關於 substantive law ，我們在網路上蒐集到這些相關的討論、資訊與評價

Breaking‼️

美東時間1月5日傍晚，川普以國家安全為由，用行政命令方式禁止阿里支付寶、微信支付、QQ錢包在內的8款中國應用程式（App)。

行政命令發佈後45天，禁止任何人與實體與這8款中國應用程式（App）進行交易。

按照日程，美國下任政府將在15天後，1月20日上任。

—

美國商務部長在同一時間發聲明表示，已指示商務部按行政命令執行禁令，「支持川普總統保護美國人民隱私與安全，免於受到中國共產黨的威脅。」

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▫️8款App:

支付寶（Alipay）、掃描全能王(CamScanner)、QQ錢包（QQ Wallet）、茄子快傳（SHAREit）、騰訊QQ（Tencent QQ）、阿里巴巴旗下海外短視頻應用VMate、微信支付（WeChat Pay）和辦公型App WPS Office。

圖三：美國商務部聲明

圖四：美國國安顧問聲明
—

▫️白宮行政命令全文：

The White House
Office of the Press Secretary
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
January 5, 2021
EXECUTIVE ORDER



- - - - - - -



ADDRESSING THE THREAT POSED BY APPLICATIONS AND OTHER SOFTWARE DEVELOPED OR CONTROLLED BY CHINESE COMPANIES



By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code,

I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States of America, find that additional steps must be taken to deal with the national emergency with respect to the information and communications technology and services supply chain declared in Executive Order 13873 of May 15, 2019 (Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain). Specifically, the pace and pervasiveness of the spread in the United States of certain connected mobile and desktop applications and other software developed or controlled by persons in the People's Republic of China, to include Hong Kong and Macau (China), continue to threaten the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States. At this time, action must be taken to address the threat posed by these Chinese connected software applications.

By accessing personal electronic devices such as smartphones, tablets, and computers, Chinese connected software applications can access and capture vast swaths of information from users, including sensitive personally identifiable information and private information. This data collection threatens to provide the Government of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) with access to Americans' personal and proprietary information -- which would permit China to track the locations of Federal employees and contractors, and build dossiers of personal information.

The continuing activity of the PRC and the CCP to steal or otherwise obtain United States persons' data makes clear that there is an intent to use bulk data collection to advance China's economic and national security agenda. For example, the 2014 cyber intrusions of the Office of Personnel Management of security clearance records of more than 21 million people were orchestrated by Chinese agents. In 2015, a Chinese hacking group breached the United States health insurance company Anthem, affecting more than 78 million Americans. And the Department of Justice indicted members of the Chinese military for the 2017 Equifax cyber intrusion that compromised the personal information of almost half of all Americans.

In light of these risks, many executive departments and agencies (agencies) have prohibited the use of Chinese connected software applications and other dangerous software on Federal Government computers and mobile phones. These prohibitions, however, are not enough given the nature of the threat from Chinese connected software applications. In fact, the Government of India has banned the use of more than 200 Chinese connected software applications throughout the country; in a statement, India's Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology asserted that the applications were "stealing and surreptitiously transmitting users' data in an unauthorized manner to servers which have locations outside India."

The United States has assessed that a number of Chinese connected software applications automatically capture vast swaths of information from millions of users in the United States, including sensitive personally identifiable information and private information, which would allow the PRC and CCP access to Americans' personal and proprietary information.

The United States must take aggressive action against those who develop or control Chinese connected software applications to protect our national security.

Accordingly, I hereby order:

Section 1. (a) The following actions shall be prohibited beginning 45 days after the date of this order, to the extent permitted under applicable law: any transaction by any person, or with respect to any property, subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, with persons that develop or control the following Chinese connected software applications, or with their subsidiaries, as those transactions and persons are identified by the Secretary of Commerce (Secretary) under subsection (e) of this section: Alipay, CamScanner, QQ Wallet, SHAREit, Tencent QQ, VMate, WeChat Pay, and WPS Office.

