關於 define persecution ，我們在網路上蒐集到這些相關的討論、資訊與評價

【LIVE🔴多國元首峰會發表演說】

「哥本哈根民主高峰會」就「從香港戰場為民主奮鬥（Fighting for Democracy – From the Battlegrounds of Hong Kong）」發表演說，有幸成為峰會首位發言嘉賓。

部份出席峰會政界領袖：

美國國務卿蓬佩奧
US Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo

台灣總統蔡英文
President of the Republic of China (Taiwan) Dr. Tsai Ing-wen

歐盟委員會副主席堯羅娃
European Commission Vice-President Vera Jourova

北大西洋公約組織副秘書長傑瓦納
NATO Deputy Secretary-General Mircea Geoana

前美國國務卿凱瑞
68th US Secretary of State (2013-2017) John Kerry

前美國國務卿歐布萊特
64th US Secretary of State (1997-2001) Madeleine Albright

前澳洲總理滕博爾
29th Australian Prime Minister (2015-2018) Malcolm Turnbull

—————————

2020 Copenhagen Democracy Summit
Fighting for Democracy – From the Battlegrounds of Hong Kong
Joshua Wong
18 June 2020

Thank you so much for inviting me to speak, Ryan. I say this knowing I might not have the chance to do so again in the future, and this is not an exaggeration. Many of you still recall the scene when millions of Hong Kongers took to the street last year. We opposed the extradition arrangements that would’ve essentially allowed legalized kidnapping: Hong Kongers found guilty of breaking Chinese law could be sent to stand trial in a Chinese court. The authorities eventually withdrew the bill under tremendous pressure, but they also responded our demand to full democracy with oppressive policing forces. The number of arrested protested since last summer is already more than the number of prisoners in Hong Kong right now. More than thousands were arrested and charged with rioting. Many more injured or even went missing.

New Crackdown

This prolonged struggle with the Chinese Communist Party for years now. The Umbrella Movement broke out in 2014 demanding that Beijing lived up to its promises of democracy. But rather than doing so in honour of the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984, Xi Jinping’s crackdown on our autonomy has only intensified over time.

What Xi Jinping learnt from Hong Kong’s democratic movement last year is to become more draconic and oppressive. It would be best to have me sent across the border to stand trial directly than to engage in dynamic diplomatic talks and negotiation. Therefore, precisely one year afterwards, when I am attending this summit, Beijing's legislature, the NPCSC, at the same time holds meetings, finalizing a sweeping national security law that targets democratic activists like myself.

Under the pretext of ‘national security’, this law purports to target acts of “collusion with foreign forces’’. Beijing did not define what is ‘’collusion’’, but it will wield massive discretionary power to punish activists and electoral candidates on the one hand, and cut off Hong Kong from the international society and their crucial support, on the other. Take this occasion as an example, I’m convinced that every word comes from my mouth today could well become proof of crime at the Chinese courtroom in the near future. Worse still, not only can democratic activists and legislators who have participated in international advocacy efforts be barred from running elections or even imprisoned, INGOs and other organizations, including their personnel and assets, can also be subject to legal persecution.

So the developments in Hong Kong have changed quite swiftly. Large-scale protests defying the communist government may no longer be an option. It could be my last testimony when I am still free, yet prosecuted and put behind bars under the sweeping security law. Our long march to democracy will be forced into a prolonged period of fierce crackdown, perhaps similar to what Poland experienced in the Communist era, with secret police agency stationed in the city.

The Wounds of Hong Kong are Proof of Defying Beijing’s Oppression

These scenarios may create a stark contrast with the impression we usually have to a cosmopolitan Hong Kong famous for its international financial centre. The economic freedom, free flow of capital and freedom to information we used to enjoy in Hong Kong, will fade away after the law imposed. It is also the Sword of Damocles over all investors and ex-pats living and working on this island. When geopolitical tension intensifies, ex-pats can fall victim to the ill-defined law and China's hostage diplomacy. In the past, two Canadian nationals were detained for nearly two years as retaliation to Huawei's executive Meng Wanzhou's arrest, let alone Swedish NGO worker Peter Dahlin, Australian writer Yang Hengjun and Taiwanese NGO activist Lee Ming-che. Foreign journalists, human rights workers and academics were barred from Hong Kong. When China makes national security its priority, no one is safe.

