關於 went missing中文 ，我們在網路上蒐集到這些相關的討論、資訊與評價

我到美國接受了星島中文電台的訪問，當中談及了公民抗命、DQ事件、民主自決等等，最後節目被改名（刪去了「民主自決」的字眼），甚至被下架。自今，星島中文電台仍未有解釋原因。

節目內容和編排，包括解釋民主自決的理念，也是電台一方建議的。如果星島因為政治敏感而將節目下架，為何當初要如此建議？再者，每個人也有談及自己政治主張的權利和自由，也有權不同意或作出批評，作為媒體，何必如此懼怕，要自我審查？

星島中文電台必須盡快清楚解釋，及把節目重新上載網頁，我們需要的是媒體，不是政權的喉舌。

(中文版本在英文版本下方)
==== Press Release: A protest against political censorship by Sing Tao Chinese Radio (AM1400) ====

Agnes Chow 周庭, who was disqualified in the Hong Kong LegCo by-election in January this year, was invited by Stanford Hong Kong Student Association to attend the Cantonese Awareness Week in mid April. Northern California Hong Kong Club had coordinated with the hosts of a current affairs talk show 焦點訪談 of Sing Tao Chinese Radio (AM1400) to arrange Agnes Chow and another ex-Scholarism member appearing in the 4/17 (Tuesday) show.

Everything went smoothly and there were good interaction among the host, the guests and the audience. As usual, the program recording was archived in the show web site (http://www.chineseradio.com/…/%E7%AF%80%E7%9B%AE…/cm-f09-10/) in the same afternoon.

Alerted by a friend, however, we noticed that the recording of this particular episode has gone through sequences of editing and censorship afterward.

1) The title of the episode has changed from "04/17/2018 香港眾志常委周庭闡述香港自決主張" to "04/17/2018 訪問香港眾志常委周庭".

2) Starting from 4/19 (Thu) afternoon or earlier, the link of this episode no longer works while all other older and newer episodes work just fine. (See the attached screen capture: singtao_0421.png.)

In fact, we found out only the MP3 file of this episode (http://archive.chineseradio.com/Archive/C20180417_09-10.mp3) is removed or renamed. The episode one day before (http://archive.chineseradio.com/Archive/C20180416_09-10.mp3) and one day after (http://archive.chineseradio.com/Archive/C20180418_09-10.mp3) are still accessible.

3) We notified the host on 4/19 (Thu) about this issue. Later on, we filed a formal complaint through its official contacts with email and online message board. Not only do we not get any official response, but the operation to block this episode also seems to step up.

4) Starting from 4/23 (Mon) afternoon or earlier, even the web page of the whole talk show archive is removed (screen capture: singtao_0423.png) and a new archive page is created (screen capture: singtao_0424.png). In this new page, however, the 4/17 episode disappears and all other episodes have no title. Besides, this talk show is missing in the archive page of all cantonese programs (screen capture: singtao_cantonese_0424.png). All these appear to be a cover-up for the removal of the episode involing Agnes Chow.

So far, we do not receive any official explanation. Based on the sequences of events, the only logical conclusion is that the blocking is an intended political censorship and not a technical error.

Let us be clear that we had had good working relationship with the hosts in the past. We appreciated their openness and professionalism to invite different spectrum of view points to their program.

We suspect this post-censorship is an intervention from the senior management of the Sing Tao Group, as the political leaning of the owner and the editor in chief of the Sing Tao Group is well known.

We have to ask the Sing Tao senior management:
- Why are you so afraid of a 21-year-old activist has to say?
- The director of HK ETO in San Francisco was willing to attend the panel discussion in Stanford on the very same day (4/17) to debate Agnes Chow head on. Where is your courage?

Although the majority of the mass media in Hong Kong has been influenced directly or indirectly by mainland China or pro-establishment interest, it is a whole different matter when such political censorship happens in the United States. According to the Foreign Agents Registration Act, an organization and persons have to disclose the related activities and finances if they act "at the order, request, or under the direction or control" of a foreign power. As such, we would like to remind our media friends in the United States about the potential consequence of your action.

Northern California Hong Kong Club
2017-04-24

[Background information]
梁建鋒 (Editor in Chief of Sing Tao Group): 百無小政客
https://www.singtaousa.com/…/481534-%E7%99%BE%E7%84%A1%E5%…/

维基百科: 何柱國 (Owner of Sing Tao Group)
https://zh.wikipedia.org/…/%E4%BD%95%E6%9F%B1%E5%9C%8B_(%E5…

Foreign Agents Registration Act
https://en.wikipedia.org/wi…/Foreign_Agents_Registration_Act
_________________________________________________
==== 4月17日是怎樣被星島中文電台消失的 ====

今年一月在香港立法會補選中被奪去參選資格的香港眾志常委周庭，應史丹福大學香港同學會的邀請，到訪灣區參加四月中旬的廣東話週。北加洲香港會協調安排了周庭與另一位前學民思潮成員，於4月17日（星期二）在星島中文電台（AM1400）「焦點訪談」節目中接受現場訪問。

訪問過程順利，主持人、來賓和聽眾互動良好。當日節目重温一如既往，當天下午即存檔在節目網站（http://www.chineseradio.com/…/%E7%AF%80%E7%9B%AE…/cm-f09-10/）。

然而，一位朋友稍後注意到當曰節目重温連結出現了問題，她把這事情告知我們。我們開始跟進，發現該連結經過一系列的編輯和疑似審查：

1）當日節目重温標題，由原先的“04/17/2018 香港眾志常委周庭闡述香港自決主張”，後被改為“04/17/2018 訪問香港眾志常委周庭”。

2）從4月19日（星期四）下午或更早的時候開始， 當日節目重温連結失效，然而所有其他較新或較舊的節目重温連結仍正常工作。（參閱屏幕截圖：singtao_0421.png）

我們發現只有這一集的MP3語音文件（http://archive.chineseradio.com/Archive/C20180417_09-10.mp3）被刪除或重新命名。 之前一天（http://archive.chineseradio.com/Archive/C20180416_09-10.mp3）和之後的一天（http://archive.chineseradio.com/Archive/C20180418_09-10.mp3）的文件則完好無缺。

3）4月19日（星期四）下午，我們通知星島中文電台主持人有關事宜。之後我們再依正式途徑，用電郵和網上留言投訴。我們不但沒有得到回覆，星島對該節目的屏閉動作反而更進一步。

4）從4月23日（週一）下午或更早的時候開始，整個「焦點訪談」節目的原有重温網頁亦被删除（參閱屏幕截圖：singtao_0423.png），而新建了一個重温網頁（參閱屏幕截圖：singtao_0424.png）。在這個新的網頁中，4月17日消失了，而其他日子亦沒有題目。另外在羅列所有粤語節目的網頁中 (singtao_cantonese_0424.png)，「焦點訪談」亦不見了。種種動作，似乎是對周庭訪問重温被消失作掩飾。

到目前為止，我們沒有收到星島中文電台的任何解釋。根據事件的發展時序，唯一合乎邏輯的結論是，封鎖是有意的政治審查，而不是技術上的錯誤。

我們一直與「焦點訪談」節目主持人有著良好的工作關係。我們讚賞他們以專業及開放的態度，邀請不同的觀點的來賓到他們的節目發表言論。

我們認為這次審查是源於管理高層的介入，星島集團主席和總編輯的政治傾向是眾所周知的。

我們必須問星島集團管理高層：
- 為什麼你們如此害怕一個21歲的年青人的言論？
- 舊金山香港經貿辦主任，就在同一天（4月17日）願意出席史丹福大學的香港問題討論會，面對面與周庭同場討論。為何你們沒有這個勇氣？

儘管香港傳媒近年常因中國大陸或親建制勢力的影響，而直接或間接的進行政治審查。但要在美國進行這樣的政治審查，則要面對一種完全不一樣的環境。根據美國“外國代理人註冊法”，如果一個組織和個人，在外國勢力的指揮或控制下行事，他們必須披露相關活動和財務聯繫。我們想提醒身在美國的媒體朋友，注意你們的行為可能引起的後果。

北加州香港會
2017年4月24日

那個南方叫屏東
屏東的黑鮪魚好ㄘ(〃∀〃)

【2016，這就是台灣人想要的總統！】

「妳回北京以後，告訴他們，」蔡英文說：「台灣的下一任總統曾經為妳服務過。」

（“Go back to Beijing,” says Tsai, “and tell them you were served by the next President of Taiwan.”）

上面那段話，是這幾天來，最讓我感佩與震撼的一段話。那是蔡英文主席接受《TIME》雜誌專訪長文的結語，鏗鏘有力，也讓人無比動容...

