider this subject. Hong Kong has been widely criticised for failing to fully protect refugee children and the Subcommittee is to be praised for taking step to raise the issue to the Administration. I would like to just take a moment to say that there was a time when Hong Kong children were being placed in detention camp by the Japanese here in Hong Kong or made into refugees. This issue is not about immigration. It’s not about being a refugee. It’s about children and about basic humanity and dignity. Secondly, I’d like to thank my fellow child welfare professionals here today giving evidences. I have read and heartily commend the valuable submissions to the Subcommittee. I’ve also read the paper submitted by the Administration and I’d like to make some preliminary remarks about it. There is no mention within the paper of the words, human rights or children’s rights or discrimination, within the substances of the paper. There is no mention of any investigation or attempt to ascertain the problems faced by the refugee children, whatsoever. The focus of the paper instead appears to be the immigration Unified Screening Mechanism (USM) for children. This is a mistake. It is obvious that from the paper that the Administration has not taken a right-based approach to the issues faced by refugee children. There is no attempt to address public criticisms made by international human right experts against the problems faced by the refugee children. Instead, they talked about basic needs being met by ISS’s contributions and by the discretion to provide extra benefits in special cases. This is regrettable, because, children are not special case. From the paper submitted, there are more than 850 of them. They’re not longer special cases. It’s a substantial problem that needs rules and branch reform. In this regard, I commend the Chief Executive for her promise to create a Children Commission but given the approach taken by the Administration and its paper, I suggest that this underscored the need for an independent commission. The Administration cannot claim that it has not deal with the problems because they were unaware of these criticisms. Over the last decade ago, several United Nation’s expert panels, including the Committee on Children’s Right, Committee against Torture and Committee on the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights have made specific criticisms relating to treatment of refugee children in Hong Kong. Neither can the Administration claimed that it has taken sufficient measures to provide for their welfare or protection. The Equal Opportunity Commission, as well as the NGOs and social welfare organisations presented today have reported clearly the on-going breaches of the human and children’s rights face by refugee children. These problems extend to discrimination, education, early childhood development, basic needs and medical care. Each of these deputations has made specific recommendations, many of which were required only administrative measures. In this regard, I’ll ask those Administration’s members present today to read the collective written submission, which was I think only lately submitted, where we detailed specific requests. I ask the Administration to address these specific problems and make commitment to implement the recommendations. I ask the Subcommittee and the LegCo to hold the Administration to account, and particular, to manifest the commitment to protect children’s rights.
Thank you for your time and attention.

#難民兒童 #尋求庇護者 #難民 #人權 #refugeechildren #asylumseekers #refugee #humanright