Citizen journalists, booksellers, NGO workers, religious groups, online bloggers, booksellers, writers, human rights defenders or even critics of government policies are put behind bars. Amnesty International also raised concerns about its spill-out effects on economic activities and online speech. Once the law reaches out its claw to this beacon of liberty on China's soul, this vibrant civil society is on the brink of collapse.

Certainly, I would devote whatever efforts I can to defy this new round of oppression. But Beijing’s continued moves to crush democracy in Xinjiang and in Hong Kong also explain the Goliath we are facing is not as fierce as it looks like. In the past two decades, Beijing’s aggressive expansion in Europe, Asia and Africa has given a warning signal to democratic states all over the world. The world is awakening from the Chinese Nightmare. If we are determined to safeguard democratic aspirations, we must act to defy China's dictatoral grip.

Towards Democracy: Pain, Tears and Compassion.

In Hong Kong, we had experienced many depressing moments last year when state-mobilized mobs attacked passengers in the metro station, when police forcefully entered the university campus to arrest and to torture protestors, when witnessing countless students younger than me were put behind bars. What drives us to continue our struggle? My answer is compassion.

As my dear friend, Brian Leung said, ‘’Hong Kong Belongs to Everyone Who Shares Its Pain’’. In the previous year, we burst into tears mourning the death of protestors, we shared boxes of surgical masks to one another to defend ourselves from the Coronavirus. I also pray for protesters who are forced to leave our home because of their sacrifice in the movement. I pray for brothers who are struggled in jail now and I pray for those who will become political refugees soon. They are the reasons I’m still fighting in this battle. As we grow in pain, in tears and in compassion, I believe we shall succeed one day.

Thank you.

【LIVE🔴多國元首峰會發表演說】

「哥本哈根民主高峰會」就「從香港戰場為民主奮鬥（Fighting for Democracy – From the Battlegrounds of Hong Kong）」發表演說，有幸成為峰會首位發言嘉賓。

部份出席峰會政界領袖：

美國國務卿蓬佩奧
US Secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo

台灣總統蔡英文
President of the Republic of China (Taiwan) Dr. Tsai Ing-wen

歐盟委員會副主席堯羅娃
European Commission Vice-President Vera Jourova

北大西洋公約組織副秘書長傑瓦納
NATO Deputy Secretary-General Mircea Geoana

前美國國務卿凱瑞
68th US Secretary of State (2013-2017) John Kerry

前美國國務卿歐布萊特
64th US Secretary of State (1997-2001) Madeleine Albright

前澳洲總理滕博爾
29th Australian Prime Minister (2015-2018) Malcolm Turnbull

—————————

2020 Copenhagen Democracy Summit
Fighting for Democracy – From the Battlegrounds of Hong Kong
Joshua Wong
18 June 2020

Thank you so much for inviting me to speak, Ryan. I say this knowing I might not have the chance to do so again in the future, and this is not an exaggeration. Many of you still recall the scene when millions of Hong Kongers took to the street last year. We opposed the extradition arrangements that would’ve essentially allowed legalized kidnapping: Hong Kongers found guilty of breaking Chinese law could be sent to stand trial in a Chinese court. The authorities eventually withdrew the bill under tremendous pressure, but they also responded our demand to full democracy with oppressive policing forces. The number of arrested protested since last summer is already more than the number of prisoners in Hong Kong right now. More than thousands were arrested and charged with rioting. Many more injured or even went missing.

New Crackdown

This prolonged struggle with the Chinese Communist Party for years now. The Umbrella Movement broke out in 2014 demanding that Beijing lived up to its promises of democracy. But rather than doing so in honour of the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984, Xi Jinping’s crackdown on our autonomy has only intensified over time.

What Xi Jinping learnt from Hong Kong’s democratic movement last year is to become more draconic and oppressive. It would be best to have me sent across the border to stand trial directly than to engage in dynamic diplomatic talks and negotiation. Therefore, precisely one year afterwards, when I am attending this summit, Beijing's legislature, the NPCSC, at the same time holds meetings, finalizing a sweeping national security law that targets democratic activists like myself.