2016，我希望我能有幸擁有這樣的總統，一股溫柔的力量，卻又充滿自信與霸氣，不慍不火、不卑不亢，而這正是台灣這個即將新生的島國，用來在世界永續立足，最需要的態度。

朋友們告訴我，昨天附上的《TIME》雜誌英漢對照翻譯文章，已經被下架了。對此，我真的感到非常遺憾。（更新消息：PTT貼文者並非原譯，因恐引起誤會而刪文。原譯文出自獨立記者Jessie Chen臉書，特此致謝。）

對於那篇連夜趕出的翻譯稿，也許不同立場的朋友，會有不同想法與批評。但對於譯者的熱心與用心，我只有發自內心的感激和敬佩。因此，我在網路上找到備份文章，再一次（無修改）分享給我的朋友們，需要的，就幫忙再傳播出去吧！

德不孤必有鄰，一位擅長漫畫的朋友，也默默傳了她關於那段「溫柔力量」談話的圖像詮釋。淡淡的畫風，彷彿原景重現，對我而言，那份感動，似乎又更深了一些...

有人以文字速譯向小英致敬、有人以圖像速寫向小英致敬──

而我，只能藉此臉書一角，向翻譯者、漫畫家，跟小英總統本人，獻上最誠心的祝福與感謝！

謝謝你們，讓台灣變成一個更好更美的地方。
　

──────────底下為英漢對照翻譯原文──────────

民進黨主席暨總統參選人蔡英文登上最新一期時代雜誌封面，標題是「她將可能領導華人世界唯一民主國家， She Could Lead The Only Chinese Democracy」。蔡主席是繼印度總理莫迪、印尼總統佐科威、韓國總統朴槿惠後，最新一位登上時代雜誌封面的亞洲領導人。

中英譯全文：

雜誌封面
She Could Lead the Only Chinese Democracy
And that makes Beijing nervous
她將可能領導華人世界唯一的民主國家
這讓北京感到緊張

目錄頁
Cover Story: Championing Taiwan
Presidential front runner Tsai Ing-wen wants to put the island’s interests first
封面故事：壯大台灣
總統大選領先者蔡英文要將台灣利益置於優先

內頁大標
‘The Next President Of Taiwan’
That’s how Tsai Ing-wen refers to herself. But will the island’s voters agree?
台灣的下一任總統
蔡英文是這樣認為。但是這座島嶼的選民會同意嗎？

內文
Emily Rauhala / 台北報導 Adam Ferguson / 攝影

Tsai Ing-wen is making breakfast. The presidential candidate cracks five eggs and lets them bubble with bacon in the pan. She stacks slices of thick, white toast. It’s a recipe adapted from British chef Jamie Oliver, but the ingredients, she can’t help but say, are pure Taiwan. The meat comes courtesy of Happy Pig, a farm near her spare but tasteful Taipei apartment, the bread from a neighborhood bakery. She offers me an orange. “Organic,” she says, in English. “And local, of course.”

蔡英文正在做早餐。這位總統候選人打了五個蛋，和著平底鍋裡面的培根一起吱吱作響，再把一片片白色的厚片土司疊起來。料理手法學自英國名廚傑米奧利佛（Jamie Oliver），但是她忍不住要說，烹調食材屬於最純粹的台灣原料。培根來自「快樂豬」農場，距離她那簡單卻有品味的公寓不遠，而麵包是從她家附近的烘培坊買來的。她遞了一顆橘子給我，用英文跟我說：「有機的！當然也是在地的。」

This is not an average breakfast for the 58-year-old lawyer turned politician running to become Taiwan’s next President—most days she grabs a coffee and books it to the car. But it is, in many ways, oh so Tsai. The Taipei-raised, U.S.- and U.K.-educated former negotiator wrote her doctoral thesis on international trade law. As a minister, party chair and presidential candidate (she narrowly lost to two-term incumbent Ma Ying-jeou in the 2012 race), Tsai gained a reputation for being wonky—the type who likes to debate protectionism over early-morning sips of black coffee or oolong tea.

對於這位58歲、從律師轉變成政治人物的總統候選人來說，這可不是她平常吃的早餐。她通常隨手抓一杯咖啡在車上喝。不過許多方面來說，這應該可以算是一貫的「蔡式」風格。這位在臺北長大、在英美留學過的談判專家，博士論文寫的是國際貿易法。在她當陸委 會主委、民進黨主席、總統候選人期間（她在2012年的總統大選中以些微差距輸給了馬英九總統），得到學院派的風評──她是那種喜歡在早上喝黑咖啡或烏龍茶時，跟你辯論保護主義的人。

Now, as the early front runner in Taiwan’s January 2016 presidential election, her vision for the island is proudly, defiantly, Taiwan-centric. Tsai says she would maintain the political status quo across the strait with China—essentially, both Taipei and Beijing agreeing to disagree as to which represents the one, true China, leaving the question of the island’s fate to the future. But Tsai wants to put Taiwan’s economy, development and culture first. While Ma and his government have pushed for new trade and tourism pacts with Beijing—China accounts for some 40% of Taiwan’s exports—Tsai aims to lessen the island’s dependence on the mainland by building global ties and championing local brands. “Taiwan needs a new model, ” she tells TIME.

現在，身為在2016年台灣總統大選中的領先者，蔡英文的願景充滿自信又堅定地強調以台灣為核心。蔡英文說她會維持兩岸的現狀──這指的是說臺北與北京彼此同意對於何者代表中國保留不同的認知（註明：這是時代雜誌記者的見解），並且把這個島嶼的命運留給未來決定。但，蔡英文想要將台灣的經濟、發展與文化置於首位。當馬英九和他的政府推動與中國的貿易及觀光協議時（中國占台灣出口的百分之四十），蔡英文希望加強與世界連結、扶植台灣品牌，以降低台灣對中國的依賴。她對時代雜誌說：「台灣需要一個新模式」。

Whether voters share her vision is a question that matters beyond Taipei. Taiwan is tiny, with a population of only 23 million, but its economy—powered by electronics, agriculture and tourism—ranks about mid-20s in the world by GDP size, with a GDP per capita about thrice that of China’s. Ceded by China’s Qing dynasty to Japan after the 1894–95 First Sino-Japanese War, colonized by Tokyo for half a century, then seized by Nationalist forces fleeing the Communists at the end of the Chinese civil war, Taiwan has long been a pawn in a regional great game. It is a linchpin for the U.S. in East Asia alongside Japan, South Korea and the Philippines, and, most important, it’s the only real democracy in the Chinese-speaking world.
“This election matters because it’s a window into democracy rooted in Chinese tradition,” says Lung Ying-tai, an author and social commentator who recently stepped down as Culture Minister. “Because of Taiwan, the world is able to envision a different China.”

台灣的選民是否同意她的願景，是一件擴及台北以外的事情。台灣的土地雖小，只有兩千三百萬的人口，但是經濟因電子業，農業以及觀光業的支，以國內生產毛額來說在世界排名第二十幾名。台灣的國內人均產值則是中國的三倍。台灣在1894-95的中日戰爭被中國清朝割讓後，被日本殖民了半個世紀；之後在中國內戰結束時逃避共產黨的國民黨勢力給佔領。長期以來台灣是區域競爭中的一個棋子。在美國的東亞布局中，台灣、日本、南韓及菲律賓同為最關鍵的環節。更重要的是，台灣是在華語世界中唯一一個真正的民主國家。甫卸任文化部長的作者與社會評論員龍應台表示：「這場選舉很重要，因為它提供了一個窗口，讓外界一探以中華文化為根基的民主……因為台灣，世界得以想像一個不一樣的中國。」

Taiwan’s politics irritate and befuddle Beijing. To the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Taiwan is the province that got away, a living, breathing, voting reminder of what could happen to China if the CCP loosens its grip on its periphery, from Tibet to Xinjiang to Hong Kong. Beijing is particularly wary of a change in government from Ma’s relatively China-friendly Kuomintang (KMT) to Tsai’s firmly China-skeptic Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). When Tsai ran for President in 2012, Beijing blasted her, without actually naming her, as a “troublemaker” and “splittist”—CCP-speak reserved for Dalai Lama–level foes. “A DPP government means uncertainty for cross-strait ties,” says Lin Gang, a Taiwan specialist at Shanghai Jiao Tong University’s School of International and Public Affairs.