(b) The Secretary is directed to continue to evaluate Chinese connected software applications that may pose an unacceptable risk to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, and to take appropriate action in accordance with Executive Order 13873.

(c) Not later than 45 days after the date of this order, the Secretary, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Director of National Intelligence, shall provide a report to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs with recommendations to prevent the sale or transfer of United States user data to, or access of such data by, foreign adversaries, including through the establishment of regulations and policies to identify, control, and license the export of such data.

(d) The prohibitions in subsection (a) of this section apply except to the extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted before the date of this order.

(e) Not earlier than 45 days after the date of this order, the Secretary shall identify the transactions and persons that develop or control the Chinese connected software applications subject to subsection (a) of this section.

Sec. 2. (a) Any transaction by a United States person or within the United States that evades or avoids, has the purpose of evading or avoiding, causes a violation of, or attempts to violate the prohibition set forth in this order is prohibited.

(b) Any conspiracy formed to violate any of the prohibitions set forth in this order is prohibited.

Sec. 3. For the purposes of this order:

(a) the term "connected software application" means software, a software program, or group of software programs, designed to be used by an end user on an end-point computing device and designed to collect, process, or transmit data via the Internet as an integral part of its functionality.

(b) the term "entity" means a government or instrumentality of such government, partnership, association, trust, joint venture, corporation, group, subgroup, or other organization, including an international organization;

(c) the term "person" means an individual or entity;

(d) the term "personally identifiable information" (PII) is information that, when used alone or with other relevant data, can identify an individual. PII may contain direct identifiers (e.g., passport information) that can identify a person uniquely, or quasi-identifiers (e.g., race) that can be combined with other quasi-identifiers (e.g., date of birth) to successfully recognize an individual.

(e) the term "United States person" means any United States citizen, permanent resident alien, entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States (including foreign branches), or any person in the United States.

Sec. 4. (a) The Secretary, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General, is hereby authorized to take such actions, including adopting rules and regulations, and to employ all powers granted to me by IEEPA, as may be necessary to implement this order. All agencies shall take all appropriate measures within their authority to implement this order.

(b) The heads of agencies shall provide, in their discretion and to the extent permitted by law, such resources, information, and assistance to the Department of Commerce as required to implement this order, including the assignment of staff to the Department of Commerce to perform the duties described in this order.

Sec. 5. Severability. If any provision of this order, or the application of any provision to any person or circumstance, is held to be invalid, the remainder of this order and the application of its other provisions to any other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.

Sec. 6. General Provisions. (a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:

(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department, agency, or the head thereof; or

(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.

(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.

(c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.



DONALD J. TRUMP



THE WHITE HOUSE,

January 5, 2021.

The President’s Executive Order on Hong Kong Normalization

Issued on: July 14, 2020

By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, including the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 (Public Law 102-393), the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act of 2019 (Public Law 116-76), the Hong Kong Autonomy Act of 2020, signed into law July 14, 2020, the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.) (IEEPA), the National Emergencies Act (50 U.S.C. 1601 et seq.) (NEA), section 212(f) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (8 U.S.C. 1182(f)), and section 301 of title 3, United States Code,
I, DONALD J. TRUMP, President of the United States of America, determine, pursuant to section 202 of the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, that the Special Administrative Region of Hong Kong (Hong Kong) is no longer sufficiently autonomous to justify differential treatment in relation to the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) under the particular United States laws and provisions thereof set out in this order. In late May 2020, the National People’s Congress of China announced its intention to unilaterally and arbitrarily impose national security legislation on Hong Kong. This announcement was merely China’s latest salvo in a series of actions that have increasingly denied autonomy and freedoms that China promised to the people of Hong Kong under the 1984 Joint Declaration of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the People’s Republic of China on the Question of Hong Kong (Joint Declaration). As a result, on May 27, 2020, the Secretary of State announced that the PRC had fundamentally undermined Hong Kong’s autonomy and certified and reported to the Congress, pursuant to sections 205 and 301 of the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, as amended, respectively, that Hong Kong no longer warrants treatment under United States law in the same manner as United States laws were applied to Hong Kong before July 1, 1997. On May 29, 2020, I directed the heads of executive departments and agencies (agencies) to begin the process of eliminating policy exemptions under United States law that give Hong Kong differential treatment in relation to China.
China has since followed through on its threat to impose national security legislation on Hong Kong. Under this law, the people of Hong Kong may face life in prison for what China considers to be acts of secession or subversion of state power –- which may include acts like last year’s widespread anti-government protests. The right to trial by jury may be suspended. Proceedings may be conducted in secret. China has given itself broad power to initiate and control the prosecutions of the people of Hong Kong through the new Office for Safeguarding National Security. At the same time, the law allows foreigners to be expelled if China merely suspects them of violating the law, potentially making it harder for journalists, human rights organizations, and other outside groups to hold the PRC accountable for its treatment of the people of Hong Kong.
I therefore determine that the situation with respect to Hong Kong, including recent actions taken by the PRC to fundamentally undermine Hong Kong’s autonomy, constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States. I hereby declare a national emergency with respect to that threat.
In light of the foregoing, I hereby determine and order:

Section 1. It shall be the policy of the United States to suspend or eliminate different and preferential treatment for Hong Kong to the extent permitted by law and in the national security, foreign policy, and economic interest of the United States.

Sec. 2. Pursuant to section 202 of the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 5722), I hereby suspend the application of section 201(a) of the United States-Hong Kong Policy Act of 1992, as amended (22 U.S.C. 5721(a)), to the following statutes:
(a) section 103 of the Immigration Act of 1990 (8 U.S.C. 1152 note);
(b) sections 203(c), 212(l), and 221(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, as amended (8 U.S.C. 1153(c), 1182(l), and 1201(c), respectively);
(c) the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.);
(d) section 721(m) of the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended (50 U.S.C. 4565(m));
(e) the Export Control Reform Act of 2018 (50 U.S.C. 4801 et seq.); and
(f) section 1304 of title 19, United States Code.

Sec. 3. Within 15 days of the date of this order, the heads of agencies shall commence all appropriate actions to further the purposes of this order, consistent with applicable law, including, to:
(a) amend any regulations implementing those provisions specified in section 2 of this order, and, consistent with applicable law and executive orders, under IEEPA, which provide different treatment for Hong Kong as compared to China;
(b) amend the regulation at 8 CFR 212.4(i) to eliminate the preference for Hong Kong passport holders as compared to PRC passport holders;
(c) revoke license exceptions for exports to Hong Kong, reexports to Hong Kong, and transfers (in-country) within Hong Kong of items subject to the Export Administration Regulations, 15 CFR Parts 730-774, that provide differential treatment compared to those license exceptions applicable to exports to China, reexports to China, and transfers (in-country) within China;
(d) consistent with section 902(b)(2) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991 (Public Law 101-246), terminate the export licensing suspensions under section 902(a)(3) of such Act insofar as such suspensions apply to exports of defense articles to Hong Kong persons who are physically located outside of Hong Kong and the PRC and who were authorized to receive defense articles prior to the date of this order;
(e) give notice of intent to suspend the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Hong Kong for the Surrender of Fugitive Offenders (TIAS 98-121);
(f) give notice of intent to terminate the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Hong Kong for the Transfer of Sentenced Persons (TIAS 99-418);
(g) take steps to end the provision of training to members of the Hong Kong Police Force or other Hong Kong security services at the Department of State’s International Law Enforcement Academies;
(h) suspend continued cooperation undertaken consistent with the now-expired Protocol Between the U.S. Geological Survey of the Department of the Interior of the United States of America and Institute of Space and Earth Information Science of the Chinese University of Hong Kong Concerning Scientific and Technical Cooperation in Earth Sciences (TIAS 09-1109);
(i) take steps to terminate the Fulbright exchange program with regard to China and Hong Kong with respect to future exchanges for participants traveling both from and to China or Hong Kong;
(j) give notice of intent to terminate the agreement for the reciprocal exemption with respect to taxes on income from the international operation of ships effected by the Exchange of Notes Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Hong Kong (TIAS 11892);
(k) reallocate admissions within the refugee ceiling set by the annual Presidential Determination to residents of Hong Kong based on humanitarian concerns, to the extent feasible and consistent with applicable law; and
(l) propose for my consideration any further actions deemed necessary and prudent to end special conditions and preferential treatment for Hong Kong.

