假酒疑雲之吐舌頭的小狗
昨天一篇假酒疑雲, 釣出許多專家和愛酒富豪, 真是本小站的榮幸.
當然要特別謝謝專業侍酒師Alex Tsai提供的解說. 雖然很多人(包括我)喝不起DRC, 但是長見識長知識也是很好的, 買的起喝得起的人未必知道這些呢.
所以略略整理了一下Alex Tsai(再次感謝)對酒標細節的釋疑, 讓沒留意到他精采留言的讀者也可以複習一下:
1，1986年之前，DRC各酒款的編號都是6位數。之後才改成5位數. (這點很容易辨識, 很多假酒馬上露餡!)
2，編號的印刷是正的，不是印成斜的。(這也是極易察覺的)
3，也不會有那行斜的紅字。(這行紅色斜字的法文是: 禁止出口至美國)
4，關於簽名，有朋友說明：Lalou 共同主事 1974-1992。之後換外甥 Charles 主事，幾個月後車禍後換Henry-Frederic 到2018. 現在換Perrine Fenal。1974 Albert Villaine 才接手，所以在這之前是其父Henri. 所以74年之前有可能是H. de Villane的簽名.
不過以上解釋並未提出我昨天的兩個疑點:
1. PRODUCE OF FRANCE和PRODUCT OF FRANCE. 我略略查了一下法國國會對食品標籤的規定, 本來法國規定所有標籤都必須使用法文, 唯有在某些約定成俗或是淺顯易懂的字可以被通融. 比如英文的on/off, made in, copyright… 等字. 因此produce of France/product of France是被允許的.
2. 不過兩字的嚴格定義並不一樣. Produce of France是指在法國製作. 換句話說, 如果產品/原料來自其他國家, 只要在法國過水(裝罐, 裝瓶, 貼標…)都可以用produce of France. 但是product of France必須是法國生產製造的才行, 是高一階的”血統純正的法國產品”, 沒有經過處理轉化過的食品(如葡萄酒)更是如此. 因此多數葡萄酒標上都會使用product of France, 而不是produce of France.
3. 另外就是關於”PROPRIĖTAIRE”這個法文字, 假酒酒標這個字的E上面少一撇.
關於最後一點, 想起一件有趣的事.
幾年前, 曾幫Sotheby’s拍賣公司鑑定葡萄酒真偽, 有酒界福爾摩斯之稱的Michael Egan偵破了一批仿造布根地Bonnes Mares的假酒.
假酒事件年年有, 處處有, 為何這件事特別值得一提? M. E. 說: 這批酒是我生平見過仿冒的最完美的, 如果不是一個法文字露餡, 我應該就被蒙騙過去了.
這個破綻是: 酒背後的標籤一行: La consommation de boissons alcoolisées pendant la grossesse, même en faible quantité, peut avoir des conséquences graves sur la santé de l’enfant. 假酒標籤上” consequences”的第一個e頭上少了一撇. (這句話的意思是: 孕婦請勿飲酒, 即使少量, 也可能對胎兒的健康造成嚴重後果)
昨天和懷疑喝到假酒的朋友聊到這些冒出來的新資訊, 他說現在做假酒騙錢也就算了, 有的乾脆藏在酒塞中嘲笑你一番.
他傳來一張波爾多五大之一的Château Latour照片: 正牌的瓶塞(和酒標)上的圓塔上都是一隻雄偉的獅子, 有人開瓶一看, 瓶塞上烙印的圓塔不但變矮了, 獅子變成一隻吐舌頭的小狗.
氣人啊～ 我連吐舌頭小狗酒都沒喝到!