台灣的政治讓北京感到惱怒又百思不解。對中國共產黨來說，台灣是一個逃走的省，也是對中國活生生的提醒──若中國鬆懈對於香港、西藏及新疆等非核心地區的掌控時，可能會發生的事。北京對於台灣的政權，由對中國相對友善的馬政府輪替到對中國保持疑慮的民進黨，抱持格外戒慎的態度。蔡英文在2012年參選總統的時候，北京雖然沒有指名道姓，卻明顯對她大肆抨擊，說她是一個「麻煩製造者」或「分裂主義者」——在共產黨的術語中，這些話專門達賴喇嘛這一層級的仇敵。任教於上海交通大學國際與公共關係學院的台灣事務專家林岡說：「民進黨政府代表的是兩岸關係的不確定性。」

To the U.S., which is bound by the Taiwan Relations Act to come to the island’ s aid if it’s attacked, Taiwan is a longtime friend and unofficial ally, though the strength of that friendship is being tested by China’s rise. Washington worries that Taiwan’s people, especially its youth, are growing warier of China, and that any conflict between the two might draw in the U.S.
“What this election has done is crystallize the changes, the shift in public opinion,” says Shelley Rigger, a Taiwan scholar at Davidson College in North Carolina and the author of Why Taiwan Matters. “I don’t think cross-strait relations are going to be easy going forward, and that’s not something U.S. policymakers want to hear.”

對美國來說，根據《台灣關係法》，在台灣受到武力攻擊的情況下，須協防台灣。台灣是美國長期友邦和非正式盟國，儘管兩國之間友誼的強度正受到中國崛起的考驗。華府擔心台灣人民，特別是年輕人，對於中國的警戒心逐漸提高，而兩者之間的衝突可能會把美國牽扯進來。著有《台灣為何重要》（Why Taiwan Matters）一書的美國北卡羅來那州戴維森大學（Davidson College）教授任雪麗（Shelley Rigger）說：「這場選舉讓所有的改變具體化，反映出民意板塊的移動……我不認為接下來的兩岸關係會更融洽，而這不是美國的政策制定者想要聽到的東西。」

The KMT has yet to formally nominate a candidate for the top job, but the favorite is Hung Hsiu-chu, the legislature’s female deputy speaker. Nicknamed ”little hot pepper” because of her diminutive stature and feisty manner, Hung, 67, would be a contrast to the more professorial Tsai should she get the KMT’s nod. “I don’t think [Tsai] is a strong opponent,” Hung tells TIME. Yet the DPP’s choice, who has already started pressing the flesh islandwide, is spirited too. “People have this vision of me as a conservative person, but I’m actually quite adventurous,” she says. And possessed of a sharp sense of humor—when I compliment her cooking, Tsai looks at me with mock exasperation: “I have a Ph.D., you know.”

國民黨雖然還未正式提名總統候選人，但目前最被看好的就是立法院副院長洪秀柱。因為身材嬌小與好戰性格而被封為「小辣椒」的洪秀柱（67歲），如果獲黨的提名，將與擁有學者形象的蔡英文，呈現顯著的對比。洪秀柱向時代記者表示：「我不認為蔡英文是一位強的對手」。然而，民進黨的候選人已經士氣高昂，在全台各地展開競選活動。蔡英文說：「有些人認為我是一個保守的人，但我其實是很愛冒險的」。她有一種犀利的幽默感──當我讚美她的廚藝時，她用搞笑的語氣假裝惱怒說：「我可是擁有博士學位的。」

Tsai grew up in a home on Taipei’s Zhongshan Road North, a street named after Taiwan’s symbolic father, Sun Yat-sen, the Chinese revolutionary who helped overthrow the Qing and co-founded the KMT. Her own father, an auto mechanic turned property developer, was of the Confucian kind: he encouraged her to study hard but also expected her, as the youngest daughter, to devote herself to his care. “I was not considered a kid that would be successful in my career,” says Tsai.

蔡英文在台北的中山北路長大，這條街是以革命推翻清朝、成立國民黨並視為國父的孫逸仙命名。她的父親是一位修車技師，後來成為土地開發商。他承襲了儒家思想，希望蔡英文要用功讀書，但也期許身為小女兒的蔡英文可以留在父親身邊照顧他。蔡英文說：「我小時候不是一個被認為未來會有成就的孩子。」

After attending university in Taiwan, she studied law at Cornell in New York because, she says, it seemed the place for a young woman who “wanted to have a revolutionary life.” From there she went to the London School of Economics, where she earned her Ph.D., also in law, in less than three years. “That pleased my father,” she says. When he called her home, she obliged, returning to Taiwan to teach and, in 1994, to enter government in a series of high- profile but mostly policy-oriented roles in the Fair Trade Commission, National Security Council and Mainland Affairs Council.

在台灣大學畢業後，她前往紐約州康乃爾大學研讀法律，因為她說，這是一個「想過革命性的生活」的年輕女子該去的地方。之後，她前往倫敦政治經濟學院攻讀法學博士，並且三年不到就獲得學位。她說：「這讓我父親很高興」。她遵從父親的意思返回台灣，先回大學教書並在1994年進入政府，出任公平交易委員會、國安會及陸委會等一系列重要的、政策導向的職位。

Even close supporters say Tsai was, and perhaps still is, an unlikely politician, especially for the DPP. Taiwan’s opposition party was forged in struggle and led by veterans of the democracy movement—a fight Tsai mostly missed. The Kaohsiung Incident in 1979—a human-rights rally that was violently broken up by security forces, galvanizing the democracy movement— took place while Tsai was overseas, cocooned in the ivory tower. If the archetypal DPP operative is a bare-knuckle street fighter, Tsai is an Olympic fencer—restrained and precise.

就連許多親近蔡英文的支持者都認為，蔡英文是一位非典型的政治人物，特別就民進黨而言。身為在野黨的民進黨，在台灣民主運動的奮鬥過程中焠煉而成，由民主運動的老兵所成立，這是一場蔡英文錯過的戰役。1979年高雄的美麗島事件，當一場人權遊行遭警政單位暴力驅散，而後來激勵了台灣的民主運動，蔡英文當時正在國外求學，受到象牙塔的庇護。若說民進黨的典型人物是赤手空拳的街頭鬥士，蔡英文則是一位奧林匹克級的劍術家：自我克制又精確到位。

She stepped into the spotlight in 2008, becoming party chair when the DPP found itself booted from office, with its chief Chen Shui-bian, the outgoing President, later convicted of corruption. While she possessed a deep knowledge of policy, Tsai did not then seem like a leader. “She used to sort of hide behind me when we went door to door,” recalls legislator Hsiao Bi-khim, a longtime colleague and friend. “People compared her to a lost bunny in the forest, with wolves surrounding, both from within the party and outside.

在2008年民進黨失去政權，而前總統陳水扁隨即遭貪汙罪起訴的時刻，蔡英文踏入了鎂光燈下，成為民進黨主席。雖然蔡英文對於政策擁有深度的瞭解，但當時她還不像一位領導人。長期以來是她同事與朋友的立法委員蕭美琴說「以前當我們挨家挨戶去拜訪時，她有點會躲在我身後」。「有些形容她為一個在森林裡迷路的兔子，被黨內與黨外的狼群包圍。」

After an unsuccessful 2010 mayoral bid, Tsai ran for, and also lost, the presidency in 2012. Jason Liu, a veteran DPP speechwriter, says now that the campaign did not “sell” Tsai well enough. The ideas were strong, but the delivery left “distance between her and the voters.” Ironically, it was not until her concession speech that Tsai seemed to connect emotionally with Taiwan’s citizens. “You may cry,” she told the tearful crowd. “But don’t lose heart.”

2010年，蔡英文參與市長選舉失利，在2012年也沒順利當選總統。民進黨資深文膽劉建忻表示，當時的競選總部對於「行銷」蔡英文這個概念，做得不夠好；雖然擁有許多好點子，但是執行上還是「讓選民感到有所距離」。諷刺地，一直到敗選感言，蔡英文才似乎與台灣人民產生情感上的連結。她對含著淚水的群眾表示：「你可以哭泣，但不能洩氣。」

A lot has changed since 2012. Eleven hours after making eggs, with a policy meeting, a cross-country train ride and a harbor tour behind her, Tsai is addressing a couple hundred students at a university in the southern city of Kaohsiung, a DPP stronghold. She’s in lecture mode, at ease, talking about her party’s economic plans: stronger regional links and a focus on innovation to support small businesses. “How many of you went to Taipei for the Sunflower protests?” she asks in Mandarin. At least a third raise their hands.