Sec. 4. All property and interests in property that are in the United States, that hereafter come within the United States, or that are or hereafter come within the possession or control of any United States person, of the following persons are blocked and may not be transferred, paid, exported, withdrawn, or otherwise dealt in:
(a) Any foreign person determined by the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, or the Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State:
(i) to be or have been involved, directly or indirectly, in the coercing, arresting, detaining, or imprisoning of individuals under the authority of, or to be or have been responsible for or involved in developing, adopting, or implementing, the Law of the People’s Republic of China on Safeguarding National Security in the Hong Kong Administrative Region;
(ii) to be responsible for or complicit in, or to have engaged in, directly or indirectly, any of the following:
(A) actions or policies that undermine democratic processes or institutions in Hong Kong;
(B) actions or policies that threaten the peace, security, stability, or autonomy of Hong Kong;
(C) censorship or other activities with respect to Hong Kong that prohibit, limit, or penalize the exercise of freedom of expression or assembly by citizens of Hong Kong, or that limit access to free and independent print, online or broadcast media; or
(D) the extrajudicial rendition, arbitrary detention, or torture of any person in Hong Kong or other gross violations of internationally recognized human rights or serious human rights abuse in Hong Kong;
(iii) to be or have been a leader or official of:
(A) an entity, including any government entity, that has engaged in, or whose members have engaged in, any of the activities described in subsections (a)(i), (a)(ii)(A), (a)(ii)
(B), or (a)(ii)(C) of this section; or
(B) an entity whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order.
(iv) to have materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this section;
(v) to be owned or controlled by, or to have acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this section; or
(vi) to be a member of the board of directors or a senior executive officer of any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this section.
(b) The prohibitions in subsection (a) of this section apply except to the extent provided by statutes, or in regulations, orders, directives, or licenses that may be issued pursuant to this order, and notwithstanding any contract entered into or any license or permit granted before the date of this order.

Sec. 5. I hereby determine that the making of donations of the types of articles specified in section 203(b)(2) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1702(b)(2)) by, to, or for the benefit of any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to section 4 of this order would seriously impair my ability to deal with the national emergency declared in this order, and I hereby prohibit such donations as provided by section 4 of this order.

Sec. 6. The prohibitions in section 4(a) of this order include:
(a) the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to section 4(a) of this order; and
(b) the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person.

Sec. 7. The unrestricted immigrant and nonimmigrant entry into the United States of aliens determined to meet one or more of the criteria in section 4(a) of this order, as well as immediate family members of such aliens, or aliens determined by the Secretary of State to be employed by, or acting as an agent of, such aliens, would be detrimental to the interest of the United States, and the entry of such persons into the United States, as immigrants and nonimmigrants, is hereby suspended. Such persons shall be treated as persons covered by section 1 of Proclamation 8693 of July 24, 2011 (Suspension of Entry of Aliens Subject to United Nations Security Council Travel Bans and International Emergency Economic Powers Act Sanctions). The Secretary of State shall have the responsibility of implementing this section pursuant to such conditions and procedures as the Secretary has established or may establish pursuant to Proclamation 8693.

Sec. 8. (a) Any transaction that evades or avoids, has the purpose of evading or avoiding, causes a violation of, or attempts to violate any of the prohibitions set forth in this order is prohibited.
(b) Any conspiracy formed to violate any of the prohibitions set forth in this order is prohibited.