Under the pretext of ‘national security’, this law purports to target acts of “collusion with foreign forces’’. Beijing did not define what is ‘’collusion’’, but it will wield massive discretionary power to punish activists and electoral candidates on the one hand, and cut off Hong Kong from the international society and their crucial support, on the other. Take this occasion as an example, I’m convinced that every word comes from my mouth today could well become proof of crime at the Chinese courtroom in the near future. Worse still, not only can democratic activists and legislators who have participated in international advocacy efforts be barred from running elections or even imprisoned, INGOs and other organizations, including their personnel and assets, can also be subject to legal persecution.

So the developments in Hong Kong have changed quite swiftly. Large-scale protests defying the communist government may no longer be an option. It could be my last testimony when I am still free, yet prosecuted and put behind bars under the sweeping security law. Our long march to democracy will be forced into a prolonged period of fierce crackdown, perhaps similar to what Poland experienced in the Communist era, with secret police agency stationed in the city.

The Wounds of Hong Kong are Proof of Defying Beijing’s Oppression

These scenarios may create a stark contrast with the impression we usually have to a cosmopolitan Hong Kong famous for its international financial centre. The economic freedom, free flow of capital and freedom to information we used to enjoy in Hong Kong, will fade away after the law imposed. It is also the Sword of Damocles over all investors and ex-pats living and working on this island. When geopolitical tension intensifies, ex-pats can fall victim to the ill-defined law and China's hostage diplomacy. In the past, two Canadian nationals were detained for nearly two years as retaliation to Huawei's executive Meng Wanzhou's arrest, let alone Swedish NGO worker Peter Dahlin, Australian writer Yang Hengjun and Taiwanese NGO activist Lee Ming-che. Foreign journalists, human rights workers and academics were barred from Hong Kong. When China makes national security its priority, no one is safe.

Citizen journalists, booksellers, NGO workers, religious groups, online bloggers, booksellers, writers, human rights defenders or even critics of government policies are put behind bars. Amnesty International also raised concerns about its spill-out effects on economic activities and online speech. Once the law reaches out its claw to this beacon of liberty on China's soul, this vibrant civil society is on the brink of collapse.

Certainly, I would devote whatever efforts I can to defy this new round of oppression. But Beijing’s continued moves to crush democracy in Xinjiang and in Hong Kong also explain the Goliath we are facing is not as fierce as it looks like. In the past two decades, Beijing’s aggressive expansion in Europe, Asia and Africa has given a warning signal to democratic states all over the world. The world is awakening from the Chinese Nightmare. If we are determined to safeguard democratic aspirations, we must act to defy China's dictatoral grip.

Towards Democracy: Pain, Tears and Compassion.

In Hong Kong, we had experienced many depressing moments last year when state-mobilized mobs attacked passengers in the metro station, when police forcefully entered the university campus to arrest and to torture protestors, when witnessing countless students younger than me were put behind bars. What drives us to continue our struggle? My answer is compassion.

As my dear friend, Brian Leung said, ‘’Hong Kong Belongs to Everyone Who Shares Its Pain’’. In the previous year, we burst into tears mourning the death of protestors, we shared boxes of surgical masks to one another to defend ourselves from the Coronavirus. I also pray for protesters who are forced to leave our home because of their sacrifice in the movement. I pray for brothers who are struggled in jail now and I pray for those who will become political refugees soon. They are the reasons I’m still fighting in this battle. As we grow in pain, in tears and in compassion, I believe we shall succeed one day.

Thank you.

【#TheDiplomat: 沈旭暉隨緣家書英文版🇭🇰】很久沒有向國際關係評論網 The Diplomat 供稿，但國際線十分重要，不應放棄。這次他們希望分享23條、國安法、反恐法風雨欲來的「新香港」前瞻，願國際社會能多了解快將出現的危機：

While the world is preoccupied with a fight against the COVID-19 pandemic, Beijing has been tightening its political grip on all aspects of Hong Kong’s civil society. Rumor has it that Beijing will push through legislating national security laws under Article 23 of Hong Kong’s Basic Law by unconventional means, such as massively disqualifying pro-democratic legislators or even directly applying a national law, widely argued as a major step to destroy the rights and freedom of Hong Kongers, and bring Chinese authoritarianism to Hong Kong.

After the 2019 protests, the administration of Carrie Lam, who theoretically is still leading the special administrative region of China, has little political capital at stake, with its legitimacy reaching rock bottom. The pro-government camp has dwindling prospects for the city’s upcoming Legislative Council election. The government‘s ”nothing to lose“ mentality is apparent from its recent blatant reinterpretation of the Basic Law’s Article 22 (another article that limits the influence of China’s offices in Hong Kong’s internal affairs). The debate is nothing new, but the pressure this time is quite different.