2012年之後的台灣，歷經了許多改變。蔡英文煎蛋後的11個小時後，歷經了一場政策會議、搭乘高鐵從北一路向南、緊接著進行高雄碼頭導覽。她抵達南台灣民進黨的重鎮高雄，向數百位大學生發表演說。她以一派輕鬆的授課模式，闡述著民進黨的經濟計畫：加強區域間的連結，並聚焦於支持創新的小型經濟。她用中文詢問在場學生「你們之中有多少人去台北參加過太陽花學運？」現場至少有三分之一的學生舉起了手。

Taiwan’s students were once seen as apathetic. But during spring last year, Taipei was swept up by thousands-strong demonstrations over a services pact with China. Student and civic groups worried that the deal could hurt Taiwan’s economy and leave it vulnerable to pressure from Beijing. They felt it was pushed through without adequate public scrutiny. The Sunflower Movement, as it came to be called after a florist donated bundles of the blooms, grew into a grassroots revolt, culminating in the March 18 storming of the legislature.

台灣的學生過去一度被視為相當冷漠。但是在去年的春天，台北市被數以千計的抗議者淹沒，反對與中國簽訂的服務貿易協議。學生與公民團體擔憂這個協議會傷害台灣經濟，讓台灣的經濟受制於中國壓力而變得脆弱。他們也認為，服貿協議的推動並沒有經過適當的公民審議。太陽花運動是民間累積的抗爭與不滿，在3月18日這天一舉衝進立法院，運動的稱號是由於抗爭期間一位花販捐贈了大量太陽花而因此命名。

The movement was grounded in questions of social justice. Since coming to power in 2008, Ma has argued that cross-strait commerce is the key to the island’s fortunes, signing 21 trade deals. Yet young people in particular wonder if the deals benefit only Big Business on both sides of the strait. They say rapprochement with Beijing has left them none the richer, and agonize over the high cost of housing, flat wages and the possibility of local jobs going to China. A sign during a protest outside the Presidential Palace on March 30 last year captured the mood: “We don’t have another Taiwan to sell.”

這個運動的主要訴求就是社會正義。自從國民黨2008年執政以來，簽訂了21個兩岸貿易協定，馬英九主張兩岸的商業往來是台灣最關鍵的財富來源。但是年輕人質疑這項論述，他們認為這些貿易協議只有兩岸的大財團獲利。他們說北京的和解政策並沒有讓年輕人變得富有，反而讓他們受困於高房價、停滯的薪資、以及在地工作機會可能流失到中國的可能性。在去年3月30日於總統府外的抗議中，有個標語最能捕捉整體的社會氛圍：「台灣只有一個，賣了就沒了！」

The emphasis on quality of life, and not just macro-indicators, is good news for Tsai. Her vision for a more economically independent Taiwan did not sway the electorate in 2012 but may now have stronger appeal. The KMT, bruised by the Sunflower protests and then battered by fed-up voters in midterm polls last fall, is trying to remake itself as a more populist party. Timothy Yang, a former Foreign Minister who is now vice president of the National Policy Foundation, the KMT’s think tank, says the party stands by its cross-strait record. But even Yang, a KMT stalwart, is keen to address the issue of equity:
“The benefits of this interaction with mainland China should be shared with the general public.”

台灣社會對於生活品質的重視，而非僅僅強調宏觀經濟指標，對蔡英文來說是件好事。她希望打造一個經濟上更加獨立的台灣，雖然這個理念在2012年並沒有說動選民，但，現在可能更有吸引力。國民黨在太陽花運動中受到重創，在去年秋天的期中選舉中又再度被選民以選票教訓。現在，國民黨試圖把自己再造成一個民粹的政黨。目前擔任國民黨智庫『國家政策基金會』副董事長的前外交部長楊進添先生受訪時說道，「國民黨堅持其兩岸的立場」。但即便像楊進添這樣堅定的國民黨員，也熱衷於解決公平的議題。他說：「兩岸互動的利益，應該要與全民共享！」

Tsai should easily carry traditional DPP support: much of the south, the youth vote, and those who identify as Taiwanese and who are not a part of the elite that came from China after the CCP victory in 1949. The DPP’s missing link is Big Business, which supports the KMT and closer ties with the mainland, where many Taiwan companies are invested. Tsai recognizes that this is a constituency she needs to woo but doesn’t seem clear as to how, beyond saying, “Our challenge is to produce something that is sensible to both sides without being considered as a traitor to the friends we used to be with when we were an opposition party.”

蔡英文要得到傳統民進黨的支持並不難，例如南部選民、年輕選票、還有那些認同自己是台灣人，而不是1949年中國共產黨勝利後來自中國的精英份子。然而，民進黨缺乏與大企業的連結，因為台灣企業大量投資大陸，而其中這些大財團多半支持國民黨，以及與大陸建立更緊密的關係。蔡英文也理解到這是她必須要去吸引的一群選民，但是對於如何進行並沒有太清楚的圖像。她說：「我們的挑戰是要去創造雙方都認為合理的立場，又不能被我們在野時的朋友認為是叛徒。」

That will be hard. The KMT has long argued that it, not the DPP, is best qualified to run the economy, which, corruption apart, did not do well under Chen. Tsai’s supporters concede that many citizens feel the same way—that the DPP can be an effective opposition but not administration. “The KMT has always portrayed itself as more suited to guide the economy,” says J. Michael Cole, a Taipei-based senior fellow with the University of Nottingham’s China Policy Institute and a senior officer at Tsai’s Thinking Taiwan Foundation. “There’s this stubborn perception that a DPP government would be bad for business.”

這是困難的挑戰。國民黨長期主張自己比民進黨更擅長治理經濟，尤其陳水扁執政時期除了貪污，經濟表現並不好。蔡英文的支持者也同意，確實有些民眾認為民進黨可是一個稱職的反對黨，但不是執政黨。諾丁漢大學中國政策研究中心資深研究員暨小英基金會資深主管寇謐將（J. Michael Cole）說：「國民黨把自己描繪是一個更適合主導經濟的政黨。另外也有一種僵化的刻版印象，認為民進黨執政對企業不利。」

It’s a narrative that the CCP backs and may well float as the campaign progresses, either directly, in China’s state-controlled press, or indirectly, through, for instance, its connections in Taiwan’s business community. “Beijing is going to want to make a point through all sorts of channels, including Big Business, that cross-strait relations will not be as smooth if you vote a government into power that has not accepted the foundation that has underpinned developments of the last eight years,” says Alan Romberg, a distinguished fellow at the Stimson Center, a Washington, D.C., think tank.

這種論調受到中國共產黨的支持，並且今隨著選戰的進展不斷被拋出。共產黨可能直接地利用中國控制的媒體影響選舉，或是間接地透過中國與台灣商業界的連結。美國華府智庫史汀森研究中心（Stimson Center）資深學者容安瀾（Alan Romberg）說：「北京將會透過大企業等各種管道來闡述其立場，表明要是台灣人民讓一個不接受過去八年兩岸發展基
礎的政府執政，兩岸關係的發展將不會如現在一樣平順。」

Beijing has never been receptive to a DPP government, but it is particularly negative now. Since coming to power in 2012, China’s leader Xi Jinping has proved himself to be more assertive and nationalistic than most expected, a man not eager to compromise. Last September he told a delegation from the island that China and Taiwan might be one day be reunited under Hong Kong’s “one country, two systems” formula, which is rejected by both the KMT and DPP and, surveys consistently show, the vast majority of Taiwan’s people. This May, Xi warned again about the danger of “separatist forces”—a comment widely interpreted as a swipe at the DPP.

