關於 when is constitution day 2020 ，我們在網路上蒐集到這些相關的討論、資訊與評價

【Joshua Wong speaking to the Italian Senate】#意大利國會研討會演說 —— 呼籲世界在大學保衛戰一週年後與香港人站在同一陣線

中文、意大利文演說全文：https://www.patreon.com/posts/44167118

感謝開創未來基金會（Fondazione Farefuturo）邀請，讓我透過視像方式在意大利國會裡舉辦的研討會發言，呼籲世界繼續關注香港，與香港人站在同一陣線。

意大利作為絕無僅有參與一帶一路發展的國家，理應對中共打壓有更全面的理解，如今正值大學保衛戰一週年，以致大搜捕的時刻，當打壓更為嚴峻，香港更需要世界與我們同行。

為了讓各地朋友也能更了解香港狀況，我已在Patreon發佈當天演說的中文、英文和意大利文發言稿，盼望在如此困難的時勢裡，繼續讓世界知道我們未曾心息的反抗意志。

【The Value of Freedom: Burning Questions for Hong Kongers】

Good morning. I have the privilege today to share some of my thoughts and reflections about freedom, after taking part in social activism for eight years in Hong Kong. A movement calling for the withdrawal of the extradition law starting from last year had escalated into a demand for democracy and freedom. This city used to be prestigious for being the world’s most liberal economy, but now the infamous authoritarian government took away our freedom to election, freedom of assembly, freedom of expression and ideas.

Sometimes, we cannot avoid questioning the cause we are fighting for, the value of freedom. Despite a rather bleak prospect, why do we have to continue in this struggle? Why do we have to cherish freedom? What can we do to safeguard freedom at home and stay alert to attacks on freedom? In answering these questions, I hope to walk through three episodes in the previous year.

Turning to 2020, protests are not seen as frequently as they used to be on the media lens, partly because of the pandemic, but more importantly for the authoritarian rule. While the world is busy fighting the pandemic, our government took advantage of the virus to exert a tighter grip over our freedom. Putting the emergency laws in place, public assemblies in Hong Kong were banned. Most recently, a rally to support press freedom organized by journalists was also forbidden. While many people may ask if it is the end of street activism, ahead of us in the fight for freedom is another battleground: the court and the prison.

Freedom Fighters in Courtrooms and in Jail

Part of the huge cost incurred in the fight for freedom and democracy in Hong Kong is the increasing judicial casualties. As of today, more than 10 thousand people have been arrested since the movement broke out, more than a hundred of them are already locked up in prison. Among the 2,300 protestors who are prosecuted, 700 of them may be sentenced up to ten years for rioting charges.

Putting these figures into context, I wish to tell you what life is like, as a youngster in today’s Hong Kong. I was humbled by a lot of younger protestors and students whose exceptional maturity are demonstrated in courtrooms and in prison. What is thought to be normal university life is completely out of the question because very likely the neighbour next door or the roommate who cooked you lunch today will be thrown to jail on the next.

I do prison visits a few times a month to talk to activists who are facing criminal charges or serving sentences for their involvement in the movement. It is not just a routine of my political work, but it becomes my life as an activist. Since the movement, prison visits has also become the daily lives of many families.

But it is always an unpleasant experience passing through the iron gates one after one to enter the visitors’ room, speaking to someone who is deprived of liberty, for a selflessly noble cause. As an activist serving three brief jail terms, I understand that the banality of the four walls is not the most difficult to endure in jail. What is more unbearable is the control of thought and ideas in every single part of our daily routine enforced by the prison system. It will diminish your ability to think critically and the worst of it will persuade you to give up on what you are fighting for, if you have not prepared it well. Three years ago when I wrote on the first page of prison letters, which later turned into a publication called the ‘Unfree Speech’, I was alarmed at the environment of the prison cell. Those letters were written in a state in which freedom was deprived of and in which censorship was obvious. It brings us to question ourselves: other than physical constraints like prison bars, what makes us continue in the fight for freedom and democracy?