This article highlights the different strategies Beijing could adopt to enact Article 23 insidiously or under disguise to avoid backlash from the international community, while continuing to reap benefits from the city’s globally recognized special status. This seems to be part of Beijing’s brinkmanship to bring Hong Kong protesters and their supporters to their knees and move the city closer to authoritarianism. To counter these moves, Hong Kongers must define the boundaries beyond which Hong Kong falls into authoritarian rule and make a case as to why the city’s downfall is detrimental to the international community‘s interest.

The Long-Term Controversy Over National Security Laws

Back in 2003, the implementation of Article 23 was thwarted by the moderate pro-establishment politician James Tien. In face of overwhelming public disapproval of the law, he withdrew support and votes from his Liberal Party. However, 17 years later, it is hard to imagine Beijing following the old legislative playbook: start with a public consultation, followed by public discourse and political debate, and end with the majority rule. This playbook only works in peaceful societies ruled by a trustworthy government with integrity.

The aftermath of 2003, as well as the 2019 protests, should have taught Beijing and the Hong Kong government a lesson: pushing through national security legislation in a flawed parliament controlled by the minority pro-government camp would inevitably set off another full city-scale protest — and undoubtedly more fierce and focused this time. Given the current government’s numerous displays of dishonesty, it is conceivable that they will embark on a less-traveled path to implement Article 23.

Strategy One: “Anti-Terrorism”

In principle, one possible strategy could be to directly enact Chinese national law across Hong Kong, which can be achieved by declaring a state of emergency in the city. However, this is risky business as it would tarnish the integrity of “one country two systems” and subsequently Hong Kong’s international standing. Beijing, a risk-averse regime, is also unwilling to see Hong Kong’s status as a middleman for laundering money disappear into thin air.

Instead, Beijing could be concocting a narrative that would see Chinese national law applied to Hong Kong while not damaging Hong Kong’s international standing and Beijing’s own interests. The key word in this script is “anti-terrorism.” As early as 2014, pro-Beijing scholars have been claiming the emergence of “local terrorist ideology” on Hong Kong soil. Since the anti-extradition bill protests last year, government rhetoric frequently described the protests, which caused no deaths at all in the entire year, with phrases like “inclination to terrorist ideology.” That was a signal to the world that Hong Kong’s internal conflicts had ballooned into a national security issue. This gives the government the legitimacy to justify the implementation of Chinese national laws across the highly autonomous region to counter terrorism. The Chinese government knows that if it can persuade the world that terrorism exists in Hong Kong, and that it is as severe as the terror threat facing many other nations today, the international community will be less critical of Beijing’s actions in Hong Kong. Enacting Chinese laws directly is a convenient path that will save Beijing from having to tackle Hong Kong’s internal conflicts, basically turning the Hong Kong issue into a nonissue.

Strategy Two: Stacking the Legislature by Disqualifying Candidates

An even bolder strategy was probably foretold by a recent incident where the Hong Kong government and Beijing’s agencies for Hong Kong affairs (HKMAO and the Liaison Office) jointly criticized lawmaker Dennis Kwok for filibustering, framing it as “misconduct in public office” and “violating his oath.” It is incomprehensible to claim that filibustering goes against a lawmaker’s main duty; rather, it is common understanding that legislative work includes debating the law and representing public opinion against unreasonable laws. In a parliament controlled by the minority, pro-democratic members representing the majority of Hong Kongers are forced to express their objections using means like filibustering. Wouldn’t a lack of different political opinions turn the legislative branch into a rubber-stamp institution?

The above allegation has set a dangerous precedent for twisting the logic behind a certain provision in the Basic Law to target opposing lawmakers. In other words, to fulfill Beijing’s interpretation of the principal requirement for holding public office in Hong Kong, one could be required to take a meticulously legalistic approach to uphold the Basic Law down to its every single wording. A public official, by this new definition, not only needs to support “one country, two systems” or object Hong Kong independence, but also must abide by every single provision in the Basic Law. Worst of all, based on the previous cases, whether an official’s words or actions oversteps a provision is up to Beijing’s interpretation of his/her “intent.”