北京對於民進黨政權的接受度向來不高，但現在尤其抱持負面的態度。中國領導人習近平在2012年掌權後，證明自己比外界想像的還更加武斷，帶有更強烈的民族主義色彩，是一個不輕易妥協的人。去年九月，他對一個來自台灣的代表團說，中國和台灣可望採用香港「一國兩制」的模式統一，然而這卻是一個國民黨和民進黨都反對的方案，而且民調也一再顯示，絕大多數的台灣人民無法接受。今年五月，習近平再度警告「分裂主義勢力」會帶來的危險──這段說詞普遍被外界詮釋為對民進黨的抨擊。

Cross-strait relations are managed according to the so-called 1992 Consensus reached by Beijing and Taipei (then also governed by the KMT), a formula the KMT’s Yang calls “a masterpiece of ambiguity.” Under the 1992 Consensus, both sides acknowledge that there is only one China, but without specifying what exactly that means. This, Yang says, has allowed the KMT to move forward on bilateral trade, transport and tourism without being forced to address whether “one China” is the China imagined by Beijing or by Taipei.

兩岸關係是治理目前根據北京和台北（當時為國民黨執政）之間所謂的九二共識，這是一個被國民黨的楊進添形容為「模糊性的一大鉅作」的政策。根據九二共識，雙方承認只有一個中國，但不表明一個中國的確切意含。楊進添說，這讓國民黨在推展雙邊貿易、交通和觀光方面得以取得進展，而不需被迫去回答「一個中國」究竟是北京或是台北心目中的中國。

The DPP has long promoted de jure independence. The first clause in its charter calls for “the establishment of an independent sovereignty known as the Republic of Taiwan,” not the Republic of China, Taiwan’s official name. This platform resonates with the DPP base but is increasingly untenable given China’s economic clout and growing power on the world stage. While the first DPP presidency under Chen was hardly a break from the past, it did see a cooling with Beijing. Things warmed again under Ma. Lin, the Taiwan expert at Shanghai Jiao Tong University, says Tsai is somewhere between Chen and Ma: “If she wins the election, she will not pursue Taiwan in dependence. But she will not promote the development of the cross-strait relationship as Ma Ying-jeou did.”

民進黨過去長期以來推動台灣的法理獨立。民進黨黨綱第一條闡明「建立主權獨立自主的台灣共和國」，而非台灣的正式國號中華民國。這個立場獲得民進黨基本盤的認同，卻在中國的經濟實力成長與中國在世界舞台上崛起之下，越來越無法實現。儘管陳水扁主政時期的民進黨政府跟過去的政策並無太大差別，但跟北京的關係確實趨向冷淡。馬英九主政時期兩岸關係再度暖化。上海交通大學的台灣專家林岡說，蔡英文的立場介於馬英九和陳水扁之間。他說：「如果她勝選，她不會追求台灣獨立。但她也不會像馬英九一樣推動兩岸關係的發展。」

Tsai stresses that she will not alter the politics between Taiwan and China, but she is vague about whether she will repeal the DPP’s independence clause. And unification? That, she says, “is something you have to resolve democratically—it is a decision to be made by the people here.”

蔡英文強調她不會改變台灣和中國之間的政治關係，但對於是否撤回台獨條文卻是依然維持模糊。至於統一呢？她說：「那是必須經由民主程序解決的事情——這是一個必須經由此地的人民來做的決定。」

Hung, Tsai’s potential KMT opponent, says the DPP flag bearer needs to clarify her stance on cross-strait relations. “People ask her, ‘What is the status quo?’ and she can’t say anything specific,” says Hung. The KMT’s Yang offers a metaphor: “Before you harvest, you have to plow the land, transplant the seedlings, fertilize; all the work … has been done by the KMT, and yet they are going to harvest the crop?”

蔡英文的在對手洪秀柱說，民進黨的掌舵手需要清楚地闡明她對兩岸關係的立場。洪秀柱說：「大家問她『維持現狀是什麼意思？』，她卻沒有給具體的回應。」國民黨的楊進添用一個比喻：「在收割之前，要先耕地、播種、施肥；所有的工作……都已經被國民黨完成了，然而他們現在卻想要收割？」

Tsai believes she will win that right. Several days before I return to my Beijing base, over Taiwan-Japanese fusion in Kaohsiung, Tsai is quietly confident that she will gain the trust of Taiwan’s voters and secure victory, whatever Beijing might think. She puts a final piece of tuna on my plate. It’ s from Pingtung County in the south, where she was born. “Go back to Beijing,” says Tsai, “and tell them you were served by the next President of Taiwan.”

蔡英文相信她會贏得這項權利。在我返回北京駐點的前幾天，我們在一家位於高雄的台式日本料理小店用餐，蔡英文對於取得台灣選民的信任並贏得選戰，展現出低調的自信。當時，她把最後一片鮪魚夾到我的盤子上。那塊鮪魚來自南方的屏東，她的出生地。「妳回北京以後，告訴他們，」蔡英文說：「台灣的下一任總統曾經為妳服務過。」

—With reporting by Zoher Abdoolcarim, Gladys Tsai and Natalie Tso/Taipei

─────────────────────
圖片：猜猜看，認出畫風了嗎？^^

（歡迎任何形式分享，一律免問）

「她將可能領導華人世界唯一民主國家， She Could Lead The Only Chinese Democracy」。

民進黨主席暨總統參選人蔡英文登上最新一期時代雜誌封面，蔡主席是繼印度總理莫迪、印尼總統佐科威、韓國總統朴槿惠後，最新一位登上時代雜誌封面的亞洲領導人。
中英譯全文：

［雜誌封面］
She Could Lead the Only Chinese Democracy
And that makes Beijing nervous
她將可能領導華人世界唯一的民主國家
這讓北京感到緊張

［目錄頁］
Cover Story: Championing Taiwan
Presidential front runner Tsai Ing-wen wants to put the island’s interests first
封面故事：壯大台灣
總統大選領先者蔡英文要將台灣利益置於優先

［內頁大標］
‘The Next President Of Taiwan’
That’s how Tsai Ing-wen refers to herself. But will the island’s voters agree?
台灣的下一任總統
蔡英文是這樣認為。但是這座島嶼的選民會同意嗎？