#假酒疑雲
#ChateauLatour
consequences意思 在 [分享] 〈俄羅斯為何將輸掉這場戰？〉-1.俄羅斯部分- 看板Military 的推薦與評價
文章來源：https://bit.ly/35Bysww
作者是美國威爾遜研究中心的研究員Kamil Galeev所發表的推文
(威爾遜研究中心的維基：https://bit.ly/3vt5sSn )
目前為居住在莫斯科的獨立研究者及記者。
之前發表過普丁對少數民族與文化政策的研究文章。
昨天他在推特上發表一篇關於「俄羅斯為何將輸掉這場戰役」的文章，
他不但從許多俄國歷史文化的角度分析兩國之間的關係，
也從近年俄、烏雙方的建軍歷程說明俄、烏兩軍的表現為何如此「出人意料」。
因為這邊是軍事版，所以我就略過歷史的部分，摘要近年俄、烏建軍歷程的相關段落，
，且因時間有限，我直接使用推特的翻譯功能，提供中文對照，
頂多太怪的會順手修一下，如果版友們有任何翻譯建議，也請在推文提供。
如需要看完整文章，請至他個人推特瀏覽。
PS：看到很多版友討論他太早論定輸贏，
他在這個文章後半部有解釋為何他個人會下這樣的標題。
下面有板友halfmonster建議標題改為「俄羅斯為何將輸掉這場戰役」
我也覺得這樣翻譯更符合原文本意，特此感謝。
------
一、俄國近年的建軍問題：
Consider a timely paper on Russian army by Bismarck Analysis. It's good &
informative. It's correct on its land-based and artillery-centric character.
It's also correct that Minister of Defence Serdyukov greatly increased army's
efficiency in 2007-2012. But it's still misleading.
考慮一下俾斯麥分析關於俄羅斯軍隊的即時論文。這很好，內容豐富。它的陸基和以火砲
為中心的特徵是正確的。同樣正確的是，國防部長謝爾久科夫在 2007-2012 年大大提高
了軍隊的效率。但這仍然具有誤導性。
(下圖為他所說的分析論文)
https://twitter.com/kamilkazani/status/1497994067019452422/photo/1
Yes, Minister Serdyukov indeed reformed the army. He increased its
efficiency, fought with corrupt and crony armament producers improving the
army supplies. As a result he became extremely unpopular, made tons of
powerful enemies and was ousted in 2012 losing his power and status.
是的，謝爾久科夫部長確實改革了軍隊。他提高了它的效率，與腐敗和裙帶關係的軍備生
產商進行了鬥爭，改善了軍隊的供應。結果，他變得非常不受歡迎，結下了無數強大的敵
人，並於 2012 年被趕下台，失去了權力和地位。
His successor Shoygu knew better than that. Now who's Shoygu? Shoygu is the
*only* single Russian minister who uninterruptedly worked in government since
1991, since the very beginning of Russian Federation. He worked for all
presidents, all prime ministers avoided all purges.
他的繼任者Shoygu這更清楚。誰是Shoygu？自 1991 年以來，Shoygu是*唯一的*持續在任
的俄羅斯部長，自俄羅斯聯邦成立之初就不間斷地在政府工作。他為所有總統工作，所有
總理都避免了所有清洗.
What does it mean? It means he's a cunning political entrepreneur, great in
court politics, publicity, image. You survive every single administration by
maxing your political survival. And to max it you need to minimise animosity.
So you never object to powerful interest groups.
這是什麼意思？這意味著他是一個狡猾的政治企業家，擅長宮廷政治、宣傳、形象。你通
過最大化你的政治生存來生存每一屆政府。為了最大化它，你需要最小化敵意。所以你永
遠不會反對強大的利益集團.
Serdyukov fought with interest groups and was destroyed. Shoygu was smarter
than that. He launched a PR campaign presenting himself as the "saviour" from
the Serdyukov's legacy. Whatever his predecessor did, was dismantled. Media
cheered, people cheered, interest groups cheered.
謝爾久科夫與利益集團作戰並被摧毀。 Shoygu比那更聰明。他發起了一場公關活動，將
自己展示為謝爾久科夫遺產的“救世主”。無論他的前任做什麼，都被拆除了。媒體歡呼
，民眾歡呼，利益集團歡呼.
That's a very, very typical problem. Efficiency-maxing requires ruthlessness
in dealing with established elites and interest groups. Meanwhile
court-politics-maxing requires pondering to them and not making enemies.
Serdyukov was maxing efficiency, Shoygu - court politics.