If this approach is applied, in the next election, there might be additional official questions for screening candidates like the following: “The Basic Law states that the enactment of Article 23 is a constitutional duty. Failing to support Article 23 legislation violates the Basic Law. Do you support it?” This question would suffice to disqualify even moderate or even pro-establishment candidates like James Tien. Even if any pro-democratic candidates were elected, once Article 23 re-enters the legislative process, they could risk ouster by raising objections.

Despite the absurdity of this tactic, the Chinese regime may just be tempted enough if such a strategy could resolve two of China’s current nuisances — voices of dissent in the Legislative Council and the previous failure to implement Article 23.

Strategy Three: The “Boiling Frog Effect”

Article 23 is not yet implemented, but the dystopian world that the protesters pictured in 2003 is already becoming reality. Regular citizens have been persecuted for “sedition” for sharing their views on social media or participating in legal protests; workers face retaliation for taking part in strikes; corporations are pressured to publicly side with the government’s stance; employees who have the “wrong” political views are fired; schools have been closely monitored for teaching material; protest-supporting fundraisers were framed for money laundering; a retweet or like may lead to persecution, under a colonial-era law. Only now have Hong Kongers woken up to their new reality — although the Basic Law technically protects citizens’ rights to speak, rally, march, demonstrate, and go on strike, the government could enfeeble civil rights by bending antiquated laws and legal provisions. The frequent abuse of law enforcement power on a small scale, such as improper arrests and police violence, is desensitizing the public and the international community. In a few years, Hong Kong will become unrecognizable. This is indeed a clever play on Beijing’s part to slowly strip away Hong Kong’s autonomy and freedom, without causing much international attention.

Counter-Strategies Against Beijing’s Brinkmanship

Beijing’s overarching goal is to hollow out Hong Kong but, at the same time, avoid major backlash from the international community, which could spell the end of the privileged global status of Hong Kong not granted to other Chinese cities. Beijing also aims at preventing single incidents that could cascade down into mass protests as seen in 2003, 2014, and 2019; and eliminating any resistance forces from within Hong Kong’s legislature. The tactics outlined above are typical in a game of brinkmanship.

In response, Hong Kongers in Hong Kong and on the so-called “international frontline” must know their strengths and bargaining chips on this negotiating table with Beijing.

Unlike Xinjiang and Tibet, Hong Kong is a city with transparency and free flow of information. Hong Kongers need to make a case to the world that the protests are not acts of terrorism. Some suggestions include comparing the Hong Kong protests to similar struggles in 20 or so other counties in the world at the present time, none of which were classified as terrorism; collecting a large amount of concrete evidence of the disproportionate use of force by the Hong Kong police; and showing how enacting Chinese national laws in Hong Kong will end the city’s autonomy and spell disaster for international community‘s interests.

The Legislative Council is the institution that can counteract Beijing’s “boiling frog” strategy and to keep Hong Kongers’ hope alive in the system. Those who plan to run for legislative office must be prepared to be disqualified from running. If only individuals are banned, there need to be alternative candidates as back-up plans. However, if and when the disqualification process is applied broadly to entire camps of candidates (for example, all who object to Article 23), the pro-democracy camp must make a strong case to the Hong Kong and global public that this is the endgame for Hong Kong democracy. Then the incumbent popularly elected legislators will hold the internationally recognized mandate from the public and serve as the last resistance.

These recommendations delineates how the slogan “if we burn, you burn with us,” often seen in the protests, may play out in the game of international relations. If the national security laws are “passed” by a legislature that is jury-rigged in this manner, or if related national laws are directly implemented in Hong Kong, Hong Kongers should signal clearly to the world that it goes way beyond the promised “one country, two systems.” Crossing this red line by Beijing should be seen by the world as a blunt violation of its promised autonomy to Hong Kongers. At that time, if the international community led by the United States and the United Kingdom decided to revoke the “non-sovereignty entity” status of Hong Kong and regard the SAR as an ordinary Chinese city, it shouldn’t come as a surprise.

Dr. Simon Shen is the Founding Chairman of GLOs (Glocal Learning Offices), an international relations start-up company. He also serves as an adjunct associate professor in the University of Hong Kong, Chinese University of Hong Kong and the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, and associate director of the Master of Global Political Economy Programme of the CUHK. The author acknowledges Jean Lin, Coco Ho, Chris Wong, Michelle King, and Alex Yap for their assistance in this piece.

▶️ 高度自治 vs 全面管治
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pwt8wZl8jHQ