［內文］
Emily Rauhala / 台北報導 Adam Ferguson / 攝影
Tsai Ing-wen is making breakfast. The presidential candidate cracks five eggs and lets them bubble with bacon in the pan. She stacks slices of thick, white toast. It’s a recipe adapted from British chef Jamie Oliver, but the ingredients, she can’t help but say, are pure Taiwan. The meat comes courtesy of Happy Pig, a farm near her spare but tasteful Taipei apartment, the bread from a neighborhood bakery. She offers me an orange. “Organic,” she says, in English. “And local, of course.”
蔡英文正在做早餐。這位總統候選人打了五個蛋，和著平底鍋裡面的培根一起吱吱作響，再把一片片白色的厚片土司疊起來。料理手法學自英國名廚傑米奧利佛（Jamie Oliver），但是她忍不住要說，烹調食材屬於最純粹的台灣原料。培根來自「快樂豬」農場，距離她那簡單卻有品味的公寓不遠，而麵包是從她家附近的烘培坊買來的。她遞了一顆橘子給我，用英文跟我說：「有機的！當然也是在地的。」
This is not an average breakfast for the 58-year-old lawyer turned politician running to become Taiwan’s next President—most days she grabs a coffee and books it to the car. But it is, in many ways, oh so Tsai. The Taipei-raised, U.S.- and U.K.-educated former negotiator wrote her doctoral thesis on international trade law. As a minister, party chair and presidential candidate (she narrowly lost to two-term incumbent Ma Ying-jeou in the 2012 race), Tsai gained a reputation for being wonky—the type who likes to debate protectionism over early-morning sips of black coffee or oolong tea.
對於這位58歲、從律師轉變成政治人物的總統候選人來說，這可不是她平常吃的早餐。她通常隨手抓一杯咖啡在車上喝。不過許多方面來說，這應該可以算是一貫的「蔡式」風格。這位在臺北長大、在英美留學過的談判專家，博士論文寫的是國際貿易法。在她當陸委會主委、民進黨主席、總統候選人期間（她在2012年的總統大選中以些微差距輸給了馬英九總統），得到學院派的風評──她是那種喜歡在早上喝黑咖啡或烏龍茶時，跟你辯論保護主義的人。
Now, as the early front runner in Taiwan’s January 2016 presidential election, her vision for the island is proudly, defiantly, Taiwan-centric. Tsai says she would maintain the political status quo across the strait with China—essentially, both Taipei and Beijing agreeing to disagree as to which represents the one, true China, leaving the question of the island’s fate to the future. But Tsai wants to put Taiwan’s economy, development and culture first. While Ma and his government have pushed for new trade and tourism pacts with Beijing—China accounts for some 40% of Taiwan’s exports—Tsai aims to lessen the island’s dependence on the mainland by building global ties and championing local brands. “Taiwan needs a new model,” she tells TIME.
現在，身為在2016年台灣總統大選中的領先者，蔡英文的願景充滿自信又堅定地強調以台灣為核心。蔡英文說她會維持兩岸的現狀──這指的是說臺北與北京彼此同意對於何者代表中國保留不同的認知［註明：這是時代雜誌記者的見解］，並且把這個島嶼的命運留給未來決定。但，蔡英文想要將台灣的經濟、發展與文化置於首位。當馬英九和他的政府推動與中國的貿易及觀光協議時（中國占台灣出口的百分之四十），蔡英文希望加強與世界連結、扶植台灣品牌，以降低台灣對中國的依賴。她對時代雜誌說：「台灣需要一個新模式」。
Whether voters share her vision is a question that matters beyond Taipei. Taiwan is tiny, with a population of only 23 million, but its economy—powered by electronics, agriculture and tourism—ranks about mid-20s in the world by GDP size, with a GDP per capita about thrice that of China’s. Ceded by China’s Qing dynasty to Japan after the 1894–95 First Sino-Japanese War, colonized by Tokyo for half a century, then seized by Nationalist forces fleeing the Communists at the end of the Chinese civil war, Taiwan has long been a pawn in a regional great game. It is a linchpin for the U.S. in East Asia alongside Japan, South Korea and the Philippines, and, most important, it’s the only real democracy in the Chinese-speaking world. “This election matters because it’s a window into democracy rooted in Chinese tradition,” says Lung Ying-tai, an author and social commentator who recently stepped down as Culture Minister. “Because of Taiwan, the world is able to envision a different China.”
台灣的選民是否同意她的願景，是一件擴及台北以外的事情。台灣的土地雖小，只有兩千三百萬的人口，但是經濟因電子業，農業以及觀光業的支撐，以國內生產毛額來說在世界排名第二十幾名。台灣的國內人均產值則是中國的三倍。台灣在1894-95的中日戰爭被中國清朝割讓後，被日本殖民了半個世紀；之後在中國內戰結束時逃避共產黨的國民黨勢力給佔領。長期以來台灣是區域競爭中的一個棋子。在美國的東亞布局中，台灣、日本、南韓及菲律賓同為最關鍵的環節。更重要的是，台灣是在華語世界中唯一一個真正的民主國家。甫卸任文化部長的作者與社會評論員龍應台說：「這場選舉很重要，因為它提供了一個窗口，讓外界一探以中華文化為根基的民主……因為台灣，世界得以想像一個不一樣的中國。」
Taiwan’s politics irritate and befuddle Beijing. To the ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP), Taiwan is the province that got away, a living, breathing, voting reminder of what could happen to China if the CCP loosens its grip on its periphery, from Tibet to Xinjiang to Hong Kong. Beijing is particularly wary of a change in government from Ma’s relatively China-friendly Kuomintang (KMT) to Tsai’s firmly China-skeptic Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). When Tsai ran for President in 2012, Beijing blasted her, without actually naming her, as a “troublemaker” and “splittist”—CCP-speak reserved for Dalai Lama–level foes. “A DPP government means uncertainty for cross-strait ties,” says Lin Gang, a Taiwan specialist at Shanghai Jiao Tong University’s School of International and Public Affairs.
台灣的政治讓北京感到惱怒又百思不解。對中國共產黨來說，台灣是一個逃走的省，也是對中國活生生的提醒──若中國鬆懈對於香港、西藏及新疆等非核心地區的掌控時，可能會發生的事。北京對於台灣的政權，由對中國相對友善的馬政府輪替到對中國保持疑慮的民進黨，抱持格外戒慎的態度。蔡英文在2012年參選總統的時候，北京雖然沒有指名道姓，卻明顯對她大肆抨擊，說她是一個「麻煩製造者」或「分裂主義者」——在共產黨的術語中，這些話專門達賴喇嘛這一層級的仇敵。任教於上海交通大學國際與公共關係學院的台灣事務專家林岡說：「民進黨政府代表的是兩岸關係的不確定性。」
To the U.S., which is bound by the Taiwan Relations Act to come to the island’s aid if it’s attacked, Taiwan is a longtime friend and unofficial ally, though the strength of that friendship is being tested by China’s rise. Washington worries that Taiwan’s people, especially its youth, are growing warier of China, and that any conflict between the two might draw in the U.S. “What this election has done is crystallize the changes, the shift in public opinion,” says Shelley Rigger, a Taiwan scholar at Davidson College in North Carolina and the author of Why Taiwan Matters. “I don’t think cross-strait relations are going to be easy going forward, and that’s not something U.S. policymakers want to hear.”
對美國來說，根據《台灣關係法》，在台灣受到武力攻擊的情況下，須協防台灣。台灣是美國長期友邦和非正式盟國，儘管兩國之間友誼的強度正受到中國崛起的考驗。華府擔心台灣人民，特別是年輕人，對於中國的警戒心逐漸提高，而兩者之間的衝突可能會把美國牽扯進來。著有《台灣為何重要》（Why Taiwan Matters）一書的美國北卡羅來那州戴維森大學（Davidson College）教授任雪麗（Shelley Rigger）說：「這場選舉讓所有的改變具體化，反映出民意板塊的移動……我不認為接下來的兩岸關係會更融洽，而這不是美國的政策制定者想要聽到的東西。」
The KMT has yet to formally nominate a candidate for the top job, but the favorite is Hung Hsiu-chu, the legislature’s female deputy speaker. Nicknamed “little hot pepper” because of her diminutive stature and feisty manner, Hung, 67, would be a contrast to the more professorial Tsai should she get the KMT’s nod. “I don’t think [Tsai] is a strong opponent,” Hung tells TIME. Yet the DPP’s choice, who has already started pressing the flesh islandwide, is spirited too. “People have this vision of me as a conservative person, but I’m actually quite adventurous,” she says. And possessed of a sharp sense of humor—when I compliment her cooking, Tsai looks at me with mock exasperation: “I have a Ph.D., you know.”
國民黨雖然還未正式提名總統候選人，但目前最被看好的就是立法院副院長洪秀柱。因為身材嬌小與好戰性格而被封為「小辣椒」的洪秀柱（67歲），如果獲黨的提名，將與擁有學者形象的蔡英文，呈現顯著的對比。洪秀柱向時代記者表示：「我不認為蔡英文是一位強的對手」。然而，民進黨的候選人已經士氣高昂，在全台各地展開競選活動。蔡英文說：「有些人認為我是一個保守的人，但我其實是很愛冒險的」。她有一種犀利的幽默感──當我讚美她的廚藝時，她用搞笑的語氣假裝惱怒說：「我可是擁有博士學位的。」