Sec. 9. Nothing in this order shall prohibit transactions for the conduct of the official business of the Federal Government by employees, grantees, or contractors thereof.
Sec. 10. For the purposes of this order:
(a) the term “person” means an individual or entity;
(b) the term “entity” means a government or instrumentality of such government, partnership, association, trust, joint venture, corporation, group, subgroup, or other organization, including an international organization;
(c) the term “United States person” means any United States citizen, permanent resident alien, entity organized under the laws of the United States or any jurisdiction within the United States (including foreign branches), or any person in the United States; and
(d) The term “immediate family member” means spouses and children of any age.

Sec. 11. For those persons whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to this order who might have a constitutional presence in the United States, I find that because of the ability to transfer funds or other assets instantaneously, prior notice to such persons of measures to be taken pursuant to section 4 of this order would render those measures ineffectual. I therefore determine that for these measures to be effective in addressing the national emergency declared in this order, there need be no prior notice of a listing or determination made pursuant to section 4 of this order.

Sec. 12. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, is hereby authorized to take such actions, including adopting rules and regulations, and to employ all powers granted to me by IEEPA as may be necessary to implement this order. The Secretary of the Treasury may, consistent with applicable law, redelegate any of these functions within the Department of the Treasury. All departments and agencies of the United States shall take all appropriate measures within their authority to implement this order.

Sec. 13. The Secretary of the Treasury, in consultation with the Secretary of State, is hereby authorized to submit recurring and final reports to the Congress on the national emergency declared in this order, consistent with section 401(c) of the NEA (50 U.S.C. 1641(c)) and section 204(c) of IEEPA (50 U.S.C. 1703(c)).
Sec. 14. (a) Nothing in this order shall be construed to impair or otherwise affect:
(i) the authority granted by law to an executive department or agency; or
(ii) the functions of the Director of the Office of Management and Budget relating to budgetary, administrative, or legislative proposals.
(b) This order shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.
(c) This order is not intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law or in equity by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

Sec. 15. If, based on consideration of the terms, obligations, and expectations expressed in the Joint Declaration, I determine that changes in China’s actions ensure that Hong Kong is sufficiently autonomous to justify differential treatment in relation to the PRC under United States law, I will reconsider the determinations made and actions taken and directed under this order.

DONALD J. TRUMP

THE WHITE HOUSE,
July 14, 2020.

各位，生成器也許已沒有用了。選管會一天就收到4500封電郵。看來，大家炸他電郵還是有點用的。

以下乃沈大師言為「內部AO提供範本」。的確是官話文章，請先仔細閱讀，才選擇是否發出電郵吧。

你還有5小時。

请广传，好人一生平安。

[#官方資訊] 早前分享了一位高級政務官朋友就《逃犯條例》爭議的感受，得到數千轉載，迴響十分熱烈，也有不少公務員私訊回應。本頁對象一直以黃藍以外的專業人士為主，雖然平日只分享國際視野資訊，但在關鍵時刻，也希望為一些平日對社會抽離的朋友，提供更多資訊參考。以下是我的另一位AO朋友擔心局勢惡化，希望以自己的方式真正為特區政府服務，因此以私人身份草擬的意見書，回應特區政府選舉管理委員會關於區議會選舉的官方諮詢，並使用了完美官僚理據、格式和文法，就DQ候選人提供了詳細意見。根據官方資訊，《逃犯條例》收到4500份意見書，其中3000份「贊成」，因此發出意見書並非毫無價值。這位AO表示，大家可以直接使用這格式，根據個人觀點加減內容直接電郵遞交，因為香港人大家都忙，這過程只需一分鐘，應該最符合成本效益。截止日期是7月10日或之前，請廣傳，好人一生平安。

10 July 2019

Chairman
Electoral Affairs Commission (EAC)
By Email: eacenq@eac.hk

Dear Chairman,

Public consultation on District Council Election proposed guidelines

I write to object to Chapter 3 of the Proposed Guidelines, as it gives Government an unjust, unfair, and unchecked power to disqualify any candidate during the nomination period by reason of Government’s own political motives.