這是一個非常非常典型的問題。效率最大化需要在與老牌精英和利益集團打交道時冷酷無
情。同時，法庭政治最大化需要仔細考慮他們而不是樹敵。謝爾久科夫正在最大限度地提
高效率，Shouygu- 宮廷政治。
There was another issue. Shoygu is ethnic Tuvan. In such a country as Russia
minority member can hardly become the supreme leader. People don't perceive
him as ethnic Russian (see his palace) which means he's not dangerous for the
leader and you can safely delegate him the army.
還有另一個問題。 Shoygu是圖瓦人。在俄羅斯這樣的國家，少數族裔很難成為最高領導
人。人們不認為他是俄羅斯人（見他的宮殿），這意味著他對領導人沒有危險，你可以放
心地將軍隊委任給他。
Shoygy not only purged Serdyukov's appointees, pondered to old military
establishment, stopped arguing with army suppliers about the equipment cost
and quality. He also pondered to numerous feel-good-lies regarding the
Russian big strategy. Let's consider the army vs navy problem.
Shoygy 不僅清洗了謝爾久科夫的任命人員，還重新考慮了舊的軍事機構，不再與軍隊供應
商就裝備成本和品質爭論不休。他還琢磨了許多關於俄羅斯大戰略的自我感覺良好的謊言
。讓我們考慮陸軍與海軍的問題。
Army vs navy had been a traditional dilemma of European powers for centuries.
As a rule, you couldn't support both first class army and first class navy,
you had to choose. Some powers ignored this to their demise - like 17-18th cc
France. Others were more rational, like Prussia.
幾個世紀以來，陸軍與海軍一直是歐洲大國的傳統困境。通常，你不能同時支持一流的陸
軍和一流的海軍，你必須做出選擇。一些大國無視這一點而走向滅亡比如 17-18 cc
France。其他人更理性，比如普魯士。
(以下回顧17世紀布蘭登堡到18世紀普魯士建軍的政策，我就先省略，共2段)
So. Land-maxing requires minimising the naval ambition. Does Russia minimise
its naval ambition? No. It feels obliged to maintain as much Soviet naval
legacy as possible. Keep old ships afloat, build new ones, maintain and
expand infrastructure for the ocean navy
所以。土地最大化需要最小化海軍野心。俄羅斯是否將其海軍野心最小化？不，感覺有義
務盡可能多地保留蘇聯海軍遺產。保持舊船漂浮，建造新船，維護和擴大海洋海軍的基礎
設施。
Here is another dilemma. Regional fleets can be effectively used in land
wars. For example, Russia declared "navy manoeuvres" and then attacked
Ukraine from the sea. That's cheap and effective. But keeping a regional
fleet doesn't sound sexy. It's efficiency-maxing, not PR-maxing。
這是另一個困境。區域艦隊可以有效地用於陸戰。例如，俄羅斯宣布“海軍演習”，然後
從海上襲擊烏克蘭。這既便宜又有效。但保持一支區域艦隊聽起來並不性感。這是效率最
大化，而不是公關 (PR)最大化。(*這裡PR的意思感謝abc12812版友提供翻譯協助)
And Russia is PR-maxing. Putin declared that the share of new ships should
reach 70% by 2027. Old Soviet ships are becoming obsolete, Russia's building
new ones. BUT. Major Soviet shipyards are located in Ukraine. So now Russia
expands shipyard infrastructure to reach this goal.