Tsai grew up in a home on Taipei’s Zhongshan Road North, a street named after Taiwan’s symbolic father, Sun Yat-sen, the Chinese revolutionary who helped overthrow the Qing and co-founded the KMT. Her own father, an auto mechanic turned property developer, was of the Confucian kind: he encouraged her to study hard but also expected her, as the youngest daughter, to devote herself to his care. “I was not considered a kid that would be successful in my career,” says Tsai.
蔡英文在台北的中山北路長大，這條街是以革命推翻清朝、成立國民黨並視為國父的孫逸仙命名。她的父親是一位修車技師，後來成為土地開發商。他承襲了儒家思想，希望蔡英文要用功讀書，但也期許身為小女兒的蔡英文可以留在父親身邊照顧他。蔡英文說：「我小時候不是一個被認為未來會有成就的孩子。」
After attending university in Taiwan, she studied law at Cornell in New York because, she says, it seemed the place for a young woman who “wanted to have a revolutionary life.” From there she went to the London School of Economics, where she earned her Ph.D., also in law, in less than three years. “That pleased my father,” she says. When he called her home, she obliged, returning to Taiwan to teach and, in 1994, to enter government in a series of high-profile but mostly policy-oriented roles in the Fair Trade Commission, National Security Council and Mainland Affairs Council.
在台灣大學畢業後，她前往紐約州康乃爾大學研讀法律，因為她說，這是一個「想過革命性的生活」的年輕女子該去的地方。之後，她前往倫敦政治經濟學院攻讀法學博士，並且三年不到就獲得學位。她說：「這讓我父親很高興」。她遵從父親的意思返回台灣，先回大學教書並在1994年進入政府，出任公平交易委員會、國安會及陸委會等一系列重要的、政策導向的職位。
Even close supporters say Tsai was, and perhaps still is, an unlikely politician, especially for the DPP. Taiwan’s opposition party was forged in struggle and led by veterans of the democracy movement—a fight Tsai mostly missed. The Kaohsiung Incident in 1979—a human-rights rally that was violently broken up by security forces, galvanizing the democracy movement—took place while Tsai was overseas, cocooned in the ivory tower. If the archetypal DPP operative is a bare-knuckle street fighter, Tsai is an Olympic fencer—restrained and precise.
就連許多親近蔡英文的支持者都認為，蔡英文是一位非典型的政治人物，特別就民進黨而言。身為在野黨的民進黨，在台灣民主運動的奮鬥過程中焠煉而成，由民主運動的老兵所成立，這是一場蔡英文錯過的戰役。1979年高雄的美麗島事件，當一場人權遊行遭警政單位暴力驅散，而後來激勵了台灣的民主運動，蔡英文當時正在國外求學，受到象牙塔的庇護。若說民進黨的典型人物是赤手空拳的街頭鬥士，蔡英文則是一位奧林匹克級的劍術家：自我克制又精確到位。
She stepped into the spotlight in 2008, becoming party chair when the DPP found itself booted from office, with its chief Chen Shui-bian, the outgoing President, later convicted of corruption. While she possessed a deep knowledge of policy, Tsai did not then seem like a leader. “She used to sort of hide behind me when we went door to door,” recalls legislator Hsiao Bi-khim, a longtime colleague and friend. “People compared her to a lost bunny in the forest, with wolves surrounding, both from within the party and outside.
在2008年民進黨失去政權，而前總統陳水扁隨即遭貪汙罪起訴的時刻，蔡英文踏入了鎂光燈下，成為民進黨主席。雖然蔡英文對於政策擁有深度的瞭解，但當時她還不像一位領導人。長期以來是她同事與朋友的立法委員蕭美琴說「以前當我們挨家挨戶去拜訪時，她有點會躲在我身後」。「有些形容她為一個在森林裡迷路的兔子，被黨內與黨外的狼群包圍。」
After an unsuccessful 2010 mayoral bid, Tsai ran for, and also lost, the presidency in 2012. Jason Liu, a veteran DPP speechwriter, says now that the campaign did not “sell” Tsai well enough. The ideas were strong, but the delivery left “distance between her and the voters.” Ironically, it was not until her concession speech that Tsai seemed to connect emotionally with Taiwan’s citizens. “You may cry,” she told the tearful crowd. “But don’t lose heart.”
2010年，蔡英文參與市長選舉失利，在2012年也沒順利當選總統。民進黨資深文膽劉建忻表示，當時的競選總部對於「行銷」蔡英文這個概念，做得不夠好；雖然擁有許多好點子，但是執行上還是「讓選民感到有所距離」。諷刺地，一直到敗選感言，蔡英文才似乎與台灣人民產生情感上的連結。她對含著淚水的群眾表示：「你可以哭泣，但不能洩氣。」
A lot has changed since 2012. Eleven hours after making eggs, with a policy meeting, a cross-country train ride and a harbor tour behind her, Tsai is addressing a couple hundred students at a university in the southern city of Kaohsiung, a DPP stronghold. She’s in lecture mode, at ease, talking about her party’s economic plans: stronger regional links and a focus on innovation to support small businesses. “How many of you went to Taipei for the Sunflower protests?” she asks in Mandarin. At least a third raise their hands.
2012年之後的台灣，歷經了許多改變。蔡英文煎蛋後的11個小時後，歷經了一場政策會議、搭乘高鐵從北一路向南、緊接著進行高雄碼頭導覽。她抵達南台灣民進黨的重鎮高雄，向數百位大學生發表演說。她以一派輕鬆的授課模式，闡述著民進黨的經濟計畫：加強區域間的連結，並聚焦於支持創新的小型經濟。她用中文詢問在場學生「你們之中有多少人去台北參加過太陽花學運？」現場至少有三分之一的學生舉起了手。
Taiwan’s students were once seen as apathetic. But during spring last year, Taipei was swept up by thousands-strong demonstrations over a services pact with China. Student and civic groups worried that the deal could hurt Taiwan’s economy and leave it vulnerable to pressure from Beijing. They felt it was pushed through without adequate public scrutiny. The Sunflower Movement, as it came to be called after a florist donated bundles of the blooms, grew into a grassroots revolt, culminating in the March 18 storming of the legislature.
台灣的學生過去一度被視為相當冷漠。但是在去年的春天，台北市被數以千計的抗議者淹沒，反對與中國簽訂的服務貿易協議。學生與公民團體擔憂這個協議會傷害台灣經濟，讓台灣的經濟受制於中國壓力而變得脆弱。他們也認為，服貿協議的推動並沒有經過適當的公民審議。太陽花運動是民間累積的抗爭與不滿，在3月18日這天一舉衝進立法院，運動的稱號是由於抗爭期間一位花販捐贈了大量太陽花而因此命名。
The movement was grounded in questions of social justice. Since coming to power in 2008, Ma has argued that cross-strait commerce is the key to the island’s fortunes, signing 21 trade deals. Yet young people in particular wonder if the deals benefit only Big Business on both sides of the strait. They say rapprochement with Beijing has left them none the richer, and agonize over the high cost of housing, flat wages and the possibility of local jobs going to China. A sign during a protest outside the Presidential Palace on March 30 last year captured the mood: “We don’t have another Taiwan to sell.”
這個運動的主要訴求就是社會正義。自從國民黨2008年執政以來，簽訂了21個兩岸貿易協定，馬英九主張兩岸的商業往來是台灣最關鍵的財富來源。但是年輕人質疑這項論述，他們認為這些貿易協議只有兩岸的大財團獲利。他們說北京的和解政策並沒有讓年輕人變得富有，反而讓他們受困於高房價、停滯的薪資、以及在地工作機會可能流失到中國的可能性。在去年3月30日於總統府外的抗議中，有個標語最能捕捉整體的社會氛圍：「台灣只有一個，賣了就沒了！」
The emphasis on quality of life, and not just macro-indicators, is good news for Tsai. Her vision for a more economically independent Taiwan did not sway the electorate in 2012 but may now have stronger appeal. The KMT, bruised by the Sunflower protests and then battered by fed-up voters in midterm polls last fall, is trying to remake itself as a more populist party. Timothy Yang, a former Foreign Minister who is now vice president of the National Policy Foundation, the KMT’s think tank, says the party stands by its cross-strait record. But even Yang, a KMT stalwart, is keen to address the issue of equity: “The benefits of this interaction with mainland China should be shared with the general public.”
台灣社會對於生活品質的重視，而非僅僅強調宏觀經濟指標，對蔡英文來說是件好事。她希望打造一個經濟上更加獨立的台灣，雖然這個理念在2012年並沒有說動選民，但，現在可能更有吸引力。國民黨在太陽花運動中受到重創，在去年秋天的期中選舉中又再度被選民以選票教訓。現在，國民黨試圖把自己再造成一個民粹的政黨。目前擔任國民黨智庫『國家政策基金會』副董事長的前外交部長楊進添先生受訪時說道，「國民黨堅持其兩岸的立場」。但即便像楊進添這樣堅定的國民黨員，也熱衷於解決公平的議題。他說：「兩岸互動的利益，應該要與全民共享！」