Chapter 3.1 of the Proposed Guidelines says that : “Under the law, the validity of a candidate’s nomination is to be determined by the Returning Officer (RO). The EAC is neither empowered nor involved in the making of such decision and would not provide any advice on the decision made by the RO”.

Chapter 3.9(b) of the Proposed Guidelines describes the requirement by which a candidate must declare (through signing a “Confirmation Form” by the EAC) that he would uphold the Basic Law and pledge allegiance to the HKSAR.

It is totally unclear whether a Confirmation Form duly signed by a candidate is itself sufficient to discharge the candidate’s duty to declare his willingness to uphold the Basic Law and pledge allegiance to the HKSAR when he is elected to the office.

Previous elections showed that an RO, who was a civil servant (pitched at Administrative Officer Staff Grade C / District Officer) appointed to the role of RO prior to the election, could make subjective and arbitrary judgment about a candidate’s state of mind and political orientation, with selective reference to some or a few past writings, speeches, statements, expression of opinions, posts in social media platforms in relation to the candidate, instead of merely looking at a Confirmation Form duly signed.

I find it outrageous to see that Ms. Anne Teng, then District Officer (Eastern) appointed to the role of RO in a legislative council by-election last year, could refuse to acknowledge a confirmation form signed by Miss Agnes Chow Ting and disqualify her, citing absurd and arbitrary reasons with reference to some of Miss Chow’s previous remarks or those of her political party, and without giving Miss Chow a fair opportunity to respond to those reasons uttered unreasonably by the RO.

The Proposed Guidelines shows that the EAC has failed its duty to introduce any additional safeguard or measures to plug this unreasonable, unlawful and unconstitutional loophole, which may still be freely exploited by any RO in the next election driven by bad faith and political motive.

It is unacceptable that the EAC could confess that it is “neither empowered nor involved in the making of such decision and would not provide any advice on the decision made by the RO” (Chapter 3.1). I question how the EAC can still “ensure that an election is conducted openly, fairly and honestly at all times” – its statutory duty enshrined in the Electoral Affairs Commission Ordinance - when it is not involved in scrutinising or monitoring the exercise of an RO’s power in disqualifying any candidate at the RO’s own political preference.

The Guidelines did not describe in detail how an RO could, on his or her own, research during the short nomination period the political belief and past sayings of any candidate. The Guidelines are also silent as to whether the RO would have received biased or secret advice from any agency such as Department of Justice, Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Bureau, Home Affairs Department, Information Services Department, etc., which may have compiled a detailed recollection of a candidate’s previous remarks in advance. It was suggested by some that such a compilation of speech or opinion records prepared by any agency other than the RO could have assisted the RO unlawfully in reaching a dangerous disqualification decision to deprive a candidate of the right to stand for the election.

I must remind the EAC that the right to stand for election is a fundamental right guaranteed under the Basic Law and the Hong Kong Bill of Rights. The United Nations Human Rights Committee’s General Comment 25 also states that “political opinion may not be used as a ground to deprive any person of the right to stand for election.”

I am disappointed to see that the proposed Guidelines have not offered anything substantive to protect a candidate from the RO’s unlawful interference in the election by disqualifying candidates he or she dislikes. The EAC must look at this carefully to see what it can do.

The current remedy about determining the lawfulness of an RO’s disqualification decision through an election petition to be adjudicated later by the court one or two years after the actual election is totally unsatisfactory, with the lapse of time which delays the timely delivery of a just outcome.

I stress that I object to Chapter 3 of the Proposed Guidelines in its entirety. I urge you to review all the processes described in Chapter 3 again and independently. In so doing, you must resist all political considerations wrongly dictated by the Chief Executive, Constitutional and Mainland Affairs Bureau, Department of Justice, or other government agency seeking to disturb the fairness and integrity of the forthcoming district council election.