俄羅斯正在進行公關最大化。普京宣布，到2027年，新艦船的佔比應達到70%。蘇聯的舊艦船正在
變得過時，俄羅斯正在建造新艦船。但。蘇聯的主要造船廠位於烏克蘭。所以現在俄羅斯
擴大了造船廠基礎設施以實現這一目標。
Soviet naval legacy is a curse of Russian military. USSR could afford ocean
fleets with carrier strike group. Russia can't. But abandoning Soviet
ambitions would require suppressing their own hubris (impossible). So they
strive to maintain it. Ergo: they can't and won't land-max。
蘇聯海軍遺產是俄羅斯軍隊的詛咒。蘇聯可以負擔擁有航母打擊群的遠洋艦隊。俄羅斯不
行。但是放棄蘇聯的野心需要壓制他們自己的狂妄自大（不可能）。所以他們努力維護它
。Ergo：他們不能也不會最大限度地擴展陸權。*
(land-max，這詞感謝版友rt3648yth翻譯協助)。
How does it reflect on this war? First, Russian invading force is small. It
has LOTS of artillery ofc. But it's not numerous enough to win. Pro-Russian
analysts compare their advance with Barbarossa. But unlike Wehrmacht in 1941
Russian invaders have only *ONE ECHELON OF TROUPS*。
它如何反映這場戰爭？一是俄軍入侵力量小。它有很多火砲。但它的數量不足以贏得勝利
。親俄分析師將他們的進步與巴巴羅薩進行了比較。但與 1941 年的國防軍不同，俄羅斯
入侵者只有*一個梯隊*。
How is a Blitzkrieg organised? By echelons. First echelon is moving forward
as fast as they can. Ofc this means that lots of defenders will be left in
their rear. But then the second echelon comes, then third, etc. They finish
defenders, occupy territory, control the supply lines。
閃電戰是如何組織的？按梯隊。第一梯隊正在以最快的速度前進。當然這意味著許多後
衛將留在他們的後方。但是隨後第二梯隊來了，然後是第三梯隊，依此類推。他們終結了
守軍，佔領了領土，控制了補給線。
If Russia launched a proper Barbarossa-style Blitzkrieg that would happen now
- first, second, third echelons. But the second echelon didn't come. It never
existed. Why? First, Russia's *not* landmaxing and thus doesn't have so much
resources and infrastructure for the land war.
如果俄羅斯發動一場適當的巴巴羅薩式閃電戰，現在就會發生第一梯隊、第二梯隊、
第三梯隊。但是第二梯隊沒有來。它從未存在過。為什麼？首先，俄羅斯*不是*陸軍最大
化，因此沒有那麼多資源和基礎設施用於陸戰。
Secondly, launching several echelons would require long arduous preparation.
You need to mobilise them, move to the borders, quarter, maintain and supply.
It's not that easy. It's a hard job that should have been done well in
advance to wage a Blitzkrieg. And it hadn't been done.
其次，發射幾個梯隊需要長期艱苦的準備。你需要動員他們，轉移到邊境，駐紮，維護和
供應。沒有那麼容易。這是一項艱鉅的工作，應該提前做好以發動閃電戰。而且還沒有完
成。
Why Russia didn't prepare a proper Blitzkrieg? And now we come for the third
and main reason. Blitzkrieg is a war strategy. Blitzkrieg is how you break &
suppress the enemy who's actually fighting. Russia didn't plan it because it
didn't plan a war. It planned a Special Operation.
為什麼俄羅斯沒有準備適當的閃電戰？現在我們來是為了第三個也是主要原因。閃電戰是
一種戰爭策略。閃電戰是你如何打破和壓制實際戰鬥的敵人。俄羅斯沒有計劃，因為它沒
有計劃戰爭。它計劃了一次特別行動。
Ofc partially that's just modern discourse. After WWII traditional
understanding of sovereignty as of legal right of sovereign rulers to wage
offensive war died. As a result modern states never admit they're waging
wars. They're waging "pacifications", "counterterrorism", etc.
當然部分只是現代話語。二戰後，將主權視為主權統治者發動進攻性戰爭的合法權利的傳
統理解消失了。因此，現代國家從不承認他們正在發動戰爭。他們在進行“安撫”、“反
恐”等。
Consider how all the War Departments and Ministries over the world were
renamed into "Defence" in late 1940s. Everyone's defending, nobody's
attacking. Why does the fighting happen then? Well, because of criminals -
"bandits", "terrorists", "jihadees" or as now in Ukraine "Nazis".
想想在 1940 年代後期，世界上所有的戰爭部和部委是如何更名為“國防”的。每個人都
在防守，沒有人在進攻。那為什麼會發生戰鬥呢？好吧，因為犯罪分子-“土匪”，“恐
怖分子”，“聖戰者”或現在在烏克蘭的“納粹”。
Modern world abolished the distinction between the enemy and the criminal, a
key idea of the Roman Law. Powers do wage wars, but to do so they need to
criminalise and dehumanise their enemies. Hence, all the "terrorist"
discourse. In a sense Putin is going with the flow。
現代世界廢除了敵人和罪犯之間的區別，這是羅馬法的一個關鍵思想。大國確實發動戰爭
，但要這樣做，他們需要將他們的敵人定為犯罪和非人化。因此，所有的“恐怖主義”言
論。從某種意義上說，普京只是跟隨了時代的潮流。
But on a deeper level Putin is absolutely correct. His declaration of
"special operation" in Ukraine is sincere, because he didn't expect the war.