Mutual Support to activists behind-the-scene

The support for this movement is undiminished over these 17 months. There are many beautiful parts in the movement that continue to revitalise the ways we contribute to this city, instead of making money on our own in the so-called global financial centre. In particular, it is the fraternity, the mutual assistance among protestors that I cherished the most.

As more protestors are arrested, people offer help and assistance wholeheartedly -- we sit in court hearings even if we don’t know each other, and do frequent prison visits and write letters to protesters in detention. In major festivals and holidays, people gathered outside the prison to chant slogans so that they won’t feel alone and disconnected. This is the most touching part to me for I also experienced life in jail.

The cohesion, the connection and bonding among protestors are the cornerstone to the movement. At the same time, these virtues gave so much empowerment to the mass public who might not be able to fight bravely in the escalating protests. These scenes are not able to be captured by cameras, but I’m sure it is some of the most important parts of Hong Kong’s movement that I hope the world will remember.

I believe this mutual support transcends nationality or territory because the value of freedom does not alter in different places. More recently, Twelve Hongkong activists, all involved in the movement last year, were kidnapped by China’s coastal guard when fleeing to Taiwan for political refugee in late-August. All of them are now detained secretly in China, with the youngest aged only 16. We suspect they are under torture during detention and we call for help on the international level, putting up #SAVE12 campaign on twitter. In fact, how surprising it is to see people all over the world standing with the dozen detained protestors for the same cause. I’m moved by activists in Italy, who barely knew these Hong Kong activists, even took part in a hunger strike last month calling for immediate release of them. This form of interconnectivity keeps us in spirit and to continue our struggle to freedom and democracy.

Understanding Value of freedom in the university battle
A year ago on this day, Hong Kong was embroiled in burning clashes as the police besieged the Polytechnic University. It was a day we will not forget and this wound is still bleeding in the hearts of many Hong Kongers. A journalist stationed in the university at that time once told me that being at the scene could only remind him of the Tiananmen Square Massacre 31 years ago in Beijing. There was basically no exit except going for the dangerous sewage drains.

That day, thousands of people, old or young, flocked to districts close to the university before dawn, trying to rescue protestors trapped inside the campus. The reinforcements faced grave danger too, for police raided every corner of the small streets and alleys, arresting a lot of them. Among the 800+ arrested on a single day, 213 people were charged with rioting. For sure these people know there will be repercussions. It is the conscience driving them to take to the streets regardless of the danger, the conscience that we should stand up to brutality and authoritarianism, and ultimately to fight for freedoms that are guaranteed in our constitution. As my dear friend, Brian Leung once said, ‘’Hong Kong Belongs to Everyone Who Shares Its Pain’’. I believe the value of freedom is exemplified through our compassion to whom we love, so much that we are willing to sacrifice the freedom of our own.

Defending freedom behind the bars

No doubt there is a terrible price to pay in standing up to the Beijing and Hong Kong government. But after serving a few brief jail sentences and facing the continuing threat of harassment, I learnt to cherish the freedom I have for now, and I shall devote every bit what I have to strive for the freedom of those who have been ruthlessly denied.

The three episodes I shared with you today -- the courtroom, visiting prisoners and the battle of university continue to remind me of the fact that the fight for freedom has not ended yet. In the coming months, I will be facing a maximum of 5 years in jail for unauthorized assembly and up to one ridiculous year for wearing a mask in protest. But prison bars would never stop me from activism and thinking critically.

I only wish that during my absence, you can continue to stand with the people of Hong Kong, by following closely to the development, no matter the ill-fated election, the large-scale arrest under National Security Law or the twelve activists in China. To defy the greatest human rights abusers is the essential way to restore democracy of our generation, and the generation following us.

．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．．
💪小額支持我的獨家分析及文章：https://bit.ly/joshuawonghk
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一篇在西雅圖感染新冠肺炎病毒的美國人所寫的個人經歷。
Elizabeth Schneider, a 37-year-old marketing manager who lives in Seattle, told KSAT that she contracted the virus at a small house party on Feb. 22. Nobody felt ill at the time, but 40% of the attendees became sick within a few days.