Tsai should easily carry traditional DPP support: much of the south, the youth vote, and those who identify as Taiwanese and who are not a part of the elite that came from China after the CCP victory in 1949. The DPP’s missing link is Big Business, which supports the KMT and closer ties with the mainland, where many Taiwan companies are invested. Tsai recognizes that this is a constituency she needs to woo but doesn’t seem clear as to how, beyond saying, “Our challenge is to produce something that is sensible to both sides without being considered as a traitor to the friends we used to be with when we were an opposition party.”
蔡英文要得到傳統民進黨的支持並不難，例如南部選民、年輕選票、還有那些認同自己是台灣人，而不是1949年中國共產黨勝利後來自中國的精英份子。然而，民進黨缺乏與大企業的連結，因為台灣企業大量投資大陸，而其中這些大財團多半支持國民黨，以及與大陸建立更緊密的關係。蔡英文也理解到這是她必須要去吸引的一群選民，但是對於如何進行並沒有太清楚的圖像。她說：「我們的挑戰是要去創造雙方都認為合理的立場，又不能被我們在野時的朋友認為是叛徒。」
That will be hard. The KMT has long argued that it, not the DPP, is best qualified to run the economy, which, corruption apart, did not do well under Chen. Tsai’s supporters concede that many citizens feel the same way—that the DPP can be an effective opposition but not administration. “The KMT has always portrayed itself as more suited to guide the economy,” says J. Michael Cole, a Taipei-based senior fellow with the University of Nottingham’s China Policy Institute and a senior officer at Tsai’s Thinking Taiwan Foundation. “There’s this stubborn perception that a DPP government would be bad for business.”
這是困難的挑戰。國民黨長期主張自己比民進黨更擅長治理經濟，尤其陳水扁執政時期除了貪污，經濟表現並不好。蔡英文的支持者也同意，確實有些民眾認為民進黨可是一個稱職的反對黨，但不是執政黨。諾丁漢大學中國政策研究中心資深研究員暨小英基金會資深主管寇謐將（J. Michael Cole）說：「國民黨把自己描繪是一個更適合主導經濟的政黨。另外也有一種僵化的刻版印象，認為民進黨執政對企業不利。」
It’s a narrative that the CCP backs and may well float as the campaign progresses, either directly, in China’s state-controlled press, or indirectly, through, for instance, its connections in Taiwan’s business community. “Beijing is going to want to make a point through all sorts of channels, including Big Business, that cross-strait relations will not be as smooth if you vote a government into power that has not accepted the foundation that has underpinned developments of the last eight years,” says Alan Romberg, a distinguished fellow at the Stimson Center, a Washington, D.C., think tank.
這種論調受到中國共產黨的支持，並且今隨著選戰的進展不斷被拋出。共產黨可能直接地利用中國控制的媒體影響選舉，或是間接地透過中國與台灣商業界的連結。美國華府智庫史汀森研究中心（Stimson Center）資深學者容安瀾（Alan Romberg）說：「北京將會透過大企業等各種管道來闡述其立場，表明要是台灣人民讓一個不接受過去八年兩岸發展基礎的政府執政，兩岸關係的發展將不會如現在一樣平順。」
Beijing has never been receptive to a DPP government, but it is particularly negative now. Since coming to power in 2012, China’s leader Xi Jinping has proved himself to be more assertive and nationalistic than most expected, a man not eager to compromise. Last September he told a delegation from the island that China and Taiwan might be one day be reunited under Hong Kong’s “one country, two systems” formula, which is rejected by both the KMT and DPP and, surveys consistently show, the vast majority of Taiwan’s people. This May, Xi warned again about the danger of “separatist forces”—a comment widely interpreted as a swipe at the DPP.
北京對於民進黨政權的接受度向來不高，但現在尤其抱持負面的態度。中國領導人習近平在2012年掌權後，證明自己比外界想像的還更加武斷，帶有更強烈的民族主義色彩，是一個不輕易妥協的人。去年九月，他對一個來自台灣的代表團說，中國和台灣可望採用香港「一國兩制」的模式統一，然而這卻是一個國民黨和民進黨都反對的方案，而且民調也一再顯示，絕大多數的台灣人民無法接受。今年五月，習近平再度警告「分裂主義勢力」會帶來的危險──這段說詞普遍被外界詮釋為對民進黨的抨擊。
Cross-strait relations are managed according to the so-called 1992 Consensus reached by Beijing and Taipei (then also governed by the KMT), a formula the KMT’s Yang calls “a masterpiece of ambiguity.” Under the 1992 Consensus, both sides acknowledge that there is only one China, but without specifying what exactly that means. This, Yang says, has allowed the KMT to move forward on bilateral trade, transport and tourism without being forced to address whether “one China” is the China imagined by Beijing or by Taipei.
兩岸關係是治理目前根據北京和台北（當時為國民黨執政）之間所謂的九二共識，這是一個被國民黨的楊進添形容為「模糊性的一大鉅作」的政策。根據九二共識，雙方承認只有一個中國，但不表明一個中國的確切意含。楊進添說，這讓國民黨在推展雙邊貿易、交通和觀光方面得以取得進展，而不需被迫去回答「一個中國」究竟是北京或是台北心目中的中國。
The DPP has long promoted de jure independence. The first clause in its charter calls for “the establishment of an independent sovereignty known as the Republic of Taiwan,” not the Republic of China, Taiwan’s official name. This platform resonates with the DPP base but is increasingly untenable given China’s economic clout and growing power on the world stage. While the first DPP presidency under Chen was hardly a break from the past, it did see a cooling with Beijing. Things warmed again under Ma. Lin, the Taiwan expert at Shanghai Jiao Tong University, says Tsai is somewhere between Chen and Ma: “If she wins the election, she will not pursue Taiwan independence. But she will not promote the development of the cross-strait relationship as Ma Ying-jeou did.”
民進黨過去長期以來推動台灣的法理獨立。民進黨黨綱第一條闡明「建立主權獨立自主的台灣共和國」，而非台灣的正式國號中華民國。這個立場獲得民進黨基本盤的認同，卻在中國的經濟實力成長與中國在世界舞台上崛起之下，越來越無法實現。儘管陳水扁主政時期的民進黨政府跟過去的政策並無太大差別，但跟北京的關係確實趨向冷淡。馬英九主政時期兩岸關係再度暖化。上海交通大學的台灣專家林岡說，蔡英文的立場介於馬英九和陳水扁之間。他說：「如果她勝選，她不會追求台灣獨立。但她也不會像馬英九一樣推動兩岸關係的發展。」
Tsai stresses that she will not alter the politics between Taiwan and China, but she is vague about whether she will repeal the DPP’s independence clause. And unification? That, she says, “is something you have to resolve　democratically—it is a decision to be made by the people here.”
蔡英文強調她不會改變台灣和中國之間的政治關係，但對於是否撤回台獨條文卻是依然維持模糊。至於統一呢？她說：「那是必須經由民主程序解決的事情——這是一個必須經由此地的人民來做的決定。」
Hung, Tsai’s potential KMT opponent, says the DPP flag bearer needs to clarify her stance on cross-strait relations. “People ask her, ‘What is the status quo?’ and she can’t say anything specific,” says Hung. The KMT’s Yang offers a metaphor: “Before you harvest, you have to plow the land, transplant the seedlings, fertilize; all the work … has been done by the KMT, and yet they are going to harvest the crop?”
蔡英文的濳在對手洪秀柱說，民進黨的掌舵手需要清楚地闡明她對兩岸關係的立場。洪秀柱說：「大家問她『維持現狀是什麼意思？』，她卻沒有給具體的回應。」國民黨的楊進添用一個比喻：「在收割之前，要先耕地、播種、施肥；所有的工作……都已經被國民黨完成了，然而他們現在卻想要收割？」
Tsai believes she will win that right. Several days before I return to my Beijing base, over Taiwan-Japanese fusion in Kaohsiung, Tsai is quietly confident that she will gain the trust of Taiwan’s voters and secure victory, whatever Beijing might think. She puts a final piece of tuna on my plate. It’s from Pingtung County in the south, where she was born. “Go back to Beijing,” says Tsai, “and tell them you were served by the next President of Taiwan.”
—With reporting by Zoher Abdoolcarim, Gladys Tsai and Natalie Tso/Taipei
蔡英文相信她會贏得這項權利。在我返回北京駐點的前幾天，我們在一家位於高雄的台式日本料理小店用餐，蔡英文對於取得台灣選民的信任並贏得選戰，展現出低調的自信。當時，她把最後一片鮪魚夾到我的盤子上。那塊鮪魚來自南方的屏東，她的出生地。「妳回北京以後，告訴他們，」蔡英文說：「台灣的下一任總統曾經為妳服務過。」
延伸報導： Abdoolcarim, Gladys Tsai, Natalie Tso
2

你們覺得弟弟去哪了？ 歡迎在下面留言！
Where do you think Raymond went? Leave a comment below!

很多人留言想知道本家診所：

👉Boston Family Dental
https://goo.gl/maps/vgtTGB4WsJvjr4ry5

FAQ:

Q: How old are you? A: 24
Q: Where are you from? A: Half American Half Taiwanese (currently in USA)
Q: My major? A: Graduated with BA in Film

問：你幾歲？答：二十四，準備幹大事
問：你來自哪裡？答：台灣美國混血寶寶
問：你畢業的系？答：電影學士學位