He doesn't know how to do wars. For all of his life he's been organising and
launching the special operations。
但在更深層次上，普京是絕對正確的。他在烏克蘭宣布“特別行動”是真誠的，因為他沒
想到會發生戰爭。他不知道如何進行戰爭。他一生都在組織和發起特別行動。
First, as a KGB officer. Then, as St Petersburg city councillor for foreign
affairs (= illegally selling Soviet warehouse stuff to the West). In 1990s he
closely worked with the criminal world and he did it successfully. Here you
see him with a thief-in-law, Grandpa Hassan。
首先，作為KGB官員。然後，作為聖彼得堡市外交事務議員(=非法向西方出售蘇聯倉庫
的東西）。 1990 年代，他與犯罪界密切合作，並取得了成功。在這裡你看到他和一個小
偷哈桑爺爺。
推文圖址：
https://pbs.twimg.com/media/FMoGcKtXoA82DSQ?format=jpg&name=small
Btw that's how Putin's pal Grandpa Hassan is celebrating with his close
circle. It gives some idea of Putin's business partners and associates.
順便說一句，下面影片就是普京的朋友哈桑爺爺與他的親密圈子慶祝的方式。
它讓我們了解了普京的商業夥伴和同事。
影片網址：
https://youtu.be/v941VC0wHJk?t=117
Putin worked with violent entrepreneurs used to killing. But. He had always
had the upper hand. Federal and regional governments were very much stronger
than these criminal bosses who were very much replaceable. Everyone of them
had dozens of henchmen who wanted to take his place.
普京與習慣於殺戮的暴力企業家一起工作。但。他總是佔上風。聯邦和地區政府比這些非
常容易被替換的犯罪頭目要強大得多。他們每個人都有幾十個心腹想要取代他的位置。
Putin waged special operations when he had much stronger position than these
criminals. And he got used to that. Later Yeltsin chose him as a successor
and in this capacity Putin launched a bunch of special operations to
consolidate power. Again with full support of higher ups.
普京在地位比這些罪犯強得多的時候發動了特別行動。他已經習慣了。後來葉利欽選擇了
他作為接班人，普京以此身份發動了一系列鞏固權力的特別行動。再次得到上級的全力支
持。
Yeah, Putin played badass even before becoming a President. But it was easy
to play a badass when he was backed up by then President and the entire
apparatus of Kremlin. Huge power, no risk, no accountability.
是的，普京甚至在成為總統之前就表現得很糟糕。但是當他得到當時的總統和克里姆林宮
整個機構的支持時，他很容易扮演壞蛋。巨大的權力，沒有風險，沒有責任。
Later he initiated conflicts each time his had to boost his popularity and
tough image. Chechnya, Georgia, Syria. But neither of this was a war. Every
conflict was a Special operation waged:
1) for political goals
2) against small force which had no chance to win against Russia
後來，每次為了提升知名度和強硬形象，他都會引發矛盾。車臣，喬治亞，敘利亞。但
這兩者都不是戰爭。每一次沖突都是一場特別行動：
1) 政治目標
2) 對付沒有機會戰勝俄羅斯的小部隊
Putin fought only with small countries. Chechnya - 1 million people, Georgia
- 4. Syria had more, but he fought with rebels, with no proper training or
armaments. Also "counterterrorist" discourse allowed Russians to simply level
entire cities to the ground with no consequences。
普京只與小國作戰。車臣 - 100 萬人，喬治亞 - 400萬人。敘利亞有更多，但他是與叛軍
作戰，而叛軍沒有適當的訓練或武器。此外，“反恐”言論允許俄羅斯人簡單地將整個城
市夷為平地而沒有任何戰後責任。
Every time Putin needed to confirm his alpha status he would devastate some
little country with a Special Operation. They didn't require proper
preparation because they bore no existential risk to Russia or to him. Like,
the fuck they're gonna do? No risk = no need to bother.