"I had COVID-19 and here is my story. I made this post public out of several requests from my friends who asked me to share. I hope it gives you some good information and peace of mind!
我感染了新冠病毒（武漢肺炎），由於不少我身邊朋友的請托，希望我可以跟大家分享我的情況，所以我決定把我的染病的經驗公開，讓大家可以有更多的了解。

First how easily you can get it. I believe I caught it when attending a small house party at which no one was coughing, sneezing or otherwise displaying any symptoms of illness. It appears that 40% of the attendees of this party ended up sick. The media tells you to wash your hands and avoid anyone with symptoms. I did. There is no way to avoid catching this except avoiding all other humans. 40% of folks were all sick within 3 days of attending the party all with the same/similar symptoms including fever.
首先對於新冠病毒，它比你想像的更容易被感染. 我確信我是在參加一個小型家庭聚會時被感染的。當時參加的客人沒有人咳嗽、打噴嚏，或者顯現出任何生病的症狀。結果呢？約40%參加聚會的人都被感染了！媒體上所說的要勤洗手避免跟有症狀的人接觸，我都照做了. 我覺得沒有任何方式可以避免被感染，除非你完全避免跟人群接觸。40% 被感染者都是在參加聚會後三天之內就發病，他們都有著相同的症狀，包含發燒.

Second, the symptoms appear to be different depending on your constitution and/or age. Most of my friends who got it were in their late 40s to early 50s. I’m in my mid 30s. For us it was headache, fever (for first 3 days consistently and then on and off after 3 days), severe body aches and joint pain, and severe fatigue. I had a fever that spiked the first night to 103 degrees and eventually came down to 100 and then low grade 99.5. Some folks had diarrhea.
其次，這些症狀因人而異，因每個人的身體狀況及年齡而有所不同。大部分受感染的朋友年齡層約在40到50歲左右，而我是30幾歲。對我們來說染病的初始症狀是頭痛，發燒（最初三天是持續高燒而後三天是間歇性高燒），身體的劇烈疼痛以及關節疼痛，而且有強烈的四肢無力與倦怠感。在我感染的第一個晚上高燒到103度，隨後下降到100度、99.5度.有些朋友則有腹瀉的症狀。

I felt nauseous one day. Once the fever is gone some were left with nasal congestion, sore throat. Only a very few of us had a mild itchy cough. Very few had chest tightness or other respiratory symptoms. Total duration of illness was 10-16 days.
有一天我覺得想嘔吐。當發燒症狀消退後，鼻塞、喉嚨痛的症狀則持續，僅僅極少數的人感到輕微的喉頭搔癢的乾咳。只有幾個人感到胸口鬱悶感及其他的呼吸道感染徵狀。整個發病期約持續10-16天。

The main issue is that without reporting a cough or trouble breathing many of us were refused testing. I got tested through the Seattle Flu Study. This is a RESEARCH study here in Seattle and they have been testing volunteers for strains of the flu to study transmission within the community. A few weeks ago, they started to test a random subset of samples for COVID-19 infection. They sent my sample to the King County Public Health Department for confirmation; however, I was told that all of the samples that have tested positive in the research study have been confirmed by Public Health.
問題的癥結點在於很多人在沒有咳嗽或呼吸困難的症狀時，都傾向於不需要(或不認為必須)接受武漢肺炎測試。我是透過一個叫做西雅圖流感研究的機構所做的測試。這是一個位於西雅圖的研究機構，它們透過對志願者的檢測，來研究流感病毒類型與社區傳播。幾週前這個機構開始對志願者提供新冠肺炎病毒做隨機抽樣檢測。它們把我的初測到的陽性樣本送到國王郡的公共衛生部門去做感染病毒的確認。隨後我被通知連同我在內所有陽性反應的檢測人，都被確認是感染了新冠肺炎的病毒。