Yours sincerely,

XXXX

更新：有熱心網友翻譯為中文版，並對原文作出修訂，請隨便share／修改：

10 July 2019

選舉管理委員會主席 鈞啓

選舉管理委員會主席鈞鑒： 關於區議會選舉活動建議指引公眾諮詢事宜

本人謹致函對建議指引第三章表達反對意見。建議指引第三章將賦予政府不公平、不公正以及不被箝制的權力，容許政府於提名階段取消香港市民的參選資格，以迎合政府自身的政治目的。

建議指引第三章第一部分（3.1）指：「根據法例，候選人的提名是否有效 ，完全是由選舉主任作出決定，選管會無權並一向沒有參與， 亦不會給予任何意見。」
建議指引第三章3.9(b) 要求候選人透過簽署選管會擬備的確認書表明他／她擁護《基本法》並保證對香港特別行政區效忠。

至於候選人是否能夠簽署確認書就能滿足擁護《基本法》並保證對香港特別行政區效忠的要求，建議指引對此完全沒有清晰交代。

過往選舉顯示，首長級丙級政務官／民政事務專員級別的公務員於選舉前獲委任為選舉主任，便能夠就候選人的思緒及政治取向作出主觀且隨意獨斷的決定，並只需揀選候選人往日曾經發表的文章、言論、宣言、意見表達、社交媒體帖文以及社交媒體專頁發佈關於對候選人的帖文穿鑿附會，當作輔證，而非僅以候選人是否有簽署確認書為單獨基礎作判斷。

去年立法會補選，時任東區民政事務專員鄧如欣獲委任為選舉主任，居然拒絕周庭小姐簽署的確認書，以周庭小姐及其所屬政黨昔日的言論去佐證選舉主任荒唐的理由，去褫奪周庭小姐的參選資格，並且沒有給予周庭小姐公平機會回應選舉主任的無理指控，實在令人憤慨。

由建議指引可見，選舉管理委員會並無引入任何措施或保障，去堵塞上述不合理、不合法、不合憲的漏洞。今後選舉主任依然可以使用此漏洞，依據其個人的政治目的或理念，惡意褫奪任何香港市民的參選資格。

選舉管理委員會於第三章第一部分（3.1）指：「根據法例，候選人的提名是否有效 ，完全是由選舉主任作出決定，選管會無權並一向沒有參與， 亦不會給予任何意見。」此點完全不可接受。當選舉管理委員會對選舉主任按其個人政治取向褫奪候選人參選資格的權力不作任何箝制、監察或審查， 又能如何履行其法定職責，「確保在香港舉行的選舉是以公開、公平和誠實的方式進行」呢？

建議指引並無對選舉主任如何可於短促的提名期內研究並審查任何候選人的政治理念及昔日言論有任何著墨。 建議指引亦未有論及選舉主任會否收到其他機構的秘密意見或者偏頗意見。上述的其他機構，例如律政司、內地及政制事務局、民政事務總署或政府新聞處等，可能預先詳細記錄相關候選人的昔日言論。據悉，上述由第三方準備的詳細記錄可能不合法地導致選舉主任作出褫奪候選人選舉資格的危險決定。

本人必須提醒選舉管理委員會，被選舉權是獲香港基本法及香港人權法案保障的基本權利。聯合國人權事務委員會第25號一般性意見亦指出：「不得以政治見解為由剝奪任何人參加競選的權利。」

本人對建議指引並未就保障候選人不被選舉主任按其個人喜惡褫奪資格，防止選舉主任非法干預選舉採取任何措施深感失望。選舉管理委員會必須詳細檢視自己對上述問題有何解決方法。

就選舉主任褫奪參選資格的合法性，目前透過選舉呈請，並於選舉完結一兩年後由法庭裁決的安排實在強差人意。當中所耗的時間令公義遲來。
本人對建議指引第三章完全反對。本人懇求主席重新並獨立審視第三章所包含的所有程序。在重新審視的時候，懇請閣下撇除並抗拒所有政治考量，尤其是來自行政長官、政制及事務內地局、律政司及其他政府機構企圖干預未來區議會選舉的誠信和公平性的政治考量。

敬祝 鈞安 XXXXXXXX 敬上

2019年7月9日