每次普京需要確認他的領袖地位時，他都會通過特別行動摧毀一些小國家。他們不需
要適當的準備，因為他們對俄羅斯或他沒有生存風險。就像，他們他媽的要做什麼？沒有
風險=無需費心。
Putin decided to repeat this little trick again. Hence, not that numerous
army of invasion, only one echelon of advance, etc. But Ukraine is much
bigger - it has 44 million people. What was Putin thinking? Apparently he was
expecting zero resistance from the Ukrainian army.
普京決定再次重複這個小技巧。因此，沒有那麼多入侵的軍隊，只有一個梯隊的推進，等
等。但烏克蘭要大得多它有 4400 萬人。普京在想什麼？顯然他期待烏克蘭軍隊的零
抵抗。
Putin had a good reason to believe so. Indeed, in 2014 Russian regulars ("
их там нет" = "there aren't any of them there") easily destroyed
Ukrainian forces in Debaltsevo and Ilovaysk. He saw that Ukrainian army is
weak and he can easily route them simply sending .
普京有充分的理由相信這一點。事實上，在 2014 年，俄羅斯的「小綠人(民兵」
（“их там нет”=“他們不是任何一個當地的「他們」”）輕鬆摧毀了德巴爾
採沃和伊洛韋斯克的烏克蘭軍隊。他看到烏克蘭軍隊很弱，他只需派遣俄羅斯正規軍就可
以輕鬆擊潰他們。
*這段可能需要版友協助翻譯，in 2014 Russian regulars ("их там нет" =
"there aren't any of them there") 要怎麼翻比較好？
**感謝speedwave及neutrino版友建議，暫譯如上**
另外感謝KleinSchwarz版友的說明：
推 KleinSchwarz: ихтамнеты 其實是俄文 их там нет 02/28 18:19
→ KleinSchwarz: 構成的新詞。根據俄文維基的解釋，這個詞是2014年 02/28 18:19
→ KleinSchwarz: 俄國侵占克里米亞時，普丁在節目上被問到克里米亞到 02/28 18:19
→ KleinSchwarz: 底有沒有俄軍時所用的回答。их там нет的意 02/28 18:19
→ KleinSchwarz: 思是「那裡沒有他們（俄軍）」，後來就成為俄軍的一 02/28 18:19
→ KleinSchwarz: 種能指，也是十分有趣w 02/28 18:19
Strategically speaking Putin fucked up. He defeated Ukraine, inflicted pain
and humiliation. Anyone with an IQ above the room temperature knew the war is
not over and Russians would strike again. But - Putin didn't finish Ukraine
back then. He thought he'd always have a chance.
從戰略上講，普京搞砸了。他打敗了烏克蘭，造成了痛苦和屈辱。任何智商高於室溫的人
都知道戰爭還沒有結束，俄羅斯人會再次發動襲擊。但是 - 普京當時並沒有終結烏克蘭
。他以為他永遠有機會。
What happened next was quite predictable. Inflicting a painful but not
critical defeat on your enemy is risky. Yeah, they kinda became weaker. But
the balance of power within them changed. Court politics maxing interest
groups lost and efficiency maxing upstarts get a chance.
接下來發生的事情完全可以預料。對你的敵人造成痛苦但不嚴重的失敗是有風險的。是的
，他們變弱了。但他們的內部權力平衡發生變化：宮廷政治使利益團體失勢，而效率掛帥
的新勢力抓住了機會。
(待續)
(以上為俄羅斯的部分，因為實在太長，烏克蘭我稍後開另外一篇。)
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如果閱讀感到不適，您可以直接把我或文章拉黑就好，抱歉。
※ 編輯: dennis99 (219.68.120.5 臺灣), 02/28/2022 14:38:46
剛剛忘了標，這邊我是完全看機翻的，我其實不太懂。
※ 編輯: dennis99 (219.68.120.5 臺灣), 03/01/2022 07:06:28
※ 編輯: dennis99 (219.68.120.5 臺灣), 03/02/2022 02:08:13
... <看更多>