As of Monday March 9th, it has been 13 days since my symptoms started and more than 72 hours since my fever subsided. The King County Public Health Department is recommending you stay isolated for 7 days after the start of symptoms or 72 hours after your fever subsides. I have surpassed both deadlines so I am no longer isolating myself however I am avoiding strenuous activity and large crowds and I obviously will not come near you if I see you in public. I was not hospitalized. Not every country is hospitalizing everyone with a COVID-19 infection and in my case, and in many other cases, I didn’t even go to the doctor because I was recovering on my own and felt it was just a nasty flu strain different from the ones I have been protected from with this season’s flu vaccine.
從最初感到症狀到昨天3/9為止，已經過了13天，發燒症狀消退已經過了72小時(3天)。國王郡的公衛部門建議感染者在有感染的症狀出現後，做至少7天的自我的居家隔離。在發燒症狀消退後的72小時內，也應居家隔離，避免接觸公眾。目前我已經度過了這兩個期限，所以我不再自我居家隔離，於此同時，我還是避免過度參與公眾活動與接觸大批人群。我並沒有住院，也不是所有感染新冠肺炎病毒的人都住進郡立醫院。很多跟我一樣的感染者，並沒有去看醫生，就自我痊癒了。對我們來說，這感覺就像一個比以往流行型感冒稍微嚴重一點的新型流感，與我所接種而受到保護的流感疫苗，略為不同。

I also truly believe the lack of testing is leading to folks believing that they just have a cold or something else going out into public and spreading it. And worse folks with no symptoms are also spreading it as in the case of a person attending a party or social gathering who has no symptoms.
我確信缺乏對新冠病毒檢測的機制是造成多數人相信他們只是感染風寒或一般正在傳播的季節性流感而已。最糟的情況是，很多人在沒有顯現任何症狀的情況下，仍舊正常參加集會活動或正常社交聚會，而將病毒傳播出去。

I know some folks are thinking that this can’t/won’t impact them. I hope it doesn’t but I believe that the overall lack of early and pervasive testing damaged the public’s ability to avoid the illness here in Seattle. All I know is that Seattle has been severely impacted and although I’m better now I would not wish this very uncomfortable illness on anyone.
我知道很多人認為這款病毒不會傳染給他們。我真心希望真的是如此，但是我仍舊相信整體上缺乏早期的發現與預防性檢測，將會嚴重影響到西雅圖地區公眾對新冠肺炎的抵抗能力。 目前已知的情況是西雅圖地區已經有嚴重的疫情，雖然我已經痊癒，但是我真的不希望這樣的病情發生在其他更多人身上。

One thing that I believe may have saved me from getting worse respiratory symptoms is the fact that I consistently took Sudafed, used Afrin nasal spray (3 sprays in each nostril, 3 days at a time and then 3 days off), and used a Neti pot (with purified water). This could have kept my sinuses clear and prevented the symptoms from spreading to my lungs. This is not medical advice: I’m simply sharing what I did and correlating it with the fact that I had no respiratory symptoms. The two could be entirely unrelated based on the viral strain and viral load that I received.

我想我做了一件正確的選擇，讓我呼吸系統感染的症狀不致於變得更嚴重，就是我按時服用 Sudafed (一種藥方販售，不需處方的感冒退燒藥)，Afrin 鼻腔噴劑 以及使用清鼻腔咽喉分泌物的Neti Pot 。這些措施保持我的鼻腔咽喉乾淨，從而防堵病毒向下蔓延到我的肺部。我不是在這裡提供醫療建議，只是單純的分享我個人的經驗，因為我並沒有肺部的感染。也許我所做的跟肺部感染並無相關性。而是跟我所感染的病毒特性與病毒感染量有關。

I hope this information helps someone avoid getting sick and/or push to get tested sooner rather than later so you know to isolate before it gets worse or to get medical care if you have respiratory distress. Hand washing doesn’t guarantee you won’t get sick, especially when folks without symptoms are contagious and could be standing right next to you in any given social situation. You more likely than not will not die, but do you want to risk spreading it to a loved one over 60 or someone with an immunity issue? Stay healthy folks!

