關於 information integrity ，我們在網路上蒐集到這些相關的討論、資訊與評價

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（轉）

*【就特區政府引用國安法第22條展開大規模拘捕行動的聲明】*

超過50名民主派議員、社運人士及律師，因組織及／或參與已延期的2020年立法會換屆選舉前的初選，而被指控觸犯國家安全法第22條下，有關顛覆罪的罪行。我們 － 即下列堅定相信基本法和法治的聯署人 － 以個人名義，對上述事宜表達深切關注。

在星期三(6日)的記者會上，警務處國家安全處高級警司李桂華證實，警方在是次行動中，在獲得搜查令的情況下搜查了72個處所，當中包括一間律師事務所。國安法第22條訂明，構成罪行的基本元素是「以武力、威脅使用武力或者其他非法手段」。然而當局在記者會上未能完滿地解釋，在該次初選並沒有出現任何暴力或非法行為的情況下，他們是基於甚麼原因引用第22條採取拘捕行動。

任何人不論政見均有權參與公共事務，是《公民與政治權利國際公約》第25條確保的權利，亦受《香港人權法案條例》第21條保護。這項權利，對發展民主管治和法治均發揮關鍵的作用。因此，我們強烈譴責任何打壓和平表達《基本法》賦予市民的基本人權的行為。

《約翰奈斯堡關於國家安全、言論自由和獲取信息自由原則》(U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/39) 第二條訂明：「一種以國家安全為理由所實行的限制是不合法的，除非其真正的目的和可以 證實的效果是為了保護國家的生存或領土完整免遭武力或武力威脅的侵害， 或者保護其對武力或武力威脅反應的能力，無論這些武力或武力威脅來自外 部，如軍事威脅，還是來自內部，如煽動以暴力推翻政府。」2003年3月，特區政府嘗試按照《基本法》第23條制訂國家安全法時，當時的保安局仍然正面地肯定國家安全立法需符合《約翰奈斯堡原則》。

我們促請特區政府解釋，是否已經放棄《約翰奈斯堡原則》內的適用原則，以及《基本法》訂明保障的基本權利，包括表達和集會的自由。

作為律師，我們同時深切關注搜查律師事務所可能會違反《基本法》第35條訂明法律專業保密的基本權利，即「香港居民有權得到秘密法律諮詢、向法院提起訴訟、選擇律師及時保護自己的合法權益或在法庭上為其代理和獲得司法補救」。我們急切呼籲當局自我約束，確保法律專業保密權得到充份保障，以及全面維護所有香港市民參與政治的權利。

帝理邁
張達明
林洋鋐
蔡頴德
黃耀初

2021年1月7日

【Statement on the Mass Arrest under Article 22 of the National Security Law】
We, the undersigned, as legal practitioners who firmly believe in the Basic Law and the rule of law are deeply concerned that more than 50 pro-democracy lawmakers, activists and lawyers, were arrested yesterday for alleged subversion under Article 22 of The Law of the PRC on Safeguarding National Security in the HKSAR (“NSL”) for organising and/or participating in a primary election for candidates in the 2020 Legislative Council election.
At the press conference on 6 January, Senior Superintendent Steve Li confirmed that the Police had searched 72 premises with a warrant, including a law firm. No satisfactory explanation, however, was given by the authority at the press conference as to why Article 22 of the NSL was invoked in respect of these activities, when that provision expressly requires as an essential element of the offence the use of “force or threat of force or other unlawful means”. The organisation and conduct of the primary election did not involve any violence or other unlawful acts.
The right to participate in public affairs, irrespective of one’s political opinion, is enshrined under Article 25 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights and also protected under article 21 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance (Cap.383). It also plays a crucial role in the promotion of democratic governance and is fundamental to the rule of law in Hong Kong. Therefore, we strongly oppose and condemn any attempts to suppress peaceful exercise of the fundamental human rights enshrined in the Basic Law.
We note that back in March 2003, when the NSL was introduced, the Security Bureau still acknowledged the need for the national security legislation to be consistent with the Johannesburg Principles. Principle 2 of the Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information (U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/39) provides that “A restriction sought to be justified on the ground of national security is not legitimate unless its genuine purpose and demonstrable effect is to protect a country's existence or its territorial integrity against the use or threat of force, or its capacity to respond to the use or threat of force, whether from an external source, such as a military threat, or an internal source, such as incitement to violent overthrow of the government.”
We call upon the Government to explain whether it has abandoned any due regard to the Johannesburg Principles and the fundamental rights guaranteed under the Basic Law, including the freedom of expression and assembly.
As lawyers, we are further troubled by the search of a law firm, which could violate the fundamental right of residents to legal advice as set out in Article 35 of the Basic Law. We urgently urge the authorities to exercise restraint, to ensure effective protection to legal professional privilege, and to fully uphold the right to political participation for all Hong Kong residents.

CHEUNG T.M. Eric
DALY Mark
LAM Kenneth
TSOI W.T. Michelle
WONG Davyd

Dated this 7 January 2021

【#TheDiplomat: 沈旭暉隨緣家書英文版🇭🇰】很久沒有向國際關係評論網 The Diplomat 供稿，但國際線十分重要，不應放棄。這次他們希望分享23條、國安法、反恐法風雨欲來的「新香港」前瞻，願國際社會能多了解快將出現的危機：

While the world is preoccupied with a fight against the COVID-19 pandemic, Beijing has been tightening its political grip on all aspects of Hong Kong’s civil society. Rumor has it that Beijing will push through legislating national security laws under Article 23 of Hong Kong’s Basic Law by unconventional means, such as massively disqualifying pro-democratic legislators or even directly applying a national law, widely argued as a major step to destroy the rights and freedom of Hong Kongers, and bring Chinese authoritarianism to Hong Kong.

After the 2019 protests, the administration of Carrie Lam, who theoretically is still leading the special administrative region of China, has little political capital at stake, with its legitimacy reaching rock bottom. The pro-government camp has dwindling prospects for the city’s upcoming Legislative Council election. The government‘s ”nothing to lose“ mentality is apparent from its recent blatant reinterpretation of the Basic Law’s Article 22 (another article that limits the influence of China’s offices in Hong Kong’s internal affairs). The debate is nothing new, but the pressure this time is quite different.

This article highlights the different strategies Beijing could adopt to enact Article 23 insidiously or under disguise to avoid backlash from the international community, while continuing to reap benefits from the city’s globally recognized special status. This seems to be part of Beijing’s brinkmanship to bring Hong Kong protesters and their supporters to their knees and move the city closer to authoritarianism. To counter these moves, Hong Kongers must define the boundaries beyond which Hong Kong falls into authoritarian rule and make a case as to why the city’s downfall is detrimental to the international community‘s interest.

The Long-Term Controversy Over National Security Laws

Back in 2003, the implementation of Article 23 was thwarted by the moderate pro-establishment politician James Tien. In face of overwhelming public disapproval of the law, he withdrew support and votes from his Liberal Party. However, 17 years later, it is hard to imagine Beijing following the old legislative playbook: start with a public consultation, followed by public discourse and political debate, and end with the majority rule. This playbook only works in peaceful societies ruled by a trustworthy government with integrity.

The aftermath of 2003, as well as the 2019 protests, should have taught Beijing and the Hong Kong government a lesson: pushing through national security legislation in a flawed parliament controlled by the minority pro-government camp would inevitably set off another full city-scale protest — and undoubtedly more fierce and focused this time. Given the current government’s numerous displays of dishonesty, it is conceivable that they will embark on a less-traveled path to implement Article 23.

Strategy One: “Anti-Terrorism”

In principle, one possible strategy could be to directly enact Chinese national law across Hong Kong, which can be achieved by declaring a state of emergency in the city. However, this is risky business as it would tarnish the integrity of “one country two systems” and subsequently Hong Kong’s international standing. Beijing, a risk-averse regime, is also unwilling to see Hong Kong’s status as a middleman for laundering money disappear into thin air.

Instead, Beijing could be concocting a narrative that would see Chinese national law applied to Hong Kong while not damaging Hong Kong’s international standing and Beijing’s own interests. The key word in this script is “anti-terrorism.” As early as 2014, pro-Beijing scholars have been claiming the emergence of “local terrorist ideology” on Hong Kong soil. Since the anti-extradition bill protests last year, government rhetoric frequently described the protests, which caused no deaths at all in the entire year, with phrases like “inclination to terrorist ideology.” That was a signal to the world that Hong Kong’s internal conflicts had ballooned into a national security issue. This gives the government the legitimacy to justify the implementation of Chinese national laws across the highly autonomous region to counter terrorism. The Chinese government knows that if it can persuade the world that terrorism exists in Hong Kong, and that it is as severe as the terror threat facing many other nations today, the international community will be less critical of Beijing’s actions in Hong Kong. Enacting Chinese laws directly is a convenient path that will save Beijing from having to tackle Hong Kong’s internal conflicts, basically turning the Hong Kong issue into a nonissue.

Strategy Two: Stacking the Legislature by Disqualifying Candidates

An even bolder strategy was probably foretold by a recent incident where the Hong Kong government and Beijing’s agencies for Hong Kong affairs (HKMAO and the Liaison Office) jointly criticized lawmaker Dennis Kwok for filibustering, framing it as “misconduct in public office” and “violating his oath.” It is incomprehensible to claim that filibustering goes against a lawmaker’s main duty; rather, it is common understanding that legislative work includes debating the law and representing public opinion against unreasonable laws. In a parliament controlled by the minority, pro-democratic members representing the majority of Hong Kongers are forced to express their objections using means like filibustering. Wouldn’t a lack of different political opinions turn the legislative branch into a rubber-stamp institution?

The above allegation has set a dangerous precedent for twisting the logic behind a certain provision in the Basic Law to target opposing lawmakers. In other words, to fulfill Beijing’s interpretation of the principal requirement for holding public office in Hong Kong, one could be required to take a meticulously legalistic approach to uphold the Basic Law down to its every single wording. A public official, by this new definition, not only needs to support “one country, two systems” or object Hong Kong independence, but also must abide by every single provision in the Basic Law. Worst of all, based on the previous cases, whether an official’s words or actions oversteps a provision is up to Beijing’s interpretation of his/her “intent.”

If this approach is applied, in the next election, there might be additional official questions for screening candidates like the following: “The Basic Law states that the enactment of Article 23 is a constitutional duty. Failing to support Article 23 legislation violates the Basic Law. Do you support it?” This question would suffice to disqualify even moderate or even pro-establishment candidates like James Tien. Even if any pro-democratic candidates were elected, once Article 23 re-enters the legislative process, they could risk ouster by raising objections.

Despite the absurdity of this tactic, the Chinese regime may just be tempted enough if such a strategy could resolve two of China’s current nuisances — voices of dissent in the Legislative Council and the previous failure to implement Article 23.

Strategy Three: The “Boiling Frog Effect”

Article 23 is not yet implemented, but the dystopian world that the protesters pictured in 2003 is already becoming reality. Regular citizens have been persecuted for “sedition” for sharing their views on social media or participating in legal protests; workers face retaliation for taking part in strikes; corporations are pressured to publicly side with the government’s stance; employees who have the “wrong” political views are fired; schools have been closely monitored for teaching material; protest-supporting fundraisers were framed for money laundering; a retweet or like may lead to persecution, under a colonial-era law. Only now have Hong Kongers woken up to their new reality — although the Basic Law technically protects citizens’ rights to speak, rally, march, demonstrate, and go on strike, the government could enfeeble civil rights by bending antiquated laws and legal provisions. The frequent abuse of law enforcement power on a small scale, such as improper arrests and police violence, is desensitizing the public and the international community. In a few years, Hong Kong will become unrecognizable. This is indeed a clever play on Beijing’s part to slowly strip away Hong Kong’s autonomy and freedom, without causing much international attention.

Counter-Strategies Against Beijing’s Brinkmanship

Beijing’s overarching goal is to hollow out Hong Kong but, at the same time, avoid major backlash from the international community, which could spell the end of the privileged global status of Hong Kong not granted to other Chinese cities. Beijing also aims at preventing single incidents that could cascade down into mass protests as seen in 2003, 2014, and 2019; and eliminating any resistance forces from within Hong Kong’s legislature. The tactics outlined above are typical in a game of brinkmanship.

In response, Hong Kongers in Hong Kong and on the so-called “international frontline” must know their strengths and bargaining chips on this negotiating table with Beijing.

Unlike Xinjiang and Tibet, Hong Kong is a city with transparency and free flow of information. Hong Kongers need to make a case to the world that the protests are not acts of terrorism. Some suggestions include comparing the Hong Kong protests to similar struggles in 20 or so other counties in the world at the present time, none of which were classified as terrorism; collecting a large amount of concrete evidence of the disproportionate use of force by the Hong Kong police; and showing how enacting Chinese national laws in Hong Kong will end the city’s autonomy and spell disaster for international community‘s interests.

The Legislative Council is the institution that can counteract Beijing’s “boiling frog” strategy and to keep Hong Kongers’ hope alive in the system. Those who plan to run for legislative office must be prepared to be disqualified from running. If only individuals are banned, there need to be alternative candidates as back-up plans. However, if and when the disqualification process is applied broadly to entire camps of candidates (for example, all who object to Article 23), the pro-democracy camp must make a strong case to the Hong Kong and global public that this is the endgame for Hong Kong democracy. Then the incumbent popularly elected legislators will hold the internationally recognized mandate from the public and serve as the last resistance.

These recommendations delineates how the slogan “if we burn, you burn with us,” often seen in the protests, may play out in the game of international relations. If the national security laws are “passed” by a legislature that is jury-rigged in this manner, or if related national laws are directly implemented in Hong Kong, Hong Kongers should signal clearly to the world that it goes way beyond the promised “one country, two systems.” Crossing this red line by Beijing should be seen by the world as a blunt violation of its promised autonomy to Hong Kongers. At that time, if the international community led by the United States and the United Kingdom decided to revoke the “non-sovereignty entity” status of Hong Kong and regard the SAR as an ordinary Chinese city, it shouldn’t come as a surprise.

Dr. Simon Shen is the Founding Chairman of GLOs (Glocal Learning Offices), an international relations start-up company. He also serves as an adjunct associate professor in the University of Hong Kong, Chinese University of Hong Kong and the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, and associate director of the Master of Global Political Economy Programme of the CUHK. The author acknowledges Jean Lin, Coco Ho, Chris Wong, Michelle King, and Alex Yap for their assistance in this piece.

▶️ 高度自治 vs 全面管治
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pwt8wZl8jHQ

Privacy is a fundamental pillar of our society. The advertisement-based model of our internet is a threat to our freedom. Phil and Göran discuss why privacy came into mainstream focus again via Cambridge Analytica and why it opens the door for the manipulation of our society.

While many countries increase their surveillance system to a sophisticated level, Europe is pioneering privacy rules with the GDPR.

About idka: https://www.idka.com/
Idka is a new type of social media where protection of your privacy, your integrity and your information is at the very core. On Idka you can communicate, share and work undisturbed with colleges and friends. There is no advertising, nothing irrelevant and no-one can see, share or access your stuff. Communicate freely on a platform where you own the content.

Music: Hadassah

Phil Chen
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HTC Exodus
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Rebuilding trust, one phone at a time.

Chinese parks are quite a different sort of experience, other than being a place for people to try and sell off their sons and daughters for marriage to other families, it's the only place people are really able to go out and practice their kung fu, dancing, singing, musical instruments etc. Of course there are the regular activities such as having a picnic, hiking and playing sports (as well as some boating and fishing) available as well. Come and join Sasha and I as we get the low down on how Chinese parks work.

The primary goal of attending the marriage market is for parents to find a suitable partner for their child. The standards of finding the right match may be based upon (but not limited to) age, height, job, income, education, family values, Chinese zodiac sign, and personality. All of this information is written on a piece of paper, which is then hung upon long strings among other parents' advertisements for their children. The parents walk around chatting with other parents to see if there is a harmonious fit only after their children's standards are met.

Umbrellas used for advertising
Many parents do not have permission from their child to go to this event. It has been described as "match.com meets farmers' market" with a low success rate. In many parents' eyes, parent matchmaking gatherings such as the Marriage Market are the only way to uphold a traditional dating style for their children in modern China. China's long idealized tradition of continuing their family lineage is very important within Chinese culture. As the children of the One Child Policy start to become of typical marriage age, the so-called marriage "market" of China has wavered in stability, particularly for males in China. The University of Kent predicts that by the year 2020, 24 million men will be unmarried and unable to find a wife.

Recently, well-educated women in China with established careers are in less of a hurry to get married. They have more options than women in past generations and are not afraid to put their career first. This change in marriage ideology puts the women in a higher position of power within a traditionally male-dominated society. Now more women seek to find a responsible man with personal integrity instead of just a high paying job.

Many men's standards have changed with the progression of women's status in the work industry as well, they expect a woman that has been educated and well on her way to a career path. But what has drastically changed is the older generations viewpoint on the subject—they agree with the younger generation, with the two most important qualities in a wife being "elegance and a decent career path," quite a change from "diligence and the willingness to suffer the burden of life".

⚫ Watch Conquering Southern China (my documentary) and see China like no one outside of China has ever seen it before: https://vimeo.com/ondemand/conqueringsouthernchina
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Join me on Facebook: http://www.facebook.com/winstoninchina
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Music used: Virtual Vice - Black Rose
Artist's bandcamp: https://virtual-vice.bandcamp.com/releases

China's most iconic gaming console is the "Red White Machine" otherwise known as a famiclone (knockoff NES or knockoff Famicom) the company that has been producing them in China non-stop for 30 years has just released the 30th Anniversary version of their "Red White Machine", I got my hands on one and decided to talk about how gaming in China has always had a bit of a difficult history.

Video games in China is a massive industry and pastime that includes the production, sale, import/export, and playing of video games. China is the largest and highest grossing (revenues) video game market in the world, since 2015. The landscape of the topic is strongly shaped by China's average income level, rampant software piracy, and governmental measures to control game content and playing times. In 2011, China's PC game sector was worth $6 billion, the largest in the world. Arcade games are also a thriving industry in China. Console games were banned from the country in 2000, but the ban was lifted in July 2015.

In eSports, China has been the top country in terms of tournament winnings, possessing some of the world's best talents across video games.

The Special Administrative Regions of Hong Kong and Macau have unique legal and cultural environments, thus the information below does not apply in these two regions.

As with almost all mass media in the country, video games in China are subject to the policies of censorship in China.

Violating basic principles of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China
Threatening national unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity
Divulging state secrets
Threatening state security
Damaging national sovereignty
Disturbing social order
Infringing upon others' rights

On July 2015, the ban on video game consoles within the country was lifted. According to a statement from the country's Ministry of Culture, companies like Sony, Nintendo, and Microsoft — among others — will now be allowed to manufacture and sell video game consoles anywhere in the country.

Game consoles were first banned in 2000 due to fears that the devices — and the 3D worlds produced by them — had a negative effect on the mental and physical development of children. In 2015, China eased those restrictions by letting game console-makers operate in an experimental 11-square-mile area in Shanghai, known as the free trade zone.

The State General Administration of Press and Publication and anti-porn and illegal publication offices have also played a role in screening games.

Examples of banned games have included:

Hearts of Iron (for "distorting history and damaging China's sovereignty and territorial integrity")
I.G.I.-2: Covert Strike (for "intentionally blackening China and the Chinese army's image")
Command & Conquer: Generals - Zero Hour (for "smearing the image of China and the Chinese army")
Battlefield 4 (for "smearing the image of China and endangering national security")
In addition to banning games completely, several games have had their content screened to remove certain imagery deemed offensive or unfavorable. Common examples include skeletons or skulls being either fleshed out or removed entirely. Cases of which can be seen in Chinese versions of popular video games such as DOTA 2 and World of Warcraft.

⚫ Watch Conquering Southern China (my documentary) and see China like no one outside of China has ever seen it before: https://vimeo.com/ondemand/conqueringsouthernchina
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Join me on Facebook: http://www.facebook.com/winstoninchina
Twitter: @serpentza
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Music used: Virtual Vice - Sanctuary Run
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