我希望我所分享的資訊，能幫助大家避免受到感染，或者推動整個公眾檢測系統能更快啟動讓感染者能早期自我隔離，而有呼吸道症候群感染疑慮者，能早期接受治療。洗手並無法完全避免受到感染。尤其那些沒有任何徵兆的帶原傳播者，可能正是你身邊普通社交場合出現的人們。感染病毒後不一定會致死。但是你也不會想不小心傳播病毒給你身邊所關心的年長者，或者有免疫系統功能失調的親友們。大家保重。"

https://www.click2houston.com/health/2020/03/11/i-had-covid-19-and-heres-my-story-woman-shares-details-of-coronavirus-experience/

【 黎安友專文 l 中國如何看待香港危機 】

美國哥倫比亞大學的資深中國通黎安友（Andrew Nathan）教授最近在《外交事務》（Foreign Affairs）雜誌的專文，值得一看。

黎安友是台灣許多中國研究學者的前輩級老師，小英總統去哥大演講時，正是他積極促成。小英在美國的僑宴，黎安友也是座上賓。

這篇文章的標題是：「中國如何看待香港危機：北京自我克制背後的真正原因」。

文章很長，而且用英文寫，需要花點時間閱讀。大家有空可以看看。

Andrew這篇文章的立論基礎，是來自北京核心圈的匿名說法。以他在學術界的地位，我相信他對消息來源已經做了足夠的事實查核或確認。

這篇文章，是在回答一個疑問：中共為何在香港事件如此自制？有人說是怕西方譴責，有人說是怕損害香港的金融地位。

都不是。這篇文章認為，上述兩者都不是中共的真實顧慮。

無論你多痛恨中共，你都必須真實面對你的敵人。

中共是搞經濟階級鬥爭起家的，當年用階級鬥爭打敗國民黨。而現在，中共正用這樣的思維處理香港議題。

文章有一句話：“China’s response has been rooted not in anxiety but in confidence.” 這句話道盡階級鬥爭的精髓。

中共一點都不焦慮。相反地，中共很有自信，香港的菁英階級及既得利益的收編群體，到最後會支持中共。

這個分化的心理基礎，來自經濟上的利益。

文中還提到，鄧小平當年給香港五十年的一國兩制，就是為了「給香港足夠的時間適應中共的政治系統」。

1997年，香港的GDP佔中國的18%。2018年，這個比例降到2.8%。

今日的香港經濟，在中共的評估，是香港需要中國，而不是中國需要香港。

中共正在在意的，是香港的高房價問題。香港的房價，在過去十年內三倍翻漲。

文章是這樣描述：
“Housing prices have tripled over the past decade; today, the median price of a house is more than 20 times the median gross annual household income. The median rent has increased by nearly 25 percent in the past six years. As many as 250,000 people are waiting for public housing. At the same time, income growth for many Hong Kong residents has fallen below the overall increase in cost of living.”

無論你同不同意這些說法，都請你試圖客觀地看看這篇文章。

有趣的是，黎安友在文章中部分論點引述了他的消息來源（但他並沒有加上個人評論），部分是他自己的觀察。

#護台胖犬劉仕傑
Instagram: old_dog_chasing_ball

新書：《 我在外交部工作 》

**

黎安友原文：

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-09-30/how-china-sees-hong-kong-crisis?fbclid=IwAR2PwHns5gWrw0fT0sa5LuO8zgv4PhLmkYfegtBgoOMCD3WJFI3w5NTe0S4

How China Sees the Hong Kong Crisis
The Real Reasons Behind Beijing’s Restraint

By Andrew J. Nathan September 30, 2019

Massive and sometimes violent protests have rocked Hong Kong for over 100 days. Demonstrators have put forward five demands, of which the most radical is a call for free, direct elections of Hong Kong’s chief executive and all members of the territory’s legislature: in other words, a fully democratic system of local rule, one not controlled by Beijing. As this brazen challenge to Chinese sovereignty has played out, Beijing has made a show of amassing paramilitary forces just across the border in Shenzhen. So far, however, China has not deployed force to quell the unrest and top Chinese leaders have refrained from making public threats to do so.

Western observers who remember the violent crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators in Tiananmen Square 30 years ago have been puzzled by Beijing’s forbearance. Some have attributed Beijing’s restraint to a fear of Western condemnation if China uses force. Others have pointed to Beijing’s concern that a crackdown would damage Hong Kong’s role as a financial center for China.

But according to two Chinese scholars who have connections to regime insiders and who requested anonymity to discuss the thinking of policymakers in Beijing, China’s response has been rooted not in anxiety but in confidence. Beijing is convinced that Hong Kong’s elites and a substantial part of the public do not support the demonstrators and that what truly ails the territory are economic problems rather than political ones—in particular, a combination of stagnant incomes and rising rents. Beijing also believes that, despite the appearance of disorder, its grip on Hong Kong society remains firm. The Chinese Communist Party has long cultivated the territory’s business elites (the so-called tycoons) by offering them favorable economic access to the mainland. The party also maintains a long-standing loyal cadre of underground members in the territory. And China has forged ties with the Hong Kong labor movement and some sections of its criminal underground. Finally, Beijing believes that many ordinary citizens are fearful of change and tired of the disruption caused by the demonstrations.

Beijing therefore thinks that its local allies will stand firm and that the demonstrations will gradually lose public support and eventually die out. As the demonstrations shrink, some frustrated activists will engage in further violence, and that in turn will accelerate the movement’s decline. Meanwhile, Beijing is turning its attention to economic development projects that it believes will address some of the underlying grievances that led many people to take to the streets in the first place.

This view of the situation is held by those at the very top of the regime in Beijing, as evidenced by recent remarks made by Chinese President Xi Jinping, some of which have not been previously reported. In a speech Xi delivered in early September to a new class of rising political stars at the Central Party School in Beijing, he rejected the suggestion of some officials that China should declare a state of emergency in Hong Kong and send in the People’s Liberation Army. “That would be going down a political road of no return,” Xi said. “The central government will exercise the most patience and restraint and allow the [regional government] and the local police force to resolve the crisis.” In separate remarks that Xi made around the same time, he spelled out what he sees as the proper way to proceed: “Economic development is the only golden key to resolving all sorts of problems facing Hong Kong today.”

ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS, MANY QUESTIONS

Chinese decision-makers are hardly surprised that Hong Kong is chafing under their rule. Beijing believes it has treated Hong Kong with a light hand and has supported the territory’s economy in many ways, especially by granting it special access to the mainland’s stocks and currency markets, exempting it from the taxes and fees that other Chinese provinces and municipalities pay the central government, and guaranteeing a reliable supply of water, electricity, gas, and food. Even so, Beijing considers disaffection among Hong Kong’s residents a natural outgrowth of the territory’s colonial British past and also a result of the continuing influence of Western values. Indeed, during the 1984 negotiations between China and the United Kingdom over Hong Kong’s future, the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping suggested following the approach of “one country, two systems” for 50 years precisely to give people in Hong Kong plenty of time to get used to the Chinese political system.

But “one country, two systems” was never intended to result in Hong Kong spinning out of China’s control. Under the Basic Law that China crafted as Hong Kong’s “mini-constitution,” Beijing retained the right to prevent any challenge to what it considered its core security interests. The law empowered Beijing to determine if and when Hong Kongers could directly elect the territory’s leadership, allowed Beijing to veto laws passed by the Hong Kong Legislative Council, and granted China the right to make final interpretations of the Basic Law. And there would be no question about who had a monopoly of force. During the negotiations with the United Kingdom, Deng publicly rebuked a top Chinese defense official—General Geng Biao, who at the time was a patron of a rising young official named Xi Jinping—for suggesting that there might not be any need to put troops in Hong Kong. Deng insisted that a Chinese garrison was necessary to symbolize Chinese sovereignty.

Statements made by U.S. politicians in support of the recent demonstrations only confirm Beijing’s belief that Washington seeks to inflame radical sentiments in Hong Kong.

At first, Hong Kongers seemed to accept their new role as citizens of a rising China. In 1997, in a tracking poll of Hong Kong residents regularly conducted by researchers at the University of Hong Kong, 47 percent of respondents identified themselves as “proud” citizens of China. But things went downhill from there. In 2012, the Hong Kong government tried to introduce “patriotic education” in elementary and middle schools, but the proposed curriculum ran into a storm of local opposition and had to be withdrawn. In 2014, the 79-day Umbrella Movement brought hundreds of thousands of citizens into the streets to protest Beijing’s refusal to allow direct elections for the chief executive. And as authoritarianism has intensified under Xi’s rule, events such as the 2015 kidnapping of five Hong Kong–based publishers to stand trial in the mainland further soured Hong Kong opinion. By this past June, only 27 percent of respondents to the tracking poll described themselves as “proud” to be citizens of China. This year’s demonstrations started as a protest against a proposed law that would have allowed Hong Kongers suspected of criminal wrongdoing to be extradited to the mainland but then developed into a broad-based expression of discontent over the lack of democratic accountability, police brutality, and, most fundamentally, what was perceived as a mainland assault on Hong Kong’s unique identity.

Still, Chinese leaders do not blame themselves for these shifts in public opinion. Rather, they believe that Western powers, especially the United States, have sought to drive a wedge between Hong Kong and the mainland. Statements made by U.S. politicians in support of the recent demonstrations only confirm Beijing’s belief that Washington seeks to inflame radical sentiments in Hong Kong. As Xi explained in his speech in September:
As extreme elements in Hong Kong turn more and more violent, Western forces, especially the United States, have been increasingly open in their involvement. Some extreme anti-China forces in the United States are trying to turn Hong Kong into the battleground for U.S.-Chinese rivalry…. They want to turn Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy into de facto independence, with the ultimate objective to contain China's rise and prevent the revival of the great Chinese nation.

Chinese leaders do not fear that a crackdown on Hong Kong would inspire Western antagonism. Rather, they take such antagonism as a preexisting reality—one that goes a long way toward explaining why the disorder in Hong Kong broke out in the first place. In Beijing’s eyes, Western hostility is rooted in the mere fact of China’s rise, and thus there is no use in tailoring China’s Hong Kong strategy to influence how Western powers would respond.

IT’S NOT ABOUT THE BENJAMINS

The view that Xi has not deployed troops because of Hong Kong’s economic importance to the mainland is also misguided, and relies on an outdated view of the balance of economic power. In 1997, Hong Kong’s GDP was equivalent to 18 percent of the mainland’s. Most of China’s foreign trade was conducted through Hong Kong, providing China with badly needed hard currencies. Chinese companies raised most of their capital on the Hong Kong stock exchange. Today, things are vastly different. In 2018, Hong Kong’s GDP was equal to only 2.7 percent of the mainland’s. Shenzhen alone has overtaken Hong Kong in terms of GDP. Less than 12 percent of China’s exports now flow through Hong Kong. The combined market value of China’s domestic stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen far surpasses that of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, and Chinese companies can also list in Frankfurt, London, New York, and elsewhere.

Although Hong Kong remains the largest offshore clearing center for renminbi, that role could easily be filled by London or Singapore, if Chinese leaders so desired.
Investment flowing into and out of China still tends to pass through financial holding vehicles set up in Hong Kong, in order to benefit from the region’s legal protections. But China’s new foreign investment law (which will take effect on January 1, 2020) and other recent policy changes mean that such investment will soon be able to bypass Hong Kong. And although Hong Kong remains the largest offshore clearing center for renminbi, that role could easily be filled by London or Singapore, if Chinese leaders so desired.

Wrecking Hong Kong’s economy by using military force to impose emergency rule would not be a good thing for China. But the negative effect on the mainland’s prosperity would not be strong enough to prevent Beijing from doing whatever it believes is necessary to maintain control over the territory.

CAN’T BUY ME LOVE?

As it waits out the current crisis, Beijing has already started tackling the economic problems that it believes are the source of much of the anger among Hong Kongers. Housing prices have tripled over the past decade; today, the median price of a house is more than 20 times the median gross annual household income. The median rent has increased by nearly 25 percent in the past six years. As many as 250,000 people are waiting for public housing. At the same time, income growth for many Hong Kong residents has fallen below the overall increase